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ABSTRACT 
The thesis considers the p a r a l l e l critiques of the notion of 
poesis as a mode of subjective power of self-determination i n 
P.B. Shelley and Maurice Blanchot. I t explores the terms i n 
which, i n the romantic-idealist tradition, the work of a r t i s 
valorised as the r e a l i s a t i o n of the subject's access to 
s p i r i t u a l significance. 
The thesis traces one of the sources of Blanchot 1 s notion of 
"modern l i t e r a t u r e ' to his understanding of romanticism. I t 
describes the ways i n which Blanchot' s notion of the non-
romantic essence of romanticism deconstructs the romantic-
i d e a l i s t model of the work of l i t e r a t u r e as a mode of subjective 
s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n . Blanchot focuses on the f a c t that the presence 
of the critique of t h i s model within the romantic/idealist 
theorization of the work of l i t e r a t u r e turns l i t e r a t u r e into a 
self-questioning, rather than a s e l f - r e a l i z i n g structure. The 
i d e a l i s t framework offers a notion of absolute reflection which 
si g n i f i c a n t l y extends the model/figure of the autonomous 
subject. The thesis w i l l argue that, on the evidence of some of 
Shelley's prose fragments, the empiricist and sceptical heritage 
of Shelley' s conception of the mind draws him away from 
subscribing to such a model, and ultimately leads him to repeal 
i t . The thesis w i l l also argue that a similar undermining of the 
individual integrity of the subject can be observed i n Shelley's 
conception of s e l f - i d e n t i t y . 
The analysis undertaken i n the thesis concentrates on how a 
distinc t i o n between the a b i l i t y to r e a l i z e the poetical work and 
a process of s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n i s manifested i n the three poems 
selected for scrutiny, and how t h i s problematic i s developed 
through the individual imaginative quest embodied i n the figure 
of the poet i n Alastor. 
The thesis w i l l also explore the ways i n which the ambivalence 
of the articulations around which the world of sanity and the 
notion of the accomplished work of l i t e r a t u r e are organized and 
dramatized i n Julian and Maddalo. The Triumph of Life i s then 
contrasted with the theme of the representative relation of the 
poet i n concord to his community that i s offered i n A Defence of 
Poetry. In t h i s poem, the principle of creation i s likened to 
the course of history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I n Alastor (1815), a poem which i s o f t e n considered t o be 
Shelley's f i r s t m a s t e r f u l p o e t i c a l achievement, the m o t i f o f the 
quest i s the o b j e c t of a c r i s i s . I n t h i s poem, the romantic m o t i f 
of the quest, which i s i n d i c a t i v e of the poet's imaginative 
process, and, through the poet's r e p r e s e n t a t i v i t y , of the 
subject's a b i l i t y t o access s p i r i t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , i s not 
f u l f i l l e d . I n t h i s case, the lack of f u l f i l m e n t of the quest does 
not only put i t s u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e , t o r e u n i t e the poet w i t h the 
objec t of h i s v i s i o n , i n t o doubt. I t does not seem p o s s i b l e 
e i t h e r t o assert t h a t the journey i t s e l f can be f i n a l l y 
recognized as c o n s t i t u t i n g i t s own goal. The lack of f u l f i l m e n t 
seems, t h e r e f o r e , t o have also negative i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the p o e t i c a l e n t e r p r i s e . 
The f a i l u r e which i s represented i n the poem i n a u g u r a t i n g 
Shelley's p o e t i c a l career casts doubt on the poet's c a p a c i t y t o 
access the imaginary. I t presents i n s p i r a t i o n as an overwhelming 
occurrence j e o p a r d i z i n g the poet's a b i l i t y t o even be a poet by 
making use of h i s power. I n t h i s sense, t h i s poem pushes the view 
which Shelley expressed s i x years l a t e r i n A Defence of Poetry 
t h a t , " [ P ] o e t r y i s a sword of l i g h t n i n g , ever unsheathed, which 
consumes the scabbard t h a t would c o n t a i n i t , " (1) t o more 
damaging consequences than even the d e s t r u c t i o n of the poet f o r 
the sake of h i s a r t , since he cannot give i t expression by 
himself. On the c o n t r a r y , the lack of f u l f i l m e n t and the absence 
1 
of a r t are made t o p r e v a i l . Instead o f c o n s t i t u t i n g a response 
t o the poet's a s p i r a t i o n , the imaginative and c r e a t i v e quest 
d i s a s t r o u s l y exacerbates a la c k , which i t i s powerless t o 
a l l e v i a t e . Yet, paradox l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t t h i s u n f u l f i l l e d 
e n t e r p r i s e s t i l l f i n d s the means and the resources t o take place, 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of i t s inner c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 
I t i s t h i s discrepancy between underlying i n t e n t t o reach a 
moment of f u l f i l m e n t , y e t the l a t e n t lack of concern w i t h such 
i n t e n t i n the quest i t s e l f , which I wish t o focus on i n t h i s 
t h e s i s . Moreover, I n A Defence of Poetry, Shelley r e f e r s t o the 
aspect which renders poetry r e c a l c i t r a n t t o the purposeful 
i n t e r v e n t i o n of the poet: "Poetry i s not l i k e reasoning, a power 
to be exerted according t o the determination of the w i l l . " (2) 
I t may be suggested, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t , i n conceiving poetry as an 
accomplishment which does not, however, present i t s e l f as a 
p r o j e c t , Shelley demonstrates the awareness of a tensio n a t the 
heart o f the n o t i o n of the work of poetry. 
The paradox noted concerning the romantic quest i n Shelley can 
also be r e l a t e d t o the s c e p t i c a l v e i n w i t h i n Shelley's p o e t r y , 
which d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h a t poetry from t h a t o f , f o r example, 
Wordsworth. As Rajan (3) has n o t i c e d , the Shelleyan 'epiphany', 
or p o e t i c i l l u m i n a t i o n , d i f f e r s from the Wordsworthian epiphany 
i n t h a t i t lacks "the transcendental and unequivocal p u r i t y " t h a t 
i s present i n the l a t t e r . There i s , then, a decidedly 
intermediary or t r a n s i t i o n a l aspect t o i t , which undermines the 
f a i t h i n the imagination u s u a l l y associated w i t h Romanticism. 
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However, t h i s s cepticism does not ne c e s s a r i l y c o n t r a d i c t the 
extreme q u a l i t y of the claims which, as i n A Defence of Poetry 
Shelley d i r e c t s a t v i s i o n a r y poetry, t o the e f f e c t t h a t p o e t r y 
i s s a i d t o r e s t o r e the world t o i t s t r u e comprehension. Along the 
same l i n e s , and w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l domain, Paul Dawson has 
noted t h a t the d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g Shelley's demand f o r the t o t a l 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of s o c i a l l i f e r e i n f o r c e d h i s commitment t o the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of even l i m i t e d progress. (4) More g e n e r a l l y , the 
i n e f f e c t u a l i t y w i t h which Shelley was at one time reproached 
seems t o stem from a misunderstanding over the value which 
Shelley placed on the 'non-actual', and even the i m p r a c t i c a l . 
There i s , t h e r e f o r e , a sense i n which i n e f f e c t u a l i t y , f o r 
Shelley, becomes a v i r t u e . 
Shelley hoped t h a t extreme, i m p r a c t i c a l views, by v i r t u e of being 
held, could generate the c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r wider acceptance. 
According t o t h i s model, Shelley's v a l o r i z a t i o n of poets as 
"unacknowledged l e g i s l a t o r s " i n A Defence of Poetry, l i e s 
p r e c i s e l y i n the f a c t t h a t the e f f i c a c y of t h e i r a c t i o n cannot 
be c o n c r e t e l y l o c a t e d , or d i r e c t l y a t t r i b u t e d t o them. The power 
of the p o e t i c v i s i o n , f o r Shelley, l i e s i n i t s u n f a m i l i a r i t y and 
o b s c u r i t y , and, t h e r e f o r e , i n the f a c t t h a t i t r e s i s t s becoming 
a s s i m i l a t e d w i t h i n the f a m i l i a r . I t i s , a ccordingly, apparent 
from t h i s t h a t poetry i s n e i t h e r competing w i t h , or completing, 
a view of the world from which i t i t s e l f must remain d i s t a n t . 
My approach t o Shelley's poems w i l l i n v o l v e the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
an understanding of Romanticism bequeathed mainly by i d e a l i s t 
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philosophy, because, w i t h i n the terms of t h i s l a r g e l y German 
problematic, the divorce between a r t and the o b j e c t i v e w orld, a 
divorce w i t h i n which the conception of poetry i n A Defence of 
Poetry i s concerned, i s taken t o a r e l a t i v e extremis. According 
t o the key t e n e t of the German p h i l o s o p h i c a l understanding of 
a r t , w i t h i n the a e s t h e t i c judgement, the subject i s the l o c a l e 
of s p i r i t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , transcending the d i v i s i o n between the 
o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e realms. I n the m o t i f of the quest, f o r 
example, the poet's access t o such s p i r i t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , and 
t o the power animating the universe as a whole, i s of c e n t r a l 
consequence. 
However, there i s also an ambivalence involved i n an 
understanding of the work of a r t as the 'process' which 
demonstrates the subject's a b i l i t y t o access s p i r i t u a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e , and t h i s ambiguity c o n s i s t s i n the f a c t t h a t the 
artwork i s the means of access t o a transcendent meaning of which 
i t i t s e l f i s the product. This may be considered as the paradox 
which drove the German romantics, p a r t i c u l a r l y F r i e d r i c h Schlegel 
and Novalis, t o develop a theory of l i t e r a t u r e , and a theory of 
the r e a l i z a t i o n of the artwork. I t i s also t h i s paradox which i s 
a c e n t r a l concern i n the work of Maurice Blanchot, who has 
elaborated on the conception of l i t e r a t u r e explored and t h e o r i z e d 
by the German romantics, i n a way which bypasses the dualism 
which i s o f t e n brought t o bear on an understanding o f the 
achievement of the romantic work of l i t e r a t u r e . 
4 
The approach taken i n t h i s study may be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from two 
other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Romanticism which m i r r o r each other i n 
the way t h a t they focus on the i d e a l i z i n g quest. The f i r s t type 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n examines the way i n which romantic t e x t s may 
be taken as the t a l e s of a consciousness engaged i n a quest f o r 
the i d e a l and d r i v e n by v i s i o n s of u n i t y . I n t h i s respect, these 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are f a i t h f u l t o the a b i d i n g legacy of 
Romanticism, which Hugh Roberts defines as "the hermeneutical 
d r i v e from the fragmentary p a r t t o absolute whole." (5) This 
approach i s also apparent i n the works of E a r l Wasserman (1971), 
and the New C r i t i c s . As i n the case of Meyer Abrams' Natural 
Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature 
(1971), t h i s approach can be understood as a secular v e r s i o n of 
t h e o l o g i c a l p l o t s of f a l l and redemption. 
By c o n t r a s t , w i t h i n the second type of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , which 
adopts the t h e o r i e s and methods of s t r u c t u r a l i s m , the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n of the medium of language makes i t impossible f o r 
the imagination t o e f f e c t the intended "unmediated contact w i t h 
noumenal l e v e l s of r e a l i t y . " (6) W i t h i n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
a n alysis focuses on the way i n which experience i s i n f a c t 
reconstructed w i t h i n language. The quest f o r the i d e a l i s , then, 
here considered as a r h e t o r i c a l device. This second type of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the i d e a l i z i n g endeavour analyses the 
r h e t o r i c a l means t h a t concede the i n e v i t a b l e gap, e i t h e r 
i n v o l u n t a r i l y , or v o l u n t a r y , between words and meaning. Here, 
w i t h i n t h i s form of r h e t o r i c a l or deconstructive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
the romantic t e x t i s seen as i n h e r e n t l y i r o n i c a l . 
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While, i n the former reading, Romanticism i s associated w i t h an 
"aggrandizement of a r t , " because a r t i s seen as a remedy f o r the 
d i v i s i o n s of self-consciousness, i t has also been argued t h a t the 
transcendental imagination's a c t i o n of forming the u n i t y or 
synthesis between the sensible and the i n t e l l i g i b l e , i s , f o r the 
Romantics, a ' q u e s t i o n 1 , not an assured p o s s i b i l i t y . (7) On the 
basis of t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o see romantic t e x t s 
as " d i s c l o s i n g the c o n f l i c t i n g c o n s t i t u e n t s of t h e i r themes and 
categories, and as d e r i v i n g i n s i g h t from the questioning of t h e i r 
assumptions". (8) However, as noted by Chase, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
define the knowledge which i s expected from the exposure o f such 
a c o n f l i c t : 
Even the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s or incoherencies such a 
reading may discover... can be seen as producing 
meaning and knowledge a t a higher l e v e l . How t o 
describe the grounds and the s t a t u s of such knowledge 
. . . i s one of the fundamental issues under dispute. (9) 
The a c q u i s i t i o n of such i n s i g h t can be associated w i t h the 
concept of the progressive work of a r t , as i t was developed by 
the e a r l y German Romantics a t Jena, and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , by 
F r i e d r i c h Schlegel and Novalis, at the t u r n of the 19th century. 
They envisaged the work of a r t i n i t s i n f i n i t e movement of 
p o i e s i s as a demonstration of the growth and self-transcendence 
of which the subject i s capable. For the Jena romantics, the f a c t 
t h a t the artwork could not be reduced t o a determinate meaning 
i n d i c a t e d the subject's unique connection t o an Absolute f o r 
which he or she could long f o r . However, i f , as suggested, the 
' c r i s i s ' described i n Alastor does not allow f o r such a r e t u r n 
to u n i t y , then the Jena model becomes jeopardized. 
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I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t Maurice Blanchot's r e f l e x i o n s on 
l i t e r a t u r e o f f e r a rewarding perspective on the q u a l i t y of 
achievement which the work of l i t e r a t u r e i s considered t o 
c o n s t i t u t e . Blanchot i s recognized as having renewed the c r i t i c a l 
debate concerning the o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of l i t e r a t u r e i n ways 
which i n v o l v e a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n between 
l i t e r a t u r e and philosophy. (10) My concern a t t h i s p o i n t w i t h i n 
t h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n i s t o now d e l i n e a t e the core concepts d e r i v e d 
from Blanchot on which t h i s research p r o j e c t w i l l draw; and t o 
discuss the ways i n which these i l l u m i n a t e the paradox noted 
e a r l i e r , concerning the c r i s i s a f f e c t i n g the romantic quest i n 
Shelley. 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l t o Blanchot's r e f l e x i o n s on l i t e r a t u r e t o 
recognize t h a t , f o r him, a r t i s the a p p e l l a t i o n f o r "the d e s i r e 
f o r absolute consciousness, absolute knowledge or the work t o end 
a l l works." (11) Here, Blanchot appears t o endorse f u l l y the 
romantic agenda of the v a l o r i z a t i o n of the work of a r t i n terms 
of an absolute, i n s t e a d of d e m y s t i f y i n g i t i n terms o f an 
"ideology of the a e s t h e t i c " , because, f o r Blanchot, t h i s 
endorsement prevents a r t from being assuaged i n t o mere a e s t h e t i c 
enjoyment. I n Romanticism, Blanchot detects the f i r s t sign of the 
f a c t t h a t the importance and r o l e of a r t are connected t o a mode 
of accomplishment which i s derived from the absolute demand which 
i d e a l i s t philosophy may be considered t o have placed on i t . 
Blanchot's account of romantic t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n a r t , as 
s i g n i f i c a n t of the t e n s i o n between "the conquest of the w o r l d 
according t o the aims of the r e a l i z i n g mind" and "an i n c r e a s i n g l y 
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pure, s u b j e c t i v e i n t i m a c y " , which ch a r a c t e r i z e s the modern 
pe r i o d , i s encapsulated as f o l l o w s i n The Space of Literature: 
A r t too plays i t s p a r t i n t h i s d e s t i n y . . . The a r t i s t i c 
ego a f f i r m s t h a t i t i s the sole judge of i t s e l f , the 
only j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r what i t does and what i t seeks. 
Romanticism's n o t i o n of genius strengthens t h i s r o y a l 
subject which i s not only beyond o r d i n a r y r u l e s but 
f o r e i g n t o the law of achievement and success on i t s 
own t e r r a i n as w e l l . A r t , useless t o the world where 
only e f f e c t i v e n e s s counts, i s also useless t o i t s e l f . 
(12) 
For Blanchot, t h e r e f o r e , Romanticism marks the moment when the 
r e a l i z a t i o n of the work of l i t e r a t u r e i s put i n question, by 
v i r t u e of the a r t work's withdrawal from the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d of 
"the r e a l i z i n g mind." But i t also marks the moment when the 
l i t e r a r y work's mode of being as question becomes the way i n 
which l i t e r a t u r e asserts i t s e l f : " l i t e r a t u r e begins when i t 
becomes a question," and con s i s t s i n t h i s question. (13) Out of 
the modern dilemma which withdraws a r t from o b j e c t i v e forms of 
r e a l i z a t i o n , a r t f i n d s a mode of r e a l i z a t i o n which encapsulates 
i t s e s s e n t i a l distance from the world. I n t h i s way, Blanchot 
repeatedly a f f i r m s the demand t o reach the absolute, which l i e s 
at the r o o t of the romantic p o e t i c a l work, but transforms i t i n t o 
a demand which i s now placed on the work: "poetry i s the e f f o r t 
towards what i s thus u n r e a l i z a b l e , and [ t h a t ] i t has... t h i s 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y and t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t i t seeks t o r e a l i z e i n 
v a i n , f o r i t s foundation". (14) Here, the work of l i t e r a t u r e 
becomes, w i t h i n Blanchot's terms, the paradoxical r e a l i z a t i o n of 
the i r r e a l i z a b l e , and one of the hypotheses of t h i s p r o j e c t i s 
t h a t the c r i s i s of the p o e t i c a l achievement of which Alastor has 
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been seen as a testimony may be understood i n terms of Blanchot's 
conception of t h i s paradox. 
However, i n the process which has been o u t l i n e d here, poetry can 
no longer be associated unambiguously w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
d i s c l o s i n g another, t r u e r w orld, which the w o r l d of conscious or 
r a t i o n a l determinations might overlook. Nor can poetry suggest 
or ' i l l u m i n a t e ' a more 'authentic' l i f e . The k i n d of p r i m a l 
harmony t o which a r t i s supposed t o r e t u r n t h i n g s and which i s 
i m p l i e d i n the view of the aim of a r t as being, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
"freedom f o r the w o r l d of t h i n g s which are allowed once more 
t h e i r s i n g u l a r i t y and self-possession, t o impart what i s p e c u l i a r 
t o themselves," o b s t r u c t s the claims of the artwork t o such 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . As a r e s u l t , the work of a r t may be s a i d t o 
r a d i c a l l y fragment the u n i t y t o which, on the other hand, i t 
seeks t o t e s t i f y . There i s , then, a sense i n which the modern 
work of l i t e r a t u r e , as Blanchot conceives i t , seals the end of 
the a s p i r a t i o n w i t h which romanticism i s c e n t r a l l y associated. 
For Blanchot, Romanticism i s also the moment when the a s s e r t i o n 
of the work of a r t can no longer be taken as a s u b j e c t i v e s e l f -
a s s e r t i o n . The movement of a r t away from the world, and the 
paradoxical mode of accomplishment which the work of l i t e r a t u r e 
becomes, also draws the l a t t e r away from such notions as 
d e c i s i o n , w i l l , or power, which ch a r a c t e r i z e the autonomous so-
c a l l e d humanist s u b j e c t . On the c o n t r a r y , f o r Blanchot, the 
work's a b i l i t y t o appear not t o have been made allows i t t o be 
f u l l y the work which the romantics envisaged: 
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t h a t which i s g l o r i f i e d i n the work is the work, when the 
work ceases i n some way t o have been made, t o r e f e r back t o 
someone who made i t , but gathers a l l the essence of the work 
i n the f a c t t h a t now there i s a work... (15) 
Blanchot's r e f l e x i o n s r a d i c a l l y modify a more t r a d i t i o n a l 
understanding of the work of l i t e r a t u r e as the accomplishment of 
su b j e c t i v e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n t h i s case also , then, 
Blanchot's theory of the work of l i t e r a t u r e sustains the romantic 
agenda, but w i t h consequences which also s t r i k e a t the h e a r t of 
t h a t agenda. 
As has been suggested i n t h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n , the romantic quest 
f o r the Absolute may i n f a c t r e f l e c t the need t o maintain a form 
of a s p i r a t i o n t o which such power i s inadequate, except t o the 
extent t h a t i t i s s t i l l a response t o i t . The gain which i s 
expected from t a k i n g on board Blanchot's perspective i n t o an 
examination of some of Shelley's poems l i e s i n the p o s s i b i l i t y 
t o reconsider them not so much as the scene of s t r u g g l e between 
opposing y e t r e l a t e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l or i n t e l l e c t u a l impulses, such 
as scepticism and f a i t h i n the i d e a l ; but, t o see such a s t r u g g l e 
as the e f f e c t of a movement of w r i t i n g which i s an a r t i c u l a t i o n 
of i t s e l f , whereby the romantic quest i s f u e l l e d by i t s very 
p u r s u i t . 
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Chapter Breakdown 
The poems selected f o r analysis here may be considered as amongst 
the l e a s t l y r i c a l i n the Shelleyan corpus. I n t h i s , they r e f l e c t 
a lack of assurance i n the basis which s u b j e c t i v e s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n 
provides f o r the p o e t i c a l process, and a lack of assurance i n the 
b e l i e f t h a t these poems are the r e a l i z a t i o n of a mastery of s e l f -
expression. The three poems selected, Alastor (1815), Julian and 
Maddalo (1819), and The Triumph of Life (1822), span Shelley's 
career, and they a l l express the t a l e of an anomaly which hampers 
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t they may even be narr a t e d , leaving the poems 
which n a r r a t e them t i n g e d w i t h the r e g r e t of not having done 
j u s t i c e t o what may, nevertheless, be only held as an a b e r r a t i o n : 
the s a c r i f i c e of a poet t o h i s quest. 
Chapter One: This chapter w i l l explore the ways i n which some 
aspects of e a r l y German romanticism i n Jena can be s a i d t o 
co n t r a s t w i t h the understanding of a r t o f f e r e d by transcendental 
id e a l i s m . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the chapter w i l l analyse the way i n 
which the n o t i o n of the 'fragment' both r e f l e c t s and u n s e t t l e s / 
dissolves the dilemma i n which the i d e a l i s t understanding o f the 
artwork as the p r e s e n t a t i o n of s p i r i t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e places the 
artwork - whether as the r e s u l t of such s i g n i f i c a n c e , or as the 
means of reaching i t . The chapter w i l l also discuss these issues 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the ideas of Blanchot, p a r t i c u l a r l y as expressed 
i n h i s The Athenaeum. 
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Chapter TWO: This Chapter w i l l explore the i n f l u e n c e of 
e m p i r i c i s t philosophy on Shelley's n o t i o n of mind, as expressed 
i n the essays c o l l e c t e d under the t i t l e "Speculations on 
Metaphysics" (1817-21). The chapter w i l l c h a r t Shelley's t u r n 
from r a t i o n a l i s m , towards a less r a t i o n a l i s t and more 
hermeneutical conception of the mind. Shelley's own 
tr a n s f o r m a t i o n of the e m p i r i c i s t d o c t r i n e w i l l be analysed i n 
connection w i t h h i s e a r l y p r o j e c t t o make the mind the locus of 
i t s own power. 
Chapter Three: Chapter three w i l l consider Shelley's ' D i f f i c u l t y 
of Analyzing the Human Mind 1 as an example of Shelley's 
u n s e t t l i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the aporias of s e l f - r e f l e x i o n . The 
chapter w i l l then show how t h i s i s t r e a t e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r way 
i n Alastor, through an analysis of the poe t i c quest as a psychic 
journey which i s animated by an unmastered energy. 
Chapter Four: This chapter w i l l consider Shelley's Julian and 
Maddalo i n r e l a t i o n t o Blanchot's n o t i o n of f a s c i n a t i o n , where, 
as r e f l e c t e d i n the Maniac's speech, the subject i s dispossessed 
of h i s power of comprehension. The analysis w i l l also draw on the 
concept of s u b j e c t i v i t y as r e s i s t i n g t o t a l i s a t i o n i n order t o 
i l l u m i n a t e the d e p i c t i o n of derangement i n t h i s poem. 
Chapter Five: This Chapter w i l l c o n t r a s t Shelley's understanding 
of the shaping i n f l u e n c e of poets upon t h e i r s o c i e t y , as argued 
i n A Defence of Poetry (1821), w i t h the concomitant and more 
hazardous aspect of poetry as a d i s r u p t i o n of f a m i l i a r i t y , 
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through the wish t o speak t r u l y , and the wish f o r h i s t o r y as a 
t r u e n a r r a t i v e , as expressed by Rousseau, the persona a t the 
centre of poetry's c o n t r a r y demands, i n The Triumph of Life. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Blanchot and Romantic L i t e r a t u r e 
I n t h i s Chapter, I i n t e n d t o examine various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
of a r t and of l i t e r a r y p r oduction w i t h i n romanticism w i t h a view 
t o e s t a b l i s h i n g Maurice Blanchot's n o t i o n of "the non-romantic 
essence of romanticism", and i t s l i n k w i t h h i s own n o t i o n of 
l i t e r a t u r e . Blanchot's phrase, "the non-romantic essence of 
romanticism" appears i n h i s essay, ' L' Athenaeum' ('The 
Athenaeum') i n L'Entretien infini ( 1 ) , which r e f e r s t o the s h o r t -
l i v e d j o u r n a l issued between 1798 and 1800 by the German 
romantics a t Jena, amongst whom F r i e d r i c h Schlegel and Novalis 
played a prominent r o l e . Blanchot focuses i n p a r t i c u l a r on the 
way i n which, poetry, which i s understood by the romantics as the 
self-possessed knowledge of the i d e a l i s t subject's f r e e 
consciousness, and which has, then, no other purpose but t o 
accomplish i t s e l f consciously as a " l i t e r a r y absolute", f a i l s , 
at l e a s t i n p a r t . Blanchot sees t h i s withdrawal of the Jena 
Romantics from the post-Kantian i d e a l i s t agenda as the emergence 
of l i t e r a t u r e i n a modern sense, where the n o t i o n of i t s s e l f -
r e a l i z a t i o n i s at issue. Blanchot's understanding of t h i s c r u c i a l 
Romantic moment i s expected t o o f f e r a perspective on the three 
poems selected from Shelley's corpus, from which the tensions 
a r i s i n g from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Shelley i n terms of i d e a l i s m or 
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scepticism may appear as the e f f e c t s of the question of the s e l f -
r e a l i z a t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e as Blanchot i l l u m i n a t e s i t . 
I w i l l begin, f i r s t , by l o o k i n g at the i n f l u e n c e of Kantian 
ae s t h e t i c s on romantic conceptions of l i t e r a t u r e , f ocusing on 
Kant's concept of s u b j e c t i v i t y , and on h i s concept of a r t . As 
Andrew Bowie has argued, Kant i s the philosopher who 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d the a e s t h e t i c judgment as i n d i c a t i v e of the 
subject's c a p a c i t y f o r a degree of meaningfulness which n a t u r a l 
science could not e x p l a i n . (2) Kant can then be seen as having 
set the terms of the modern n o t i o n of a e s t h e t i c s , and opened the 
way f o r romantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a r t as p r o v i d i n g a r e l a t i o n 
to the world which i s i n a c c e s s i b l e t o r e f l e x i v e thought, but i s 
a testimony t o the subject's freedom i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a higher 
c r e a t i v e p r i n c i p l e a t work i n the world, w i t h o u t being subsumed 
by i t . I w i l l then look a t a number of more contemporary c r i t i c a l 
w r i t i n g s which examine the romantic conception of a r t and 
l i t e r a r y p r oduction, i n c l u d i n g the w r i t i n g s of Deleuze, Kipperman 
and others, and w i l l focus on Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy's L'Ahsolu 
litteraire. This book provides an analysis of the way i n which 
the n o t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e proposed by e a r l y German romanticism 
evolved from a perceived lack i n Kantian philosophy. This lack 
consisted i n i t s i n a b i l i t y t o provide an account of the s u b j e c t 
out of the c a p a c i t i e s which i t a t t r i b u t e s t o i t . Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy are then l e d t o consider the romantic n o t i o n o f the 
l i t e r a r y work i n terms of a dilemma between the desire f o r a 
complete work of a r t and the d i s s o l u t i o n of t h i s work, which they 
connect t o Blanchot's conception of l i t e r a t u r e . ( 3 ) I w i l l then 
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conclude by examining the account of the romantic conception of 
a r t and l i t e r a r y p roduction w i t h i n the w r i t i n g s of Blanchot, and 
under l i n e the relevance of the n o t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e o f f e r e d by 
German romanticism f o r an understanding of Blanchot's ideas. 
F i n a l l y , I w i l l e s t a b l i s h , p r o v i s i o n a l l y , how the ideas of 
Blanchot may help t o i l l u m i n a t e aspects of Shelley's poetry. 
Ar t and the Problem of I n t e l l e c t u a l I n t u i t i o n 
I n L'Absolu litteraire, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue t h a t 
both German i d e a l i s m , represented mainly by Fichte and S c h e l l i n g , 
and e a r l y German romanticism, represented by the Jena w r i t e r s a t 
the t u r n of the 19th century, appropriated Kant's f o r m u l a t i o n s 
of the a r t i c u l a t i o n between a r t and s u b j e c t i v i t y , where a r t 
o f f e r s an image of s u b j e c t i v e f u l f i l m e n t i n harmony w i t h the 
world. However, according t o Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 
romanticism d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f from metaphysical i d e a l i s m i n 
the f o l l o w i n g manner: 
The most s p e c i f i c gesture of romanticism, the gesture 
whereby i t d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f by the narrowest and 
most c r u c i a l margin from metaphysical i d e a l i s m , i s the 
gesture whereby a t the heart of the quest f o r , and the 
theory o f , the Work [ t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of a harmonious 
r e l a t i o n of consciousness and world, which the 
c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n t o the world can only suggest i n a 
piecemeal f a s h i o n ] , romanticism forsakes, and, 
d i s c r e t e l y and on the whole u n w i t t i n g l y , withdraws the 
work i t s e l f , and turns almost imperceptibly i n t o "the 
work of the absence of work". 
(4) 
As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue, t h i s i s how e a r l y German 
romanticism i n i t i a t e s a n o t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e beside i t s avowed 
a s s e r t i o n of a " l i t e r a r y absolute": the r e a l i z a t i o n , w i t h i n the 
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form of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d work of a r t , of a meaningfulness which 
cannot-be derived from what i s given. I n order t o c l a r i f y the way 
i n which, f o l l o w i n g Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, Maurice Blanchot's 
n o t i o n of "the work of the absence of work" (5) can e n l i g h t e n an 
understanding of the essence of romanticism, i t i s f i r s t 
necessary t o summarize the Kantian conceptual legacy concerning 
s u b j e c t i v i t y and a r t . 
The main import of Kant's philosophy, which he himself has 
described as e f f e c t i n g a "Copernican r e v o l u t i o n " because of the 
extent t o which i t challenged p r e - e x i s t i n g assumptions, concerns, 
p r i m a r i l y , the c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n of the subject t o the w o r l d . 
Kant's philosophy e f f e c t s a passage from "a mimetic r e l a t i o n " 
between r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and the world t o a "transcendental 
r e l a t i o n of formation", where nothing can be known unless i t has 
been pre-formed by consciousness. As a r e s u l t of t h i s , the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l forms which make experience and knowledge p o s s i b l e 
contain the c r i t e r i o n of t h e i r own t r u t h w i t h i n themselves, 
instead of f i n d i n g t h e i r v a l i d i t y i n an extraneous p r i n c i p l e 
which they t r a n s l a t e . As Kant abandons the dogmatic n o t i o n of a 
transcendent world t o which knowledge should correspond, he also 
introduces the n o t i o n of a s u b j e c t i v e a s p i r a t i o n a t the r o o t of 
the subject's a c t i v i t y of e n v i s i o n i n g a world. 
Kant's i n n o v a t i o n , then, l i e s i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n of a s u b j e c t i v e 
p r i n c i p l e t o the subject's r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the w o r l d , i n 
o p p o s i t i o n t o the e m p i r i c i s t n o t i o n of psychological r e g u l a r i t i e s 
derived from experience, and the e m p i r i c i s t r e d u c t i o n of 
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imagination t o a mental copy of sensation. For Kant, knowledge 
of the world i n v o l v e s a p r i o r i s y n t h e t i c p r i n c i p l e s and Ideas 
which cannot be deriv e d from what i s given, and knowledge becomes 
the product of the a c t i v i t y of the knower. (6) Kant's system 
provides a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the subject and the world which 
can be r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d , and which eschews dogmatism ( t h a t 
i s , i t avoids r e s o r t i n g t o an e n t i t y or p r i n c i p l e which could 
only be p o s i t e d or assumed because i t would hold the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t s l i n k t o t h i s world-view w i t h i n i t s e l f ) . The 
necessity t o preserve man's freedom from being reabsorbed w i t h i n 
a mechanical universe of n a t u r a l law meant t h a t the subject was 
not able, according t o Kant, t o know the world "as i t i s " , b ut, 
conversely, i m p l i e d the subject's shaping a c t i v i t y . I n other 
words, man's freedom, i n the above sense, also meant t h a t the 
subject was subject t o the d i v i s i o n between the wo r l d of 
appearances and the 'noumenal world', i . e . a world beyond 
e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y . 
Kant's philosophy involves a dualism i n the sense t h a t i t f o r b i d s 
an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n between the l e g i t i m a t e knowledge w i t h i n the 
epistemological w o r l d and th i n g s i n themselves. I t may be 
described as the a s s e r t i o n of disengaged thought, which has the 
capacity t o r u l e over i t s domain i n a r e f l e x i v e manner, but 
cannot give a f u l l account of t h i s very disengagement. S i m i l a r l y , 
knowledge as Kant defines i t , i m p l i e s the i m p o s s i b i l i t y f o r the 
r e f l e x i v e subject t o have a d i r e c t access t o i t s i n t e l l i g i b l e 
f a c u l t i e s . For Kant, there can be no i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n , 
d e fined, i n Bowie's terms as "a self-caused i n t u i t i o n o f the 
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self-caused synthesizer of i n t u i t i o n s " . (7) For Kant, r e f l e x i v e 
thought does not possess the p o t e n t i a l t o be the subject t h a t i s 
not merely appearance, i . e . , the transcendental subject as he 
envisages i t . Glover argues t h a t "Kant thought Descartes was 
wrong, i n h i s proof of h i s own existence, t o suppose t h a t our 
stream of consciousness t e l l s us anything about our s e l f as i t 
r e a l l y i s " . (8) For Kant, the e m p i r i c a l subject has access only 
t o i t s apparent s e l f : 
We must also recognize, as regards inner sense, t h a t 
by means of i t we i n t u i t ourselves only as we are 
inwardly a f f e c t e d by ourselves; i n other words, t h a t , 
so f a r as inner i n t u i t i o n i s concerned, we know our 
own subject only as appearance, not as i t i s i n 
i t s e l f . (9) 
The l i m i t a t i o n of the n o t i o n of the subject who, d e f i n e d as 
representing a world t o i t s e l f , can, however, only have access 
to an appearance of i t s e l f , has been underlined by Michel Henry. 
According t o Henry, Kant 
c r i t i q u e s the Being of t h i s subject i n such a way t h a t 
anything one might advance about t h i s Being includes 
a paralogism, so t h a t i f , i n s p i t e of e v e r y t h i n g , i t 
must be spoken about, one can only say t h a t i t i s an 
1 i n t e l l e c t u a l r epresentation.'(10) 
The subject can have no more access t o the world as i t i s than 
t o t h a t which co n d i t i o n s h i s knowing a c t i v i t y , t h a t i s , t o h i s 
i n t e l l i g i b l e capacity. The highest p o i n t of philosophy cannot be 
a r t i c u l a t e d by philosophy, i n other words, the subject cannot 
give a f u l l account of i t s own nature. 
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I n a simultaneous movement, Kant was, however, l e d t o take i n t o 
account the p r e r e q u i s i t e s which h i s n o t i o n of knowledge as a 
system of s t r u c t u r a l adequacy between mind and world e n t a i l e d . 
I n the Critique of Judgement (1790), i n which he analyses the 
t e l e o l o g i c a l and the a e s t h e t i c judgments, Kant i n v e s t i g a t e s the 
issue of an access t o the ground of knowledge and t o the 
subject's i n t e l l i g i b l e nature i n i t s world-shaping a c t i v i t y . 
Although Kant has conceived a d u a l i s t i c n o t i o n of knowledge, 
where disengaged r e f l e x i v e thought cannot r e t r i e v e the l i n k 
between the t h i n k i n g being and the o b j e c t t h a t i s thought, he 
nevertheless examines the adequate r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
subject and the world, as a c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge 
which should be assumed. 
Aesthetics and the autonomy of a r t 
Although f o r Kant i t i s impossible t o know t h a t the w o r l d as i t 
i s conforms t o the knowing mind, c o g n i t i o n could not take place 
i f , f o r the sake of c o g n i t i o n ' s purposes, the world could not be 
envisaged as a whole which i t s e l f i s not merely the sum of 
accumulated knowledge. This i s the basis of Kant's n o t i o n of the 
transcendental imagination. Moreover, the need f o r coherence also 
requires t h a t perceptions be ascribed t o one o r i g i n a r y s e l f -
consciousness or 'transcendental ego'. The transcendental ego 
cannot be the o b j e c t of c o g n i t i o n , and only the r e s u l t o f i t s 
operations can be described. (11) Although the transcendental 
imagination and the transcendental ego prevent consciousness from 
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d i s i n t e g r a t i n g i n t o the various o b j e c t s of which i t i s conscious, 
Kant has l i m i t e d the e m p i r i c a l subject's access t o these 
p r i n c i p l e s . 
I t appears, then, t h a t Kant's system requires the very 
a f f i r m a t i o n which the system can countenance only i n a 
c o n d i t i o n a l mode, both because i t i s r e q u i r e d as a c o n d i t i o n , and 
because, as such, i t cannot be v e r i f i e d by the world which i t 
c o n d i t i o n s . I n e f f e c t , i t remains suspended. I n other words, 
Kant's philosophy cannot demonstrate t h a t mind and world should 
somehow conform t o each other and t h a t the subject may r e l a t e t o 
i t s e l f as other than a f u n c t i o n of synthesis. For Kant, the 
a b i l i t y t o r e l a t e t o the world i n a purposeful manner as a grand 
design, t h a t i s t o say, i n a way t h a t d i f f e r s from c o g n i t i o n , i s 
manifested i n a r t . (12) According t o Seyhan, although "concepts 
of reason, t h a t i s , ideas cannot be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o forms 
i n t u i t a b l e t o sense, ... [ I ] n the Critique of Judgment, a measure 
of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s enacted between s e n s i b i l i t y and reason". 
(13) For Kant, a r t and the b e a u t i f u l provide a sensuous i n t u i t i o n 
of Ideas (where Ideas are understood as the u n i v e r s a l and 
necessary content of mind as i t shapes the world of p o s s i b l e 
experience). 
I t should be stressed t h a t the f a c t t h a t the world can be seen 
as a whole, and as though i t were r u l e d by a purpose, and 
t h e r e f o r e f i t s the subject's a s p i r a t i o n s , shows the e x t e n t t o 
which the subject i s not w h o l l y separate from the o b j e c t i v i t y 
which r e f l e c t i o n opposes t o i t . The metaphorical r o l e o f the 
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n o t i o n of organism (14) l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t beauty i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t nature becomes su s c e p t i b l e t o freedom. According t o Bowie, 
"the only e m p i r i c a l access t o the i n t e l l i g i b l e and e t h i c a l basis 
of the r a t i o n a l being w i l l be v i a a e s t h e t i c ideas". (15) This 
c o n s t i t u t e s the s p e c i f i c i t y of a r t . However, simultaneously, t h i s 
s p e c i f i c i t y also confirms the l i m i t a t i o n s of Reason. This i s made 
evident by the f a c t t h a t , f o r Kant, the work of a r t cannot be 
reduced t o a t e c h n i c a l , r a t i o n a l i z e d or causal e x p l a n a t i o n . The 
work of the mind of genius "nearly embodies ideas." (16) However, 
the genius cannot give an account of t h a t i n which a r t c o n s i s t s . 
For Kant, nature gives the r u l e t o a r t . As a r e s u l t , the 
artwork's coming i n t o existence cannot be described 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y , (17) otherwise i t would merely amount t o another 
instance of the way i n which, l i k e c o g n i t i o n , the s u b j e c t 
determines the world through categories. The a e s t h e t i c idea, as 
a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o which no concept i s adequate, i s the 
counterpart of the r a t i o n a l idea, t o which no i n t u i t i o n can be 
adequate. A r t i s , t h e r e f o r e , the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a r e l a t i o n 
between subject and world which cannot be t r a n s l a t e d i n any other 
terms. However, beauty can only suggest t h a t nature i s accessible 
t o freedom i n a symbolical way, and by analogy. 
Kant has also i n s i s t e d on the p a r t i c u l a r pleasure i n which the 
ae s t h e t i c experience c o n s i s t s . I n the enjoyment of the b e a u t i f u l 
and i n the experience provided by works of a r t , the w o r l d i s 
envisaged i n a non-instrumental and d i s i n t e r e s t e d manner, where 
the subject r e l a t e s t o the aspect of the objects which the 
imagination r e f l e c t s . What the subject enjoys i n the experience 
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of a r t and of the b e a u t i f u l , then, i s h i s or her own shaping 
a c t i v i t y . A r t i s also seen by Kant as bearing witness t o a 
suprasensible u n i t y of a l l our f a c u l t i e s . This, i t may be argued, 
i s as close as the subject can get t o i t s own i n t e l l i g i b l e 
nature. The l a t t e r i s made most manifest i n t h a t the pleasure 
t h a t the artwork b r i n g s i s the pleasure of pure r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 
i n which the imagination i s no longer regulated by the 
c o n s t r a i n t s of the Understanding. I t presents a f r e e r e l a t i o n t o 
the w o r l d f o r i t s own sake. This i s the n o t i o n t h a t Deleuze 
o f f e r s , from the perspective of the subject's f a c u l t i e s : 
i f the f a c u l t i e s can, i n t h i s way, enter i n t o 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s which are f r e e and v a r i a b l e , but 
r e g u l a t e d by one of them, i t must f o l l o w t h a t a l l 
together are capable of r e l a t i o n s h i p s which are f r e e 
and unregulated, where each goes t o i t s own l i m i t and 
nevertheless shows the p o s s i b i l i t y of some s o r t of 
harmony w i t h the others. .. Thus we have i n the 
Critique of Judgment the foundation of Romanticism. 
(18) 
The f r e e r e l a t i o n t o the world i s also the f u l l demonstration of 
the subject's f a c u l t i e s i n i t s p l e n i t u d e . I n the process of 
examining t h a t which the c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n t o the world r e q u i r e s 
f o r i t s b a s i s , Kant's system comes close t o d e s c r i b i n g a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p which escapes the l i m i t a t i o n s of knowledge. Kant's 
n o t i o n of a r t , t h e r e f o r e , c o n s t i t u t e s a o u t l e t f o r the subject's 
need t o access the l i f e of the mind. As a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n i n the 
form of i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n i s impossible, the value and 
content o f f e r e d by a r t l i e i n t h i s metaphorical s t a t u s and i n 
preserving the meaning of "what i t would be l i k e i f freedom could 
be r e a l i z e d . " (19) That a r t " s t r i v e s towards something beyond the 
boundary of experience" (20) i s also i n d i c a t e d by the f a c t t h a t 
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i n the enjoyment of beauty, the mind "becomes a u t o - t e l i c " , i . e . , 
r e f e r s t o no e x t e r i o r o b j e c t or experience i n the outside w o r l d . 
For Kant, a r t i s attendant upon the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of the d i v i n e 
perspective which i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n would be. The n o t i o n of 
the autonomy of a r t , f o r Kant, resides i n the tension i n h e r e n t 
i n a r t ' s c l a i m f o r a world t h a t i s d i f f e r e n t from t h i s w o r l d , and 
which cannot, t h e r e f o r e , take place i n i t . This i s the d i v i s i o n 
which German i d e a l i s m intends t o c o l l a p s e . Kant had reached a 
p o i n t i n h i s philosophy where he had t o suggest the e x t e n t t o 
which subject and o b j e c t had t o be assumed t o belong tog e t h e r , 
w h i l e t a k i n g care t o withdraw t h i s domain from knowledge. This 
i s , however, the suggestion on which the German i d e a l i s t s , and, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r S c h e l l i n g , based t h e i r philosophy which gave a r t 
a c r u c i a l r o l e . 
German Idealism 
Kant had argued t h a t b e a u t i f u l nature may be s a i d t o be endowed 
w i t h a sense of purpose, which i s manifested by the f a c t t h a t the 
subject i s a f f e c t e d by the o b j e c t . This may lead t o the 
assumption of a u n i t y between subject and o b j e c t . Whereas, f o r 
Kant, a r t evokes what the World would be l i k e i f freedom from 
the d i v i s i o n between subject and o b j e c t could be r e a l i z e d , f o r 
S c h e l l i n g , a r t embodies t h i s u n i t y as i t i s not accessible t o 
r e f l e x i v e thought. Schelling's ambitious claims f o r a r t are a 
consequence of the perceived l i m i t a t i o n of the world t o which 
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r e f l e x i v e thought gave access. This l i m i t a t i o n could be overcome 
i f the o b j e c t could be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the way i n which i t i s 
known, and t h i s i s what the work of a r t achieves, i n Sche l l i n g ' s 
view. The work of a r t o f f e r s the v i s i o n whereby, w h i l e being a 
determined o b j e c t , i t can be recognized as the product of a f r e e 
s u b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y . S chelling's conception of a r t , then, derives 
from a need t o r e t r i e v e the l a r g e r context from which r e f l e x i v e 
thought has separated i t s e l f , and from the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the 
subject cannot be d e f i n e d e x c l u s i v e l y by r e f l e c t i o n . I t i s p a r t 
of an attempt t o circumvent or undermine the determining aspect 
of thought, and t o move away from the model of r e f l e c t i o n as "the 
way i n which a s e l f engenders i t s e l f as a subject." (21) 
For S c h e l l i n g , i n exceeding any d i s c u r s i v e account, a r t provides 
a u n i t y which r e f l e x i v e thought i s unable t o match, and the work 
of a r t i s , t h e r e f o r e , seen as a product t h a t i s inseparable from 
i t s meaning. This means t h a t the f i n i t e artwork embodies a 
purpose which cannot be known but only i n t u i t e d , and t h a t a r t i s 
the non-conceptual medium, combining consciousness and 
unconsciousness, which reveals the r e l a t i o n s h i p between w o r l d and 
subject as other than l i a b l e t o the d i v i s i o n s of r e f l e x i v e 
thought. A r t i s the demonstration t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s of 
imagination are the same as the p r i n c i p l e of the p r o d u c t i v i t y of 
Nature. For German i d e a l i s m , the f r e e expression of a f r e e 
r e l a t i o n t o the world which a r t s t i l l represents f o r Kant, 
becomes the document of a deeper r e l a t i o n between the su b j e c t and 
nature. I t i s o b j e c t i f i e d i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n or, i n Bowie's 
terms, "metaphysical presence". (22) 
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Schelling's claims f o r a r t r e l y on the argument t h a t the work of 
a r t transcends what r e f l e x i v e thought can achieve. S c h e l l i n g sees 
a r t as showing the u n i t y between subject and o b j e c t , or Absolute, 
which philosophy cannot, and comes t o be understood as a k i n d of 
knowledge. S c h e l l i n g , as noted by Breazeale, 
was prepared t o employ t h i s same term [ i n t e l l e c t u a l 
i n t u i t i o n ] i n a much broader sense t o designate an 
a l l e g e d l y "higher", non-sensible type of " d i r e c t 
p e r c e p t i o n " of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . . . . a s p e c i a l 
" f a c u l t y of t r u t h " possessed by at l e a s t some 
i n d i v i d u a l human beings. I t i s t h i s sense of 
" i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n " which a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n 
of Novalis and F r i e d r i c h Schlegel and f i n a l l y l e d 
S c h e l l i n g himself t o assert t h a t " a r t i s the organon 
of philosophy". (23) 
Here, the d i s t i n c t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d by Kant have been c o l l a p s e d 
by S c h e l l i n g t o produce a k i n d of d i r e c t r e a l i s m : "the a r t i s t 
represents t o us a k i n d of absolute knowledge", so t h a t " [ P ] o e t r y 
has once more collapsed i n t o some s o r t of science, and has 
f o r f e i t e d the autonomy which Kant so c a r e f u l l y created f o r i t . " 
(24) A r t i s no longer the f o r m a l i z a t i o n of the subject's 
a s p i r a t i o n t o the r e a l i z a t i o n of freedom, but the demonstration 
t h a t thought need not remain l i m i t e d and separate from i t s 
knowledge of the l i n k between the sensible and the i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
This p o i n t has been underlined by Seyhan, f o r whom, " i n 
[ S c h e l l i n g ' s ] work the problematic status of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
reaches a c l o s u r e . I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , a r t i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
becomes i d e n t i c a l w i t h r e a l i t y , and philosophy, t h e r e f o r e , 
culminates i n a r t " . (25) A r t allows us t o grasp a simple 
absolute u n i t y where ev e r y t h i n g coheres. From Sc h e l l i n g ' s 
conception of the r o l e of a r t , i t becomes possible t o understand 
how the t o t a l i t y of r e a l i t y can be explained i n s p i r i t u a l terms, 
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as u n f o l d i n g according t o an inner necessity, and t o draw a 
connection between t h i s t r a d i t i o n of i d e a l i s m and a s t r a n d of 
l i t e r a r y symbolism which heralds the poet as possessing the 
absolute knowledge of the s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y borne out by 
analogies or "correspondences".(26) The symbol i s the testimony 
of the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of every p a r t or element i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the whole, a testimony t o the f a c t t h a t e v e r ything coheres, and 
t h i s i s no longer a c o n d i t i o n a l requirement of knowledge, as i t 
was f o r Kant, but a f a c t v e r i f i e d and d i s c l o s e d by the a r t i s t . 
However, the r o l e which S c h e l l i n g a t t r i b u t e s t o a r t , t h a t of 
a l l o w i n g us t o grasp a simple absolute u n i t y , also leads him t o 
assert t h a t "there i s p r o p e r l y speaking but one absolute work of 
a r t ...even though i t should not yet e x i s t i n i t s most u l t i m a t e 
form." (27) Schelling's remark p o i n t s t o the discrepancy between 
what may be c a l l e d the Work, i . e . , the attainment of the t o t a l i t y 
of being as simple absolute u n i t y , where the i n d i v i d u a l or 
p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t y knows i t s e l f t o be meaningful, and the artwork 
as m a t e r i a l o b j e c t . Presumably, f o r S c h e l l i n g , such an absolute 
artwork would come up t o the l i m i t s of absolute u n i t y . The work 
which i s the means and even the o p e r a t i o n of coming t o s e l f -
consciousness i n t e r f e r e s w i t h t h i s attainment and achievement, 
which has t o remain an event o f , and i n , consciousness. 
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Transcendental subject and psychological subject 
The ambiguity concerning which subject i s in v o l v e d i n the 
experience of a r t can be seen as d i r e c t l y l i n k e d t o the ambiguity 
t h a t has been noted concerning the st a t u s of a r t i n r e l a t i o n t o 
i t s achievement. This s e c t i o n w i l l discuss some of the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n making the a s s i m i l a t i o n between 
e m p i r i c a l and transcendental s u b j e c t s , the coming t o s e l f -
consciousness of the u n i t y between s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e , 
c o n s i s t i n the achievement of the artwork. A r t , f o r Kant, i s t o 
be l i n k e d w i t h t h a t aspect i n the subject whereby the subject i s 
accessible t o Ideas, i . e . the u n i v e r s a l and necessary content of 
mind, independently of w o r l d l y determinations. I t p o i n t s t o the 
extent t o which the subject i s not merely an e m p i r i c a l e n t i t y 
accessible t o n a t u r a l i s t observation, "the i n d i v i d u a l , taken up 
as he i s i n the t i s s u e of the world", but i s an autonomous 
su b j e c t : 
a being capable of p o s i t i n g i t s e l f as i d e a l l y ( o r 
u l t i m a t e l y ) d i f f e r e n t from e v e r y t h i n g t h a t h i s t o r y has 
made, from e v e r y t h i n g t h a t s o c i e t y has co n d i t i o n e d , 
from everything t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s have f i x e d , from a l l 
the f u t u r e t h a t past events have already marked o r 
cle a r e d the way f o r . (28) 
Kant marks the d i s t i n c t i o n between the p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l or transcendental s u b j e c t , by a s s e r t i n g t h a t , i n 
the a r t i s t i c genius, "nature gives the r u l e t o a r t " and t h a t a r t 
proceeds from an inn a t e d i s p o s i t i o n . S c h e l l i n g o f f e r s an 
understanding of the artwork which allows the e m p i r i c a l s u b j e c t 
to transcend i t s l i m i t a t i o n s . Kant's d i s t i n c t i o n s have been 
28 
b l u r r e d by those who i n h e r i t e d h i s system, as Sychrava, r e f e r r i n g 
t o Claud Sutton, notes i n her a n a l y s i s of S c h i l l e r : 
Claud Sutton, i n The German tradition in philosophy, 
accuses the post-Kantian i d e a l i s t s of a sloppy 
a t t i t u d e t o words:'by the misuse of the words "ego" 
and "self-consciousness" they f r e q u e n t l y leave i t 
obscure whether they are speaking about the i n d i v i d u a l 
i n h i s s o c i e t y or whether they are t a l k i n g about some 
timeless absolute.'(29) 
This may be due t o Schelling's c l a i m t h a t , i n a r t , i n Breazeale's 
terms, "the fundamental i n s i g h t of transcendental i d e a l i s m ( v i z . , 
the i d e n t i t y of the i d e a l and the r e a l ) becomes apparent w i t h i n 
e m p i r i c a l consciousness." (30) According t o Kipperman, the 
ambiguity between the transcendental and the psy c h o l o g i c a l 
subject has been replaced by the a s s i m i l a t i o n of the former t o 
the l a t t e r : "so many a r t i s t s were eager t o understand 
transcendental discussion about consciousness as discussion about 
the p a r t i c u l a r p sychological s u b j e c t . " (31) This tendency may be 
a t t r i b u t e d t o the view h e l d by German idealism t h a t the a r t i s t 
provides not only f o r a s p i r i t u a l w o r l d , but also f o r the means 
by which s p i r i t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e can be gained by any e m p i r i c a l 
subject. 
Kipperman analyses "romanticism g e n e r a l l y " by means of the n o t i o n 
of the psychological s u b j e c t : 
The present examination of both p o e t i c and 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t e x t s w i l l show t h a t f o r romanticism 
g e n e r a l l y , the being of s e l f and world cannot be 
determined apart from each o t h e r . No o b j e c t of i t s 
discourse r e s t s i n i t s e l f ; a l l t h i n g s _ the s e l f , t h e 
moral and s o c i a l w o r l d _ are questions because a l l 
t h i n g s e x i s t only f o r and w i t h i n a probing dialogue 
w i t h i n a human quester. 
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I n p a r t , t h i s i n d e t e r m i n a b i l i t y stems from 
Enlightenment scepticism about the u l t i m a t e status of 
th i n g s and of the mind. But even more i t i s a r e s u l t 
of the romantics' d i a l e c t i c a l experience of the s e l f , 
which demands t o be s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g but continuously 
f i n d s t h a t i t becomes i t s e l f o n l y i n encountering a 
wor l d , which i n i t s t u r n becomes a more meaningful 
place. (32) 
In t h i s passage, Kipperman i s concerned w i t h the issue of t h e way 
i n which t e x t s - w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i n g between p o e t i c and 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t e x t s - can be understood as t r a n s l a t i n g an 
"experience of the s e l f " . The ambiguity of the status o f the 
"th i n g s " Kipperman r e f e r s t o , whether they are th i n g s i n the 
world or th i n g s i n t e x t s , i s r e f l e c t e d i n Kipperman's s h i f t from 
a use of " t e x t s " t o t h a t of "discourse" here. The consequence 
of t h i s i s t h a t the term d i a l e c t i c a l quest, f o r the romantic 
a r t i s t s , f u n c t i o n s both as a l i t e r a r y m o t i f , an a e s t h e t i c 
perspective or v i s i o n , and an account of experience. I n the 
l a t t e r understanding of the quest, i t i s possible t o de t e c t the 
in f l u e n c e of Kant's philosophy of c o g n i t i o n , as the s u b j e c t 
shapes the manifold elements supplied by sensuous i n t u i t i o n , the 
subject's f i n i t e knowledge becomes d i a l e c t i c a l . However, i t seems 
t h a t the equation between the psychological and transcendental 
subjects leads t o the a s s i m i l a t i o n of l i t e r a r y t e x t s t o a 
discourse, thereby making i t d i f f i c u l t t o understand the way i n 
which the presumed l i t e r a r y t r a n s l a t i o n of experience d i f f e r s 
from experience o u t s i d e a l l l i t e r a t u r e . 
This also leads t o the n o t i o n t h a t the perspective or v i s i o n 
which appears t o r u l e a work of a r t may f u n c t i o n as a p o s s i b l e 
p o i n t of view upon the world o u t s i d e the artwork. The equation 
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of the world i n the t e x t w i t h the world outside of i t tends t o 
t u r n the t e x t i n t o a t r a n s l a t i o n or expression of something t h a t 
p r e e x i s t s i t , such as, f o r instance, an " i n t e l l e c t u a l 
p e r s p e c t i v e " , or a l i f e - w o r l d t o be a r t i c u l a t e d by the w r i t e r . 
This i s one way of understanding Wheeler's a n a l y s i s , when, i n her 
study o f e a r l y German romanticism, she stresses the u n i f y i n g r o l e 
of the a r t i s t i n o r g a n i s i n g the m a t e r i a l of the work : "the 
' i n t e l l e c t u a l perspective' of the mind of a genius could provide 
the focus necessary t o ho l d together an apparently miscellaneous 
content". (33) I n t h i s case the i n t e l l e c t u a l perspective i s seen 
as the preserve of an i n d i v i d u a l who c a r r i e s i t out i n a work. 
However, the perspective from which the artwork i s s a i d t o d e r i v e 
also depends on the work being i t s e l f complete. The works 
p o s s i b l y suggest a pe r s p e c t i v e , but the other way round cannot 
be i n f e r r e d . Unless the work i s seen as the t r a n s l a t i o n of a 
p r e e x i s t i n g v i s i o n , the question which the i d e a l i s t d e f i n i t i o n 
of the artwork as s u b j e c t i v e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n contains, i s , how 
can the work of l i t e r a t u r e b r i n g about the a e s t h e t i c w o r l d on 
which i t s a r t i s t i c achievement i t s e l f depends? Can the 
psy c h o l o g i c a l subject be s a i d t o reach, v i a the artwork, h i s 
transcendental s e l f , i f the artwork i s already seen as the r e s u l t 
of having reached i t ? I n t h i s discrepancy l i e s the h i n t t h a t the 
poet owes h i s knowledge t o the work of a r t r a t h e r than the other 
way round. 
This may be denounced as a s l e i g h t of hand on the p a r t o f an 
a e s t h e t i c v i s i o n which has already s e t t l e d the meaning o f a r t i n 
terms of harmony, and of a t o t a l i t y where e v e r y t h i n g f i n d s i t s 
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place and i s , e v e n t u a l l y , r a t i o n a l . On the other hand, i t may be 
argued t h a t i t i s p r e c i s e l y Blanchot's concern t o explore t h i s 
discrepancy, t h a t i s , the a n t i c i p a t i o n of the work's achievement 
on the work i t s e l f which i s recuperated i n the i d e a l i s t 
philosophy as an e f f e c t of knowledge. Blanchot's r e f l e c t i o n s on 
l i t e r a t u r e probe i n t o the l i t e r a r y absolute, understood along the 
l i n e s of the i d e a l i s t artwork, and take i n t o account the 
e s s e n t i a l l y romantic sense t h a t the artwork produces a 
perspective from which i t appears t o emerge, "as though i t were 
the absolute perspective of the w o r l d i n i t s t o t a l i t y " ( 3 4 ) , and 
which endows i t w i t h the e f f e c t of complete s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 
For Blanchot, t h i s q u estioning i n t o the l i t e r a r y absolute took 
place as soon as the Jena romantics attempted t o t h e o r i z e i t . 
(35) To r e v e r t t o the well-known paradigm of the quest which has 
been t r a d i t i o n a l l y employed t o describe romanticism, the romantic 
poem understood as a psychic journey has t o miss i t s f i n a l 
d e s t i n a t i o n i f i t i s t o be seen as a f u l f i l l e d experience. 
L i t e r a t u r e according t o Jena romanticism : 
F r i e d r i c h Schlegel's v a r i o u s fragments ( ' C r i t i c a l 
Fragments'(1797), 'Athenaeum Fragments' (1798), and 'Ideas' 
(1800) r e v e a l a confidence i n the value of the a c t i v i t y of the 
c r e a t i v e a r t i s t , which proceeds from the idea t h a t o b j e c t s can 
only be endowed w i t h s i g n i f i c a n c e through the subject's 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , which f r e e s them from t h e i r uncreated naturalness. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of such a p o s i t i o n f o r the subject owes something 
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t o both Fichte's and Schelling's p h i l o s o p h i e s , t o the extent t h a t 
they both argue t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o grasp the t o t a l i t y of 
being as a simple absolute u n i t y . I n the case of Fichte's 
philosophy the c r e a t i v e process i s l i n k e d t o the i n d i v i d u a l 
f i n i t e subject's s t r u g g l e towards freedom. (36) The n o t i o n of 
a r t i f i c i a l i t y i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the ambitions which Jena 
Romanticism placed i n both the work of l i t e r a t u r e and the 
i n d i v i d u a l a r t i s t : 
I n order t o be able t o describe an o b j e c t w e l l , one 
must have ceased t o be i n t e r e s t e d i n i t ... as long as 
the a r t i s t invents and i s i n s p i r e d he remains a t l e a s t 
f o r communication i n an i l l i b e r a l frame of mind...(37) 
I n t h i s fragment by Schlegel, Kant's n o t i o n of d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s 
i n the artwork i s p e r c e p t i b l e . Schlegel r e f e r s t o the a r t i s t ' s 
detached a t t i t u d e towards h i s m a t e r i a l i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h 
mere psychological and emotional involvement. For Schlegel, the 
t r u e act of c r e a t i o n must have l e d the a r t i s t t o a s t a t e of 
i n d i f f e r e n c e towards the o b j e c t , so t h a t the a r t i s t may focus 
only on h i s design. I n t h i s way, c r e a t i o n becomes an a c t i v i t y i n 
i t s own r i g h t , the measure and c r i t e r i o n of i t s own t r u t h , and 
independent of e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t s . This also leads Schlegel t o a 
decidedly i n s t r u m e n t a l view of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c a p a c i t i e s , when 
the l a t t e r has disengaged himself from h i s non-free, n a t u r a l 
s e l f : 
A r e a l l y f r e e and c u l t i v a t e d person ought t o be able 
t o attune himself a t w i l l t o being p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r 
p h i l o l o g i c a l , c r i t i c a l or p o e t i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l o r 
r h e t o r i c a l , ancient or modern: q u i t e a r b i t r a r i l y , j u s t 
as one tunes an instrument, a t any time and t o any 
degree.(38) 
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This fragment suggests the e r a d i c a t i o n of the b e l i e f i n a n a t u r a l 
core w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l , who i s presented, on the c o n t r a r y , 
as shaping himself according t o a recognizable q u a l i t y . This 
detachment, a p p l i e d e q u a l l y t o a r t i f a c t s and i n d i v i d u a l s , makes 
i t impossible t o confuse a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n w i t h un-created 
e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y . Detachment s i g n a l s the i n t e r v e n t i o n of 
conscious c r e a t i o n w i t h i n e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y and the connection 
between self-consciousness and a p r i n c i p l e o r g a n i z i n g 
m u l t i p l i c i t y towards a f i n a l meaning. 
The connection between the p r i n c i p l e of c r e a t i o n and t h a t which 
makes r e a l i t y s i g n i f i c a n t i s f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t e d by Novalis i n 
the f o l l o w i n g passage from 'Miscellaneous W r i t i n g s ' (1797). As 
w i l l be examined i n the next chapter, t h i s passage i s s t r i k i n g l y 
close t o the a s p i r a t i o n f o r a u n i f i e d system r e v o l v i n g around the 
subject's mind, which Shelley expresses i n such prose fragments 
as "Speculations on Metaphysics' (1817-21) or 'On L i f e ' (1819): 
We are r e l a t e d t o a l l p a r t s of the universe - As we 
are t o f u t u r e and past. Which r e l a t i o n we develop 
f u l l y , which i s t o be the most important and e f f e c t i v e 
f o r us depends only on the d i r e c t i o n and d u r a t i o n o f 
our a t t e n t i o n . A t r u e theory of t h i s procedure would 
be nothing less than the long-desired a r t o f 
i n v e n t i o n . But i t would be more than t h i s . Man acts at' 
a l l times according t o i t s laws, and there i s no doubt 
t h a t by means of intense s e l f - o b s e r v a t i o n i t i s 
possib l e f o r the genius t o discover them.(39) 
I n t h i s fragment, Novalis r e f e r s t o the r e l a t i o n s which make 
r e a l i t y and the "parts of the universe" s i g n i f i c a n t . He also 
r e f e r s t o one r e l a t i o n which would summarize them a l l and which, 
i f i t could be the o b j e c t of a t t e n t i o n beyond immediate 
experience, could be equated w i t h the " a r t of i n v e n t i o n " . Novalis 
suggests t h a t the law r u l i n g man's r e l a t i o n t o the universe could 
be s p e l t out and encapsulated i n a f i n a l meaning. For Novalis, 
as f o r Schlegel, the a r t i s t i s defined by h i s r e l a t i o n t o t h i s 
f i n a l meaning, as a r u l e r e q u i r i n g no f u r t h e r a r t i c u l a t i o n but 
c o n t a i n i n g a l l p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s : 
An a r t i s t i s someone who c a r r i e s h i s centre w i t h i n 
h i m self. Whoever lacks such a centre has t o choose 
some p a r t i c u l a r leader or mediator outside of himself 
(40) 
Just as the a r t i s t i s , i n t h i s fragment, defined by a s t r u c t u r e 
of h i s p e r s o n a l i t y which becomes i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
which he i s able t o produce, s i m i l a r l y , i n d i v i d u a l s can be 
described as u n f o l d i n g the p r i n c i p l e of t h e i r character, along 
the same l i n e s as an a r t e f a c t l i k e the novel, f o r instance: 
every human being who i s c u l t i v a t e d and c u l t i v a t e s 
himself contains a novel w i t h i n himself. But i t i s n ' t 
necessary f o r him t o express and w r i t e i t out. (41) 
The i n d i v i d u a l i s a person who i s able t o mould himself i n t o a 
recognizable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . This shaping a c t i v i t y i s e n t i r e l y 
presentable as t h i s character, and has no other purpose but t o 
be presented i n t h i s way. The hope f o r a f i n a l meaning t o a l l 
p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s t o the universe, as i n s t a n t i a t e d i n Novalis's 
'Miscellaneous W r i t i n g s ' , i s accompanied by the simultaneous 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h i s meaning i s e n t i r e l y i n i t s process, as 
conveyed by Schlegel's use of the term " c u l t i v a t e " . I t i s a t t h i s 
p o i n t t h a t the romantic e x h i l a r a t i n g c r e a t i v i t y seems t o run on 
empty, as i f i t were engaged i n a p r o j e c t which could have been 
undertaken only by a n t i c i p a t i o n of i t s r e s u l t . The p r e s e n t a t i o n 
of s p i r i t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e according t o i t s own r u l e s becomes not 
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only the measure of a l l r e a l i t y , but the equal of a l l r e a l i t y , 
and i f , f o r Novalis, "the world must be romanticised," (42) t h i s 
i s a demand t h a t i s made from a perspective t h a t i s already 
romanticised. 
I n h i s essay, 'The Athenaeum', Blanchot has stressed the k i n d of 
n e a r - a n n i h i l a t i o n t o which the subject's attainment of complete 
self-consciousness i n and through a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y (43) i s 
brought i n i t s success: 
t h i s becoming self-conscious t h a t renders l i t e r a t u r e 
manifest, and reduces i t t o being nothing but i t s 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n , leads l i t e r a t u r e t o l a y c l a i m . . . t o 
e v e r y t h i n g , t o the whole that acts in every instant 
and every phenomenon ( N o v a l i s ) . . . o n l y the whole t h a t 
acts m y s t e r i o u s l y and i n v i s i b l y i n every t h i n g . (44) 
The t e n s i o n around which Jena romanticism's understanding of 
l i t e r a t u r e revolves, appears c l e a r l y . I f the r e l a t i o n s of 
s i g n i f i c a n c e a l l u d e t o one f i n a l r e l a t i o n (which would c o n s i s t , 
as Novalis's fragment from 'Miscellaneous W r i t i n g s ' i n d i c a t e s , 
i n the " a r t of i n v e n t i o n " i t s e l f ) , they also designate t h i s f i n a l 
r e l a t i o n as a lack, i . e . , n e g a t i v e l y . This i s why Novalis r e f e r s 
t o the " a r t of i n v e n t i o n " p r e c i s e l y as an a r t , t h a t i s t o say, 
such t h a t i t can only be derived or c o n t r i v e d from a design or 
a r t i f i c e . This i s why, also, Novalis can r e f e r t o such an a r t 
only i n a p r e s c r i p t i v e mode ( i t would be the a r t of i n v e n t i o n ) . 
I t i s i n the gesture of t h e i r a s c r i p t i o n of the work of 
l i t e r a t u r e t o the German i d e a l i s t agenda, t h a t the Jena Romantics 
are unable t o recognize the achievement t h a t i s a t t r i b u t e d t o 
t h i s work. I n other words, the demand f o r s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 
which i s supposed t o manifest the subject's freedom, and of which 
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the work of a r t i s the m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n a c t u a l i t y , subjects the 
work t o provide ever more evidence of t h i s freedom which i s , by 
necessity, incompatible w i t h any f i n i t e determination. I t i s thus 
possible t o understand why F r i e d r i c h Schlegel, i n the Athenaeum 
fragment n o l l 6 , defines "the romantic k i n d of poetry" as a po e t r y 
which cannot s e t t l e i n i t s works: 
Other kinds of poetry are f i n i s h e d and are now capable 
of being analysed. The romantic k i n d of poetry i s 
s t i l l i n the s t a t e of becoming; t h a t , i n f a c t , i s i t s 
r e a l essence: t h a t i t should f o r e v e r be becoming and 
never be pe r f e c t e d . (45) 
The achievement of the work of l i t e r a t u r e i s never secured. I t 
i s , then, p o s s i b l e t o assess the m o d i f i c a t i o n which the n o t i o n 
of a r t and l i t e r a t u r e , as a mode of s u b j e c t i v e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
i n the a c t i v a t i o n of the ground common t o o b j e c t and s u b j e c t , 
undergoes w i t h Jena romanticism. As Sychrava has argued, accounts 
of the poem as s e l f - c r i t i c a l or self-consuming are de r i v e d from 
the double perspective which romantic a e s t h e t i c s attaches t o 
poetry, where the poem i s seen as both an o b j e c t and a process 
of mind. Sychrava also notes t h a t " [ T ] h i s ' o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n ' , 
whereby the c r i t i c a l process i s also the s t r u c t u r e o f the 
artwork, brings about the coincidence of c r i t i c i s m - or theory -
and poetry - or p r a c t i c e , so desired by the post-Kantian 
movement." (46) The aspect of Jena romanticism on which t h i s 
a nalysis has focused i n d i c a t e s t h a t the German romantics were 
simultaneously compelled t o re-open and undo t h i s coincidence. 
Seyhan has also noted Fichte's i n f l u e n c e behind the n o t i o n o f the 
self-conscious poem: 
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From Fichte's transcendental schema, Schlegel derives 
the c r i t i c a l p o s i t i o n of transcendental poetry . . . 
Schlegel sees i n the c r i t i c a l s e n s i b i l i t y of p o e t i c s 
an a e s t h e t i c r e f l e c t i o n on the work of a r t which he 
c a l l s "poetry of poetry". I n a proper analogy t o 
transcendental philosophy, t h i s poetry represents "the 
producer along w i t h the product" and represents i t s e l f 
i n a l l i t s representations.(47) 
Seyhan goes on t o suggest t h a t t h i s leads t o the n o t i o n t h a t "the 
a e s t h e t i c d r i v e can only be s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l , " (48) and 
r e f l e c t i o n leads t o self-understanding. Here also , the p i c t u r e 
of t h i s s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g s u b j e c t i v i t y i n and through a r t , i s 
complicated i f r e f l e c t i o n i s not o n l y held as the subject's 
d e l i b e r a t e and f r e e act of self-awareness, but, on the c o n t r a r y 
as i n t e n s i f y i n g d i s j u n c t i o n and l o s t i d e n t i t y i n the r e a l i z a t i o n 
t h a t i t "depends upon the r e f l e c t e d other f o r i t s being." (49) 
The Jena Romantics are i n f a c t i n h a b i t e d by the simultaneous 
sense of t h e i r engagement i n a c r e a t i v e process whereby th e r e i s 
nothing u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , and the awareness t h a t t h i s very 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y draws them i n t o a process of becoming, (50) 
r e f l e c t i n g the re-emergence of m u l t i p l i c i t y w i t h i n the simple 
Absolute u n i t y of being. The assessment of Jena Romanticism 
revolves around whether t h i s i s t o be seen i n terms of a 
dichotomy, i n which case they are depicted as being dominated by 
longing counterbalanced by triumphant d e c l a r a t i o n s , or whether 
the s o l i d a r i t y between these two aspects i s stressed, i n which 
case t h i s n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n d i c a t e s an ambiguity w i t h i n 
l i t e r a t u r e , which Blanchot deems e s s e n t i a l . I f one r e v e r t s t o the 
terms i n which Romanticism has been defined, t h a t i s i n terms of 
the Work, which i s the attainment of an Absolute u n i t y i n s e l f -
consciousness, and the work as the demonstration of such 
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achievement i n a c t u a l i t y , then, the l a t t e r cannot be seen as 
f u l f i l l i n g the former, w i t h o u t r e i n t r o d u c i n g the d i s j u n c t i o n i n 
the process of e x h i b i t i n g i t s power of u n i f i c a t i o n , as i f the 
work was checked i n i t s movement from i t s i n c e p t i o n . This i s one 
way of understanding Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's remark, couched 
i n Blanchotian terms, on the "gesture whereby, a t the very h e a r t 
of the quest f o r , and the theory o f , the Work, [Romanticism] 
forsakes, o r , not q u i t e w i l l i n g l y , s u b t r a c t s the Work i t s e l f , and 
turns i n t o "the work of the absence of the Work." (51) This i s 
the issue which Blanchot sees Jena Romanticism as addressing, i n 
'The Athenaeum': 
L i t e r a t u r e encounters i t s most dangerous meaning -
t h a t of i n t e r r o g a t i n g i t s e l f i n a d e c l a r a t i v e mode -
at times t r i u m p h a n t l y , and i n so doing d i s c o v e r i n g 
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g belongs t o i t , a t other times, i n 
d i s t r e s s , d i s c o v e r i n g i t i s l a c k i n g everything since 
i t o n l y a f f i r m s itself by d e f a u l t . (52) 
I n t h i s passage, Blanchot a r t i c u l a t e s the paradox described above 
around the a l t e r n a t i v e "sometimes... sometimes", where i t should 
be understood t h a t these two moments are simultaneously i n v o l v e d , 
and p o i n t a t the c e n t r a l t w i s t of l i t e r a t u r e f o r Blanchot, as i s 
brought out by h i s own p r a c t i c e of w r i t i n g . Blanchot's w r i t i n g s 
c l e a r l y d i s r u p t t r a d i t i o n a l notions of genres whereby l i t e r a r y 
works are given an i d e n t i t y . For instance, L e s l i e H i l l has 
remarked t h a t h i s e a r l y novels, such as Thomas l'obscur and 
Aminadab, are l a r g e l y made up of various i n t e r n a l discourses 
( c o n j e c t u r e , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , commentary), which both s t i m u l a t e 
and o b l i t e r a t e the n a r r a t i v e and the reader's own i n t e r p r e t i n g 
engagement w i t h i t . (53) I n t h i s way, the movement o f 
comprehension towards u n i t y i s both enabled and f r u s t r a t e d , and 
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the a d d i t i o n of f u r t h e r discourses can never recuperate the 
divergence of the previous ones from c e r t a i n t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 
i n accordance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e t h a t "Plus une oeuvre se 
commente, plus e l l e appelle de commentaires" (The more a work 
comments upon i t s e l f , the more i t c a l l s f o r commentary). (54) The 
same s t r a t e g y i s a t work i n Blanchot's w r i t i n g s i n fragments, 
such as L'Ecriture du desastre and Le Pas au-dela, where the 
r e l a t i o n s between fragments expand the p u t a t i v e u n i t y which they 
p o t e n t i a l l y c o n s t i t u t e , so t h a t the fragments do not only produce 
the lack of u n i t y , ( t h i s i s the extent t o which they f a i l ) but 
they t u r n t h i s lack i n t o a space w i t h i n which they can speak. (55) 
I t i s now necessary t o t u r n t o the issue of the way i n which Jena 
displayed i t s awareness t h a t the work of l i t e r a t u r e cannot be 
understood as embodying the power t o survey things as a whole 
wit h o u t exempting i t s e l f from t h i s whole, thereby r u i n i n g i t s 
achievement i n the movement of securing i t . This w i l l i n v o l v e the 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the way i n which, f o r Blanchot, the Romantic 
fragment i s s i g n i f i c a n t of t h i s awareness. Blanchot's f o l l o w i n g 
analysis from 'The Athenaeum' may be taken as a g u i d e l i n e : 
Romanticism has the keenest knowledge of the narrow 
margin i n which i t can a f f i r m i t s e l f : n e i t h e r i n the 
world, nor outside the world; master of e v e r y t h i n g , 
but on c o n d i t i o n t h a t the whole c o n t a i n nothing; pure 
consciousness w i t h o u t content, a pure speech t h a t can 
say n o t h i n g . A s i t u a t i o n i n which f a i l u r e and success 
are i n s t r i c t r e c i p r o c i t y , f o r t u n e and misfortune 
i n d i s c e r n i b l e . By becoming e v e r y t h i n g poetry has a l s o 
immediately l o s t e v e r y t h i n g , thereby reaching t h a t 
strange era of i t s own t a u t o l o g y where i t w i l l 
i n e x h a u s t i b l y exhaust i t s d i f f e r e n c e by repeating t h a t 
i t s essence i s t o p o e t i c i z e . (56) 
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As Blanchot p o i n t s out s u c c i n c t l y i n t h i s passage, the success 
which allows the Romantics t o assert the work as s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n 
simultaneously takes away a l l grounds from them t o do so. A f t e r 
examining the way i n which the fragment may be held as the 
epitome of the work of transcendental poetry, t h i s a n alysis w i l l 
explore the way i n which i t becomes s i g n i f i c a n t of the movement 
of l i t e r a t u r e which " i n e x h a u s t i b l y exhausts i t s d i f f e r e n c e " . 
Blanchot's non-romantic essence of romanticism and the fragment. 
I n the f i r s t i n stance, Blanchot i n d i c a t e s t h a t the fragment 
represents the best hope f o r the Romantics t o r e a l i z e the t o t a l 
work: 
But t h i s t o t a l novel (57) of which most of the 
romantics are content t o dream i n the manner of a 
f a b l e . . . w i l l be undertaken only by Novalis. And here 
i s the remarkable t r a i t : not only w i l l Novalis leave 
t h i s novel u n f i n i s h e d , but he also w i l l sense t h a t the 
only way he could have accomplished i t would have been 
t o i n v e n t a new a r t : t h a t of the fragment. (58) 
The hope placed i n the fragment by the Romantics i s then l i n k e d 
to the search f o r the whole, which Blanchot, too, sees as l y i n g 
at the r o o t of the p o e t i c a l ambition, as he makes cl e a r i n La 
Part du feu: 
La recherche de l a t o t a l i t y , sous toutes les formes, 
c'est l a p r e t e n t i o n poetique par excellence, une 
prevention dans l a q u e l l e est i n c l u s e , comme sa 
c o n d i t i o n , 1 1 i m p o s s i b i l i t y de son accomplissement, de 
t e l l e s o r t e que s ' i l l u i a r r i v e jamais de s'accomplir, 
c'est en t a n t que cela ne se peut e t parce que l e 
poeme pretend comprendre dans son existence son 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y e t son irr£alisation. (59) 
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The search f o r t o t a l i t y , i n a l l i t s forms, i s the 
p o e t i c a l ambition par excellence. This ambition 
includes the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of being accomplished as 
i t s c o n d i t i o n , so t h a t i f i t i s ever accomplished, 
t h i s can only be t o the extent t h a t i t cannot be, and 
f o r t h i s reason t h a t the poem claims t o encompass i t s 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y and i t s n o n - r e a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n i t s 
existence. 
This leads t o the attempt t o t u r n c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t o a form 
which, then, becomes unassailable. The s e l f - m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f the 
work, the d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t i t i s , i s supposed t o preclude any 
o p p o s i t i o n t o i t by being the simultaneous m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f i t s 
non-accomplishment. The paradoxical s e l f - m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f the 
p o e t i c work, as Blanchot understands i t , may be l i n k e d t o the 
p a r t i c u l a r e f f i c a c y of a r t f o r the Romantics, which Bowie has 
summarized as the shaping of what philosophy cannot do: 
i f what grounds r e a l i t y cannot be included w i t h the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l system which t r i e s t o encompass i t , then 
a medium i n which the r e v e l a t i o n of the f a i l u r e t o 
a r r i v e at the f i n a l ground _ a t the unconditioned _ i s 
i n some way c o n s t i t u t i v e , may be more apt f o r 
comprehending the nature of existence and t r u t h than 
a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l system. (60) 
I t i s possible t o see the romantic fragment as the epitome o f the 
work embodying i t own movement of production, and the epitome of 
" s e l f - n e g a t i o n as self-transcendence." (61) The fragment i s the 
type of incompletion which i s not i t s e l f a lack. Simon C r i t c h l e y 
sees the fragment as "a form t h a t embodies i n t e r r u p t i o n w i t h i n 
i t s e l f . . . a genre t h a t embodies f a i l u r e w i t h i n i t s e l f . " (62) I n 
t h i s sense, and as Walter Benjamin has underlined i n the case of 
i r o n y , (63) the work as a fragment i s i n d e s t r u c t i b l e , since i t 
contains even the f a i l u r e t h a t c o n t r i b u t e s t o i t s incomplete 
completeness. F r i e d r i c h Schlegel's fragments are u s u a l l y seen as 
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t y p i c a l examples of romantic i r o n y , as i n the f o l l o w i n g : "One can 
only become a philosopher, not be one. As soon as one t h i n k s one 
i s a philosopher, one stops becoming one." (64) This leads 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy t o apply the same i r o n i c a l treatment 
t o Schlegel's own d e f i n i t i o n of the fragment: "A fragment, l i k e 
a m i n i a t u r e work of a r t , has t o be e n t i r e l y i s o l a t e d from the 
surrounding world and be complete i n i t s e l f l i k e a hedgehog." 
(65) 
Combining the p r o p o s i t i o n of the fragment, and the f a c t t h a t t h i s 
s e l f - d e f i n i n g p r o p o s i t i o n takes i t s e l f as i t s o b j e c t , Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy conclude: "the fragment on the hedgehog 
fragment i§_ such a hedgehog i n the very p r o p o s i t i o n by which i t 
simultaneously s t a t e s t h a t the hedgehog i s not here." (66) Just 
as i r o n y c h a r a c t e r i z e s the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t circumvents the 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of saying t h a t what i t says i s t r u e , the fragment 
i s the s t a t e of the work t h a t embodies the whole through 
suspending the whole. The fragment's achievement forces i t t o 
produce even i t s own disappearance, and t h i s , i n one sense, 
represents Romanticism's triumph, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 
p o i n t out: "c'est b i e n en n'etant pas l a que l e romantisme e t l e 
fragment sont absolument" ( i t i s p r e c i s e l y by v i r t u e of not being 
here t h a t Romanticism and the fragment are a b s o l u t e l y , 67). I n 
t h i s way, the d e f i n i t i o n of "the novel mode of r e a l i z a t i o n " 
which, according t o Blanchot, Romanticism proposes t o i t s e l f as 
a task, i s v e r i f i e d on one of i t s sides as being " l e p o u v o i r , 
pour l'oeuvre d'etre e t non plus de representer, d'etre t o u t . . . 
dans une forme q u i . , ne r e a l i s e pas l e t o u t , mais l e s i g n i f i e en 
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l e suspendant" (the power, f o r the work t o be and no longer t o 
represent, t o be as a whole . . . i n a form t h a t . . . does not r e a l i z e 
the whole, but s i g n i f i e s i t i n suspending i t , 68). However, i f 
the crowning achievement of the absolute work i s t o say n o t h i n g , 
not even i t s e l f , t h i s achievement also requires t h a t the work 
disowns i t . 
Another way of u n r a v e l l i n g the same paradox would be t o say t h a t , 
i f the fragment i s the form t h a t succeeds i n being a f a i l u r e , 
then i t does not f a i l , and, consequently, i t does not succeed 
e i t h e r . The non-accomplishment t h a t makes the fragment complete, 
takes, i n the same gesture, even t h i s achievement away from i t . 
This i s why, on the basis of Schlegel's own fragment, "But as y e t 
no genre e x i s t s t h a t i s fragmentary both i n form and content," 
(69) C r i t c h l e y p o i n t s out t h a t "the 'Athenaeum Fragments' are not 
themselves fragments, they should not be fragments, they are 
merely...promissory notes f o r an i n f i n i t e work yet t o be 
w r i t t e n . " (70) The fragment i s then the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the work 
turns i n t o the p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the Work, as Novalis suggests i n 
the f o l l o w i n g fragment: 
The a r t of w r i t i n g books has not yet been invented. 
But i t i s on the p o i n t of being invented. Fragments o f 
t h i s k i n d are l i t e r a r y seedings. Many among them may 
indeed be s t e r i l e - s t i l l i f only some grow. (71) 
I n t h i s case, Novalis's view of the fragment appears t o 
correspond t o Blanchot's d e s c r i p t i o n of the p r a c t i c e of w r i t i n g 
i n fragments as being taken f o r "preparations or r e j e c t e d 
versions of what i s not yet a work." (72) However, i n p r e p a r i n g 
f o r the Work, fragments p e r s i s t e n t l y designate the absence o f the 
Work, and make i t s accomplishment recede i n the same measure. 
They are then also productive of the absence of the Work, an 
absence which, n e i t h e r i n t h e i r pronouncement, nor i n the 
i n t e r r u p t i o n of t h i s pronouncement, they are able t o counter. The 
more fragmentary the work, the more i t d i v i d e s i t s e l f up, and 
p r o l i f e r a t e s . Blanchot c a l l s the i n t e n s i f i e d movement o f the 
fragment "the fragmentary exigency", where the work t h a t does not 
add up t o anything - the work t h a t does not work or "work-
lessness" (desoeuvrement) manifests i t s e l f . Blanchot's statement, 
from which the passage p r e v i o u s l y quoted i s taken, can now be 
quoted i n f u l l : 
The demand, the extreme demand of the fragmentary i s 
a t f i r s t obeyed l a z i l y , as though i t were a matter o f 
stoppping a t fragments, sketches, s t u d i e s : 
preparations or r e j e c t e d versions of what i s not y e t 
a work. That t h i s demand t r a v e r s e s , overturns, r u i n s 
the work because the work ( t o t a l i t y , p e r f e c t i o n , 
achievement) i s the u n i t y which i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h 
i t s e l f - t h i s i s what F. Schlegel sensed, but i t i s 
also what f i n a l l y escaped him, though i n such a way 
t h a t one cannot reproach him w i t h t h i s 
misunderstanding which he helped and s t i l l helps us t o 
d i s c e r n i n the very moment whereby we share i t w i t h 
him. (73) 
The fragments do not l e t the Work happen. I n i n t e r r u p t i n g i t s e l f , 
the fragment i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t i s already i n excess o f the 
p e r f e c t u n i t y towards which i t s t r i v e s , and t h a t even t h i s 
i n t e r r u p t i o n and i t s s i l e n c e cannot undo the damage done t o i t . 
The i n t e r r u p t i o n of fragments, t h e i r fragmentariness, may then 
be construed as the movement whereby speech i s being caught up 
and taken over by the worklessness which i t has i t s e l f generated. 
I t i s speech t h a t i s s t r u c k dumb from having already spoken too 
much and too e a r l y , from having "shattered the whole." (74) As 
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a fragment, the Romantic Work i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t has already put 
an end t o the whole t o which i t s t r o v e , thereby t a k i n g away the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of ever reaching i t . I n i t s i n t e r r u p t i o n , the 
fragment evokes a k i n d of speech which might be complete, were 
i t not destroyed by the fragment's nature as fragment. Fragments 
r u i n the Work, and represent a process of decay w i t h i n the 
complete Work, by i n d i c a t i n g the ceaseless c o n t i n u i t y of which 
the complete work i s merely the i n t e r r u p t i o n , t h a t i s t o say, the 
i n t e r r u p t i o n of i t s e l f . 
Blanchot has encapsulated the s o l i d a r i t y between the Work and i t s 
absence, of which i t i s the work, and which i s also i t s outcome, 
i n the f o l l o w i n g passage from The Space of Literature: 
t h i s moment which i s l i k e the work of the work, which 
outsi d e of any s i g n i f i c a t i o n , any h i s t o r i c a l o r 
a e s t h e t i c a f f i r m a t i o n , declares t h a t the work i s , 
depends on the work's undergoing, at t h i s very same 
moment, the ordeal which always r u i n s the work i n 
advance and always re s t o r e s i n i t the unending lack o f 
work, the v a i n superabundance of i n e r t i a . (75) 
A number of consequences can be drawn from the i n s i g h t on the 
romantic n o t i o n o f l i t e r a t u r e which Blanchot o f f e r s . This w i l l 
i ntroduce some of the concerns which t h i s t h e s i s w i l l examine i n 
P.B Shelley's poems and prose. For Blanchot, Jena Romanticism 
i m p l i e d the l a t e n t r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the Work t h a t could be read 
as a t o t a l i t y i n v o l v e d i n a movement which, not i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
w i t h i t , but i n s o l i d a r i t y w i t h i t , d i d not c o n t r i b u t e t o 
p e r f e c t i n g t h i s t o t a l i t y , and t h a t such i s the movement t h a t 
draws the work i n t o the process of i t s making. The t o t a l i t y 
appears t o be reached only so t h a t i t may be a t stake again 
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through the artwork, and t h i s i s the way i n which the l a t t e r 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t i s made i n l i e u of the t o t a l i t y . The romantic 
account of the work as embodying the i n f i n i t e power t h a t can 
survey t h i n g s as a whole i s accompanied by the n o t i o n t h a t the 
work cannot, and must not, be t h i s whole. Romanticism must then 
be seen as animated by a desire which almost brings the Work of 
l i t e r a t u r e t o i t s accomplishment and d e s t r u c t i o n , although i t 
must also r e s i s t t h i s d e s t r u c t i o n , since the l a t t e r i s n o t even 
something which could be implemented, but i s , i n a sense always 
already a t work. 
For Blanchot, Romanticism i s the moment when l i t e r a t u r e avoids 
being understood along the l i n e s of the n o t i o n of a r t and 
a e s t h e t i c s o f f e r e d by the Kantian and the post-Kantian 
ph i l o s o p h i e s , whose t o t a l i z i n g scheme was l a r g e l y a response t o 
the Enlightenment's t h e o r e t i c a l disengagement of the s u b j e c t from 
the world. The fragmentary exigency which, as Romanticism 
t e s t i f i e s , r u l e s l i t e r a t u r e , i s a type of separation which i s f a r 
more r a d i c a l than the disengagement t o which a r e c o n c i l i n g 
s o l u t i o n could be brought, since i t does not even l e t d i s j u n c t i o n 
gather i t s e l f , as t h i s would be the sign of a merely ordered 
d i s o r d e r . On the other hand, t h i s ceaseless d i s c o n t i n u i t y does 
not a c t u a l l y prevent the i d e a l i s t e n t e r p r i s e from h e a l i n g 
d i v i s i o n s and from making the demonstration of a u n i f y i n g 
process. On the c o n t r a r y , and more damagingly, by r e f e r r i n g t h i s 
u n i f y i n g process back t o the d i s j u n c t i o n which i t i t s e l f 
represents i n order t o operate, the fragmentary exigency t u r n s 
the i d e a l i s t p r o j e c t i n t o a v e r s i o n of i t s e l f . 
47 
The Jena Romantics were balanced between, on the one hand, the 
i d e a l i s t a s s e r t i o n t h a t the Absolute can only be known n e g a t i v e l y 
and by f i n d i n g t h a t no a c t i o n can reach what they are seeking, 
and, on the other hand, the awareness t h a t , p r e c i s e l y i n t h i s 
way, they are already engaged i n the work as worklessness. The 
l a t t e r allows them a space w i t h i n which, i n t h e i r hope t o f i n a l l y 
speak t r u l y i n the t o t a l work, they are simultaneously p r o t e c t e d 
from, and exposed t o , the lack of a f i n a l t r u t h . I n t h i s way, and 
i n i t s quest f o r the i n v e n t i o n of the a r t of w r i t i n g , romanticism 
uncovers the aspect of the work t h a t deceives and sustains any 
p r o j e c t , and any quest, t h a t i s , the work-lessness of the work. 
F i n a l l y , as has been analysed, the fragmentary exigency, i s , f o r 
Blanchot, the heart and soul of the n o t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e t o which 
romanticism gives a p o s s i b i l i t y , outside the p r o p o s i t i o n s of 
philosophy. I t may be r e l e v a n t t o an e x p l o r a t i o n of the works of 
Shelley, p a r t i c u l a r l y as the l a t t e r was h i g h l y responsive t o the 
tensions a r i s i n g from the p h i l o s o p h i c a l debates of h i s t i m e . The 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t which t h i s research w i l l take i n c a r r y i n g out such 
an e x p l o r a t i o n i s the c o n t r i b u t i o n which the n o t i o n o f the 
l i t e r a r y and fragmentary exigency can make w i t h i n the debate 
around Shelley's p h i l o s o p h i c a l a f f i n i t i e s and the r o l e which he 
envisaged f o r poetry. As suggested, the n o t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e t o 
which Blanchot sees Jena Romanticism open i t s e l f cannot be 
understood as the instrument of a re-engagement w i t h the world 
as conceived by the i d e a l i s t d o c t r i n e w i t h o u t s e r i o u s l y 
d e s t a b i l i s i n g the subject's understanding of t h i s world, and h i s 
or her a c t i o n w i t h i n i t . This n o t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e even a l t e r e d 
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the p r i o r n o t i o n of a disengagement from the world, as i f the 
s o l u t i o n changed the problem t o which i t i s the s o l u t i o n . 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EMPIRICISM AND SHELLEY'S 'SPECULATIONS ON METAPHYSICS* 
The previous Chapter has o u t l i n e d a n o t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e d e r i v e d 
from the response which i d e a l i s m meant t o give t o the issues 
a r i s i n g from the Enlightenment. This Chapter w i l l examine the 
r o l e of empiricism i n Shelley's n o t i o n of knowledge, as developed 
i n the c o l l e c t i o n of essays and fragments e n t i t l e d 'Speculations 
on Metaphysics.' 
The n o t i o n of ae s t h e t i c s emerged as the previous s c h o l a s t i c and 
e a r l y Enlightenment p i c t u r e of a world, where u n i t y was a p r i o r i 
d i v i n e l y guaranteed, was abandoned, and as changes i n conceptions 
of t r u t h i n modern thought were t a k i n g place. Aesthetics may be 
understood as the expression of the need t o provide f o r a 
meaningfulness which the s e c u l a r i z a t i o n and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of 
modern thought d i d not address.(1) As was i n d i c a t e d i n the 
previous Chapter, Kant's philosophy r e s t s a t the centre o f t h i s 
modern dilemma i n the sense t h a t i t places the subject a t the 
heart of the a c q u i s i t i o n and formation of knowledge, but bars i t s 
access t o the higher p r i n c i p l e whereby the completion of 
knowledge could be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the coherence of the w o r l d . 
Kant's d o c t r i n e was meant t o mend the fragmentariness i n which 
empiricism and Hume's s c e p t i c a l philosophy had l e f t i t . I n t h i s 
respect, i t may be seen as p a r t of the r e a c t i o n , w i t h which 
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Romanticism has been associated, against mere reasoning over 
observable f a c t s . On the other hand, Kant does not eschew the 
dualism between the o b j e c t i v e and the s u b j e c t i v e domains. 
W i t h i n t h i s framework, a r t appears r e q u i r e d i n Kantian philosophy 
as the o u t l e t f o r the a r t i c u l a t i o n of consciousness which 
knowledge cannot provide. As suggested i n the previous chapter, 
the importance which Kant gives a r t i n h i s philosophy i s 
s i g n a l l e d by the f a c t t h a t a r t i s t i c r e a l i z a t i o n cannot be 
a s s i m i l a t e d w i t h knowledge. For Kant a r t cannot become 
" o b j e c t i f i e d i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n " , as i s the case f o r 
S c h e l l i n g . That " a r t may be seen a bearer of t r u t h " (2) means, 
f o r S c h e l l i n g , t h a t a r t has already found i t s t r u t h , and i s the 
n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n of t h i s t r u t h , whereas, f o r Kant, 
a r t provides a t r u t h whose p o t e n t i a l c l a i m would be t o change 
knowledge, i f only a r t could become knowledge, t h a t i s t o say, 
redundant as a r t . That a r t comes close t o undoing the d i v i s i o n 
between o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e i s p r e c i s e l y an achievement 
which remains i n a c e s s i b l e w i t h i n the world of c o g n i t i o n . Yet 
w i t h o u t undoing t h i s d i v i s i o n , a r t would not be. A r t may be seen 
as both working w i t h i n these d i s t i n c t i o n s , and as g i v i n g them the 
l i e . This ambiguity i s a t the r o o t of the n o t i o n of the artwork's 
accomplishment which, i n e f f e c t , performs the disappearance of 
the work, and has been i d e n t i f i e d as the crowning achievement o f 
the romantic absolute work of a r t by Blanchot, i e , as m a n i f e s t i n g 
"the power t o be and no longer t o represent, t o be as a 
whole...in a form w h i c h . . . s i g n i f i e s [ t h e whole] i n suspending 
i t . " (3) 
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The n o t i o n of the a e s t h e t i c i s set i n a t e n s i o n w i t h the domain 
of knowledge. I t may be considered as having a k i n d of 
complementary r o l e i n Kant's d o c t r i n e , where i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o 
the reinforcement of Reason, and an overarching r o l e i n 
transcendental Idealism, which elevates i t t o the u n f o l d i n g , and 
even the r e v e l a t i o n , of the system of the world. As has been w e l l 
documented by Roberts, Shelley had access t o t h i s aspect of post-
Kantian thought, (4) and i n many ways, such t e x t s as 'On L i f e ' 
(1819) and The Defence of Poetry (1821) bear witness t o Shelley's 
a f f i n i t i e s w i t h t h i s t r a d i t i o n , whereby the poet's works are 
v i n d i c a t e d as making apparent t o the community i t s own wider 
c o n s t i t u t i v e movement, i e , i t s S p i r i t . However, the i d e a l i s t 
p r o pensity i n Shelley may not stand i n such c o n t r a s t w i t h the 
strand i n Shelley's i n t e l l e c t u a l make-up which has been more 
d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s of the 
Enlightenment, and connected t o h i s r a d i c a l p o l i t i c a l ideas ( 5 ) , 
t h a t i t should lead t o a reading of "two Shelleys". 
I f a r t i s seen as addressing aspects i n the subject which the 
modern d e f i n i t i o n of knowledge does not s a t i s f y , then i t i s 
possible t o suggest t h a t r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n has also c o n t r i b u t e d t o 
b r i n g these aspects t o l i g h t and t o make them more pressing t o 
address. I n t h i s sense, through a r t , r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n would come 
to remedy i t s own shortcoming. On the other hand, i f knowledge 
does not imply the subject's a l i e n a t i o n from the world a g a i n s t 
which romantic a r t was supposed t o r e a c t , then a r t does no t need 
to p l a y a c u r a t i v e , or " t h e r a p e u t i c " r o l e , t o use Hugh Roberts's 
term. For Shelley, the redemptive v i r t u e of a r t l a y more 
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obviously i n d i s r u p t i n g s t a t e s of a f f a i r s and of knowledge which 
had become adverse t o the " s p i r i t of Freedom" (A Philosophical 
View of Reform), and i n r e p e a l i n g "Large codes of f r a u d and woe" 
(Mont-Blanc), than i n achieving the u n i t y which the Post-Kantians 
envisaged. I n order t o explore t h i s issue, t h i s Chapter w i l l deal 
w i t h aspects of Shelley's conceptions of the possible knowledge 
of the world and of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between world and s u b j e c t 
i n "Speculations on Metaphysics", and t r a c e the i n f l u e n c e of 
empiricism w i t h i n these c o l l e c t e d fragments. Kenneth N e i l l 
Cameron stresses the d i f f i c u l t y i n d a t i n g the prose fragments 
gathered by Mary Shelley and e n t i t l e d 'Speculations on 
Metaphysics'. He i n d i c a t e s t h a t , together w i t h 'Speculations on 
Morals' , they were w r i t t e n over a span of fo u r years or more. (6) 
According t o David Lee Clark, the fragments, which he t i t l e s 'A 
Tre a t i s e on Morals,' were found amidst m a t e r i a l s w r i t t e n as e a r l y 
as 1815 and as l a t e as 1821. (7) Cameron expresses r e s e r v a t i o n s 
over D.L. Clark's d a t i n g of items, (8) and the l a t t e r ' s remark 
t h a t " i n thought and i n s t y l e [ t h e two fragments] belong t o 
Shelley's e a r l y prose, probably d a t i n g from 1812-1815", may be 
q u a l i f i e d by the f a c t t h a t Shelley f e l t the need t o i n c o r p o r a t e 
many elements from h i s e a r l i e r prose speculations, i n c l u d i n g 
'Speculations on Morals' w i t h i n A Defence of Poetry, one o f h i s 
l a t e r t e x t s . (9) On the basis of the reference t o Bacon i n 'What 
Metaphysics Are', and the close r e l a t i o n of the fragments t o 
Alastor, Timothy Clark suggests 1815 as a l i k e l y date. (10) The 
s e l e c t i o n of these fragments f o r the present a n a l y s i s , as agai n s t 
a more f r e q u e n t l y discussed t e x t such as 'On L i f e 1 (1819) f o r 
example, i s motivated by the attempt t o draw the value which 
53 
Shelley found i n empiricism away from a c o n t r a s t w i t h h i s more 
i d e a l i s t i c i n c l i n a t i o n s . 
Empiricism w i l l be considered here as c o n t r i b u t i n g t o 
r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n t o the extent t h a t i t challenged the dogmatic 
r a t i o n a l i s t view according t o which r a t i o n a l i t y was equated t o 
the l i g h t of nature and guaranteed by a superior, d i v i n e e n t i t y . 
Not only d i d empiricism p l a y a major r o l e i n e r a d i c a t i n g the 
s u p e r s t i t i o n s which Shelley denounced, but i t also was the main 
i n t e l l e c t u a l f o r c e i n undoing schemes of u n i t y which were 
abandoned as new conceptions of human independence from 
transcendental a u t h o r i t y emerged. Empiricism can be seen as the 
d o c t r i n e which opens the r a t i o n a l i s t i n t e l l e c t onto the world, 
and permits the n o t i o n of mind t o emerge. Far from a l i e n a t i n g the 
subject from the world, the e m p i r i c i s t emphasis on the p e r c e i v i n g 
mind revealed a whole area of experience t o which the human mind 
was now e n t i t l e d . 
The main t e n e t of e m p i r i c i s t epistemology was man's f a c u l t y of 
r e c e i v i n g impressions, i n s t e a d of being determined by innate 
f a c t o r s . The analysis w i l l focus on the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e which opens 'Speculations on Metaphysics 1: "We can 
t h i n k of nothing which we have not perceived" (11), and on the 
ways i n which i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s can be traced i n Shelley's 
c o l l e c t e d fragments. The a n a l y s i s w i l l take care t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
t h i s p r i n c i p l e from one which i s a s s i m i l a t e d w i t h the 
i m m a t e r i a l i s t d o c t r i n e according t o which 'to be i s t o be 
perceived', thereby making the human mind the determinant of 
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r e a l i t y . (12) On the c o n t r a r y , i n empiricism, the term sensation 
i n d i c a t e s a r e l a t i o n w i t h the w o r l d not divorced from mental 
processes. 
"We Can Think of Nothing Which We Have Not Perceived" (1815) 
With John Locke, the d e f i n i t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y undergoes a 
profound change: the domain of r a t i o n a l i t y extends as f a r as 
observation i s s u f f i c i e n t t o grasp n a t u r a l laws. This i m p l i e s the 
abandonment of any metaphysical model p r e - e x i s t e n t t o 
observation, and the equivalent abandonment of any transcendent 
e n t i t y s u s t a i n i n g such a model. The mind i s given a domain of 
a p p l i c a t i o n f o r i t s c a p a c i t i e s . I n opening up the independent 
i n t e l l e c t of r a t i o n a l i s m onto such a domain, empiricism has 
transformed i n t e l l e c t i n t o mind. The mind i s the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n 
of the i n t e l l e c t i n such a way t h a t the n o t i o n of world or nature 
becomes r e l e v a n t t o i t and meaningful f o r i t . 
Simultaneously, t h i s d o c t r i n e recognizes a domain of a p p l i c a t i o n 
of i t s c a p a c i t i e s f o r the mind. By f r e e i n g human reason from such 
a transcendent model, empiricism l i m i t s the domain of reason t o 
the t e s t o f experience, and lays i t open t o the i n f l u e n c e o f the 
senses and of s e n s i b i l i t y . Sensory perception has a prominent 
place i n the sentence opening the f i r s t of the fragments gathered 
under the t i t l e 'Speculations on Metaphysics': 
I t i s an axiom i n mental philosophy, t h a t we can t h i n k 
of n o thing which we have not perceived. (13) 
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I n the above q u o t a t i o n , Shelley acknowledges the d o c t r i n e of 
empiricism which denies "the existence of axioms as p r i n c i p l e s 
of knowledge which are l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from experience." (14) 
This apparently l i m i t s the domain of a p p l i c a t i o n of the mind t o 
something t h a t can be perceived. On the other hand, i f t h a t which 
i s perceived i s not understood as preceding thought, i t may not 
be seen as l i m i t i n g . At t h i s stage, however pe r c e p t i o n i s 
understood, i t may be suggested t h a t , w i t h empiricism, the term 
perception i n d i c a t e s t h a t the thought of the mind i s not merely 
what the mind can f i n d w i t h i n i t s e l f and v e r i f y by i t s e l f . 
I n order t o acquire a b e t t e r understanding of Shelley's 
endorsement of empiricism, i t w i l l be necessary, f i r s t o f a l l , 
t o give a d e s c r i p t i o n of the d o c t r i n e ' s main p o i n t s so as t o 
underline the r o l e i t was able t o p l a y i n undermining the 
opp o s i t i o n between the independent i n t e l l e c t understood along the 
l i n e s of t h i n k i n g substance on the one hand, and a p r e - e x i s t i n g 
r e a l i t y on the other hand. These p o i n t s may be summarized as 
f o l l o w s . F i r s t , the r e f u t a t i o n of innate p r i n c i p l e s i n man i s a 
move toward the autonomy of the mind i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the 
world. Second, Locke's d o c t r i n e reverses the guarantee of r e a l i t y 
o f f e r e d by r a t i o n a l i s m . T h i r d , as the mind i s considered as an 
object of science, man i s put back i n t o the n a t u r a l w o r l d . 
1) The R e f u t a t i o n of Innate P r i n c i p l e s i n Man as a Move 
Towards the Autonomy of the Mind i n i t s Relations With the 
World. 
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Empiricism was a c r i t i c a l p r o j e c t which put i n t o question the 
17th-century model of knowledge. According t o t h i s model, the 
nature of knowledge was t o be understood i n terms of the ideas 
which the mind found w i t h i n i t s e l f . These ideas insured a 
correspondence between the subject and the o b j e c t . The t r u t h of 
these ideas can be perceived, and t h i s v e r i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e s an 
i n d i v i d u a l inner sense or 'n a t u r a l l i g h t ' t h a t i s u n i v e r s a l l y 
shared. Locke's angle of a t t a c k against t h i s d o c t r i n e was 
p r i m a r i l y moral: he denied the existence of a law of conscience 
t e s t i f y i n g t o the greater l i g h t by which the mind of man had been 
invested before h i s f a l l . Empiricism put i n t o question the 
v a l i d i t y of a knowledge which was u l t i m a t e l y guaranteed by a 
"Deus ex machina" a l l o w i n g f o r the ca p a c i t y i n man t o perceive 
t r u t h , and which l e f t the door open t o s u p e r s t i t i o n and 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s . On the c o n t r a r y , empiricism asserted the 
independence of the human mind from supernatural i n f l u e n c e . 
As Yolton has suggested, the c o n t r i b u t i o n of empiricism was not 
so much t h a t i t objected t o innate ideas, as t h a t i t made in n a t e 
ideas redundant i n accounting f o r human knowledge. (15) Locke's 
d o c t r i n e aimed a t s e t t l i n g knowledge on i t s own basis, w i t h o u t 
reference t o the " l i g h t of nature", which was then considered as 
an outside a r b i t e r . (16) On the c o n t r a r y , t o determine the 
objects which were commensurate w i t h human knowledge became one 
of the concerns of empiricism. (17) With the e m p i r i c i s t emphasis 
on the n o t i o n of a world or of nature which i s seen as meaningful 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the mind, thoughts which are derived from sense 
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impressions do not represent p r e - e x i s t i n g t h i n g s , but describe 
a r e l a t i o n t o t h i n g s . 
For the e m p i r i c i s t s , the powers of the human mind had t o be 
examined, before the objects t o which the mind has access could 
be determined. With the e l i m i n a t i o n of innate p r i n c i p l e s , the 
mind ceased being seen as something l i k e a f i n i s h e d s t r u c t u r e 
t h a t merely needed t o v e r i f y a t r u t h which i t was p a r t o f i t s 
makeup t o a s c e r t a i n , t o the extent t h a t a transcendental e n t i t y 
guaranteed i t . On the c o n t r a r y , the mind's p o t e n t i a l and i t s 
capacity f o r progress were emphasised. To assert, as empiricism 
d i d , t h a t knowledge consisted of something else than the mind's 
s e l f - v e r i f i e d t r u t h , also meant t h a t the mind was above a l l the 
capacity t o come i n t o i t s own powers, as i s also asserted by 
Shelley: 
That which the most consummate i n t e l l i g e n c e t h a t have 
adorned t h i s m o rtal scene i n h e r i t as t h e i r b i r t h r i g h t , 
l e t us acquire (For i t i s w i t h i n our grasp) by c a u t i o n 
(18) 
The scope of the mind i s not pre-determined, or, i n other words, 
the mind i s no longer seen as t h i n k i n g substance. That which the 
mind can t h i n k i s not envisaged as a p r e - e x i s t i n g content t o 
which the capacity of the mind would measure up. This may be 
l i n k e d t o the n o t i o n of science as empiricism promoted i t . 
Science i m p l i e s a mind t h a t i s no longer closed upon i t s 
procedures of s e l f - v e r i f y i n g t r u t h accorded by a superior e n t i t y , 
because, on the c o n t r a r y , i t provides knowledge t h a t can be 
looked i n t o . I n t h i s sense, science a p p l i e s t o phenomena t h a t are 
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given a r e a l i t y of which the mind can take account. Science 
f o l l o w s observed f a c t s : i t i s both method and content. 
2) Locke's Doctrine Reverses the Guarantee of R e a l i t y Offered 
by Rationalism. 
Empiricism was opposed t o the r a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of knowledge, 
which was concerned not w i t h what happens t o be the case, but 
w i t h what cannot be otherwise. For a r a t i o n a l i s t l i k e Descartes, 
i t was impossible t o d i s t i n g u i s h r e a l sensations from imaginary 
ones by a d i r e c t i n s p e c t i o n , because sensations were caused by 
the a c t i o n of bodies whose existence we are assured of not by 
sensation, but by thought. (19) I t could be s a i d t h a t the 
imaginary was a category which the r a t i o n a l i s t i n t e l l e c t d i d not 
deal w i t h , since i t was not meant t o measure the degree of 
r e a l i t y of something but t o a s c e r t a i n t r u t h . On the c o n t r a r y , 
according t o Locke, a l l sensations and a l l our simple ideas were 
r e a l . The r e a l i t y of these sensations was not guaranteed by the 
c e r t i t u d e of thought against the testimony of the senses, b u t by 
the f a c t t h a t these sensations were subject t o no v o l u n t a r y 
i n t e r v e n t i o n from the s u b j e c t . I n other words, from Descartes t o 
Locke, the guarantee of r e a l i t y s h i f t e d from being equated w i t h 
the t r u t h which only the i n t e l l e c t could f i n d i n i t s e l f , t o being 
reduced t o the n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n and the p a s s i v i t y of the senses. 
Empiricism seemed t o l i m i t the a c t i v i t y of t h i s apparently 
n a t u r a l i z e d mind. I n other words, i t seemed t h a t the mind could 
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be recognized as autonomous from supernatural i n f l u e n c e , o n l y a t 
the r i s k o f appearing passive w i t h i n the n a t u r a l world. 
On the other hand, w i t h empiricism, the senses need not be 
described as passive, a t l e a s t not i n the sense i n which 
r a t i o n a l i s m understood i t . Empiricism need not be seen as 
fav o u r i n g passive senses against r a t i o n a l i s m ' s a c t i v e i n t e l l e c t , 
since, as suggested, t h i s i n t e l l e c t i t s e l f , dependent as i t was 
on a d i v i n e e n t i t y , was no longer a c t i v e f o r empiricism. The 
a c t i v i t y of the mind was l i n k e d t o i t s capacity f o r progress. I n 
f a c t , i n both empiricism and r a t i o n a l i s m , the concepts of 
p a s s i v i t y and a c t i v i t y underwent m o d i f i c a t i o n s : the p a s s i v i t y 
t h a t was i m p l i e d w i t h i n the e m p i r i c i s t d e f i n i t i o n of the mind no 
longer corresponded t o the inertness which cha r a c t e r i z e d matter 
f o r the i m m a t e r i a l i s t s ( f o r whom the immaterial p r i n c i p l e o f soul 
explained animation and l i f e ) . The apparent n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f the 
mind i m p l i e d i n Locke's d o c t r i n e could not have occurred w i t h o u t 
contemporaneous advances i n science, which transformed the very 
d e f i n i t i o n of nature i t s e l f . This t r a n s f o r m a t i o n was brought 
about by the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the n o t i o n of f o r c e i n the 
d e f i n i t i o n of matter. As a r e s u l t , "when the new concept of 
matter i s put i n place of the o l d one, the r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e 
between matter and s p i r i t disappears." (20) This s h i f t a f f e c t e d 
the guarantee of sure knowledge w i t h i n the a n a l y t i c a l method o f 
n a t u r a l science, and also w i t h i n empiricism. This guarantee could 
no longer l i e e x c l u s i v e l y i n the innate p r i n c i p l e s of the mind 
at the expense of phenomena (where perception of phenomena was 
held as p o t e n t i a l l y d e c e p t i v e ) . On the c o n t r a r y , the phenomena, 
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or f a c t s , upon which the p r i n c i p l e s of the new science were 
based, were given a r e a l i t y as something t o observe, i n both the 
senses of watching and f o l l o w i n g . 
3) The Mind i s Considered as an Object of Science and Man i s 
put back i n t o the Natural World 
The i n t u i t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y which had dominated the d e f i n i t i o n of 
man had set him outside of nature. With empiricism, on the 
c o n t r a r y , as long as the laws of nature could be grasped by 
observation and experience, there was no need f o r an i n n a t e 
p r i n c i p l e i n the mind. As Ernest Tuveson has summarized i t , 
Locke's d o c t r i n e was an epistemological r e v o l u t i o n i n which the 
locus of r e a l i t y was t r a n s f e r r e d t o the p e r c e i v i n g mind. (21) 
That the mind may be p e r c e i v i n g i m p l i e s t h a t i t i s p a r t o f i t s 
d e f i n i t i o n t h a t i t does not deal only w i t h i t s e l f . The mind d i d 
not c o n s i s t only i n a procedure such as the Cartesian i n t e l l e c t 
had f o l l o w e d t o v e r i f y i t s i n d u b i t a b l e existence. With 
empiricism, i t may be suggested, the mind t h i n k s t h a t which i s 
not already or p u r e l y a thought. 
Because empiricism claims t h a t the world i s the domain where the 
mind can exercise i t s c a p a c i t i e s , a science which i s based on 
observation means t h a t the mind which observes the o b j e c t of 
science also observes, i e , contemplates and f o l l o w s , the way of 
knowledge. Science i s always science of r e a l o b j e c t s , of o b j e c t s 
t h a t are appropriate t o the mind. This may e x p l a i n why, i n the 
f o l l o w i n g passage of 'Speculations on Metaphysics', the issue 
does not revolve around the d i v i s i o n between the world and the 
mind, a d i v i s i o n which i s susceptible of a r t i c u l a t i o n s , some of 
which may be deemed more t r u e than others, but between "words" 
and " f a c t s " : 
Logic or the science of words must no longer be 
confounded w i t h metaphysics or the science of f a c t s 
( . . . ) . Nor have those who are accustomed t o profess 
the g r e a t e s t v e n e r a t i o n f o r the i n d u c t i v e system of 
Lord Bacon adhered w i t h s u f f i c i e n t scrupulousness t o 
i t s r e g u l a t i o n s . They have professed indeed (and who 
has not professed?) t o deduce t h e i r conclusions from 
i n d i s p u t a b l e f a c t s . How came many of those f a c t s t o be 
c a l l e d i n d i s p u t a b l e ? What sanctioning correspondence 
u n i t e a concatenation of syllogisms? Their promises of 
deducing a l l systems from f a c t s has too o f t e n been 
performed by appealing i n favour of these pretended 
r e a l i t i e s t o the o b s t i n a t e preconceptions of the 
m u l t i t u d e ; or by the preposterous mistake of a name 
f o r a t h i n g . (22) 
In t h i s passage, the term " f a c t s " can be said t o be p a r t o f the 
conceptual framework of e m p i r i c a l science. I t also enables 
Shelley t o make a p o i n t about the n o t i o n of the o b j e c t i v i t y of 
science. Shelley asserts the existence of a science of f a c t s as 
i m p l i c i t l y opposed t o the v a r i a b i l i t y of words. He disputes the 
not i o n of " i n d i s p u t a b l e f a c t s " against those who have c a l l e d 
f a c t s a mere play of language. I n t h i s way, he combats both mere 
verbal disputes, and the f a l l a c y which consists i n making words 
pass as r e a l i t i e s or f a c t s . Shelley maintains the g r e a t e s t 
separation between language and the r e a l i t y which i t i s supposed 
to designate i n order t o r e s i s t language's tendency t o perpetuate 
conventions, and the f a l s e a u t h o r i t y of custom. (23) The science 
of f a c t s i s t h e r e f o r e a science t h a t w i l l never come across 
anything t h a t i s a f a c t i n i t s e l f , but only something t h a t i s 
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c a l l e d one. I n c a l l i n g l o g i c "the science of words", Shelley 
seems t o have adopted the e m p i r i c i s t tendency t o e l i m i n a t e the 
d i f f e r e n c e between the conceptual content of ideas, and other 
kinds of i n t u i t i o n , such as the i n t u i t i o n of emotional s t a t e s . 
This move makes concepts susceptible of a c u l t u r a l or i d e o l o g i c a l 
c o n s t r u c t i o n since, on the other hand, Shelley cannot subscribe 
t o the view which would t u r n an i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e i n t u i t i o n i n t o 
a f a c t . (24) Concepts are no more, and no less, i n d i s p u t a b l e than 
the evidence derived from the i n t r o s p e c t i o n i n t o our mental 
s t a t e s . For Shelley the persuasiveness which may be attached t o 
e i t h e r f o r b i d s them from t u r n i n g i n t o f a c t s which would l i m i t the 
exercise of the mind's c a p a c i t i e s . From t h i s a n a l y s i s , i t appears 
t h a t Shelley has used the o b j e c t i v i t y w i t h which the e m p i r i c a l 
n o t i o n of " f a c t " can be c r e d i t e d , i n c l u d i n g support from Bacon, 
i n order t o o f f e r a n o t i o n of open-ended o b j e c t i v i t y . 
I n t h i s passage, Shelley also makes use of the c r i t i c a l t h r u s t 
of empiricism against former metaphysical systems. I n the 
e m p i r i c a l t r a d i t i o n , observation was opposed t o metaphysical 
explanations, which were considered as u n r e l i a b l e speculations 
t h a t sought f i n a l causes and were unworthy of a science which 
d e a l t w i t h v e r i f i a b l e knowledge. So the paradox of Shelley's 
r e i n t r o d u c t i o n of the term 'metaphysics', instead of the expected 
'physics', w i t h i n a context which o v e r t l y acknowledges and 
supports the e m p i r i c a l d o c t r i n e , i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i k i n g . Yet, 
c l e a r l y , Shelley does not y i e l d t o u n v e r i f i a b l e metaphysics: he 
conforms t o the conception of sure knowledge a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the 
l i m i t s of the observable world, a conception i n h e r i t e d from the 
s p i r i t of the Encyclopaedia (the a n a l y t i c a l d i c t i o n a r y compiled 
by progressive French w r i t e r s i n the 18th c e n t u r y ) . (25) This i s 
so much so t h a t , when he characterizes h i s understanding o f the 
Universe i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: 
A catalogue of a l l the thoughts of the mind, and a l l 
t h e i r possible m o d i f i c a t i o n s , i s a cyclopaedic h i s t o r y 
of the universe. (26) 
he means t o r u l e out the same conjectures as Jean d'Alembert, one 
of the "encyclopedists", i n h i s Elements de philosophie: 
The supreme I n t e l l i g e n c e has drawn a v e i l before our 
feeble v i s i o n which we t r y i n v a i n t o remove. I t i s a 
sad l o t f o r our c u r i o s i t y and our p r i d e , but i t i s the 
l o t of humanity. We should conclude therefrom at any 
r a t e t h a t the systems, or r a t h e r the dreams of the 
philosophers on most metaphysical questions deserve no 
place i n a work e x c l u s i v e l y intended t o co n t a i n the 
r e a l knowledge acquired by the human mind. (27) 
However, the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Shelley's statements are t w o f o l d . 
F i r s t , the domain which d'Alembert has excluded from "the r e a l 
knowledge acquired by the human mind", something t h a t might have 
been c a l l e d 'speculations on metaphysics' i n d'Alembert's time, 
has been rea p p r o p r i a t e d as r e a l knowledge by Shelley. By c a l l i n g 
a science which appears t o f o l l o w the s t r i c t p r i n c i p l e s of 
empiricism 'metaphysics', Shelley makes the gesture of breaking 
the l i m i t beyond which a m a t e r i a l i s t i c v e r s i o n of empiricism 
could not go. Such a break i s po s s i b l e because there i s no 
p o s s i b i l i t y of v e r i f y i n g our knowledge against an outside w o r l d 
which would also be somehow accessible. The mind has t h e r e f o r e 
always a l l the knowledge of which i t i s capable. The combinations 
of thoughts t o which Shelley r e f e r s ("The most a s t o n i s h i n g 
combinations of poetry, the s u b t l e s t deductions of l o g i c and 
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mathematics, are no other than combinations which the i n t e l l e c t 
makes of sensations according t o i t s own laws") (28) are not due 
t o a f e l t discrepancy w i t h an outside world, and a discrepancy 
which i t would be the r o l e of progress t o reduce. With t h i s view 
of the world coming up t o the l i m i t of our mind, and w i t h o u t an 
e x t e r i o r c r i t e r i o n against which thoughts could be measured, mind 
and world evolve concomitantly. New thoughts are not brought 
about from the perce p t i o n of a need f o r them, and cannot be 
a n t i c i p a t e d , but are always l a t e n t . According t o t h i s a n a l y s i s , 
empiricism has been i d e n t i f i e d as the p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e 
which contests the conception of the mind as closed upon i t s e l f , 
and r e l y i n g on an o b j e c t i f i e d view of thoughts. The l a t t e r aspect 
of the e m p i r i c i s t c r i t i q u e played an important p a r t i n Shelley's 
view t h a t the thoughts of the mind cannot be mistaken f o r t h i n g s . 
Some s i m i l a r i t i e s between Shelley's views and those of the German 
i d e a l i s t s can be noted, t o the extent t h a t the l a t t e r ' s d o c t r i n e 
went as f a r as equating the mind w i t h the r e a l i t y made a v a i l a b l e 
t o i t . However, Shelley r e f r a i n e d from t a k i n g the i d e a l i s t step 
of arguing t h a t t h i s r e a l i t y was a v a i l a b l e because the mind 
matched the p r i n c i p l e of i t s production. I n h e r i t i n g the Kantian 
n o t i o n of reason which could not be reabsorbed i n the world of 
n a t u r a l laws, F i c h t e claimed t h a t the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of 
knowledge, or freedom, could be derived as a s t r u c t u r e , from the 
h i s t o r y of consciousness. Man i s f r e e t o the extent t h a t the 
transcendent forces which c o n d i t i o n consciousness (the "Absolute 
Ego") cannot themselves be brought down t o the l e v e l of 
consciousness, as Kant also claimed. For F i c h t e , "[B]eyond 
65 
consciousness, the mind had no r e a l o b j e c t t o focus on," (29) a 
view w i t h which Shelley's statement t h a t "the mind cannot be 
considered pure" (30) t a l l i e s t o some ext e n t . Shelley i s also 
close t o Kant, who "discounted an i n t u i t i o n based s o l e l y on the 
use of pure categories w i t h o u t the schemata of the s e n s i b i l i t y 
employed as w e l l . " (31) 
On the other hand, w i t h S c h e l l i n g , f o r freedom t o cease being an 
ab s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e t h a t could merely be derived from the h i s t o r y 
of consciousness, as was the case w i t h F i c h t e , i t had t o be 
i d e n t i f i e d not only w i t h the p r i n c i p l e of knowledge, but w i t h the 
p r i n c i p l e of r e a l i t y . (32) Schelling's move t o i d e n t i f y the 
domain of knowledge w i t h the domain of freedom also f i t s 
Shelley's view t h a t knowledge i s the r e a l world of the mind. 
However, the absence of an e x t e r i o r c r i t e r i o n , which allowed 
Shelley t o c l a i m the l a t t e r also prevented him from seeing f r e e 
man as "a f r e e source o f the f a c t s " , as young S c h e l l i n g d i d . (33) 
I t could be suggested t h a t , from the evidence o f f e r e d i n 
'Speculations on Metaphysics 1, according t o Shelley, the mind 
cannot be considered pure, but there i s no need t o separate 
freedom from knowledge. Knowledge i s the r e a l w o r l d of the mind, 
because the mind cannot be considered pure. Shelley does not aim 
at the c e r t a i n t y of i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n which both F i c h t e and 
Sc h e l l i n g opposed t o the consciousness of t h i n g s i n time and 
space. His views do not aim t o make freedom e n t i r e l y represented 
i n and as the world. Shelley's i n t e l l e c t u a l philosophy may be 
described as a k i n d of phenomenalism, a s s i m i l a t i n g as i t does a l l 
t a l k of t h i n g s perceived t o t a l k of a c t u a l or p o s s i b l e 
experience- (34) 
'Speculations on Metaphysics, 1 f o r Shelley, are nothing but 
v e r i f i a b l e f a c t s : thoughts are of the mind only i f they are 
simultaneously of the world: they are not the mental 
representations of a p r e - e x i s t i n g world. Shelley's views appear 
s i m i l a r t o those which Novalis o f f e r s i n the f o l l o w i n g passage 
from 'Logological Fragments', where, i n Novalis's case, the term 
" s p i r i t " i n d i c a t e s the poet's wish t o i d e n t i f y the mind's and the 
world's a c t i v i t y : 
What i s nature? An encyclopedic systematic index or 
pl a n of our s p i r i t . Why should we be content w i t h the 
mere catalogue of our treasures - l e t us examine them 
f o r ourselves - and work w i t h them i n diverse ways... 
Everything seems t o stream inward i n t o us, because we 
do not stream outwards. We are negative because we 
want t o be - the more p o s i t i v e we become, the more 
negative w i l l the world around become - u n t i l a t l a s t 
there w i l l be no more negation - but instead we are 
a l l i n a l l . (35) 
The d i f f e r e n c e between Shelley and Novalis i n t h i s connection i s 
t h a t , whereas the l a t t e r sees the equation of the a c t i v i t y o f the 
mind w i t h t h a t of the world as the o b j e c t i v e of a task f o r the 
mind t o derive " s p i r i t " from the "catalogue", the former evokes 
the i d e n t i t y of the thoughts of the mind and of the h i s t o r y of 
the universe as m i r r o r i n g terms or names, wi t h o u t any f u r t h e r 
r e s o l u t i o n . Shelley r e s i s t s t u r n i n g e i t h e r the m a t e r i a l universe 
or the mind i n t o an immovable p r i n c i p l e or a c t i v i t y from which 
our conceptions must be u l t i m a t e l y derived. Since, f o r Shelley, 
"we can t h i n k of nothing which we have not perceived", and 
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perception does not imply a p r e - e x i s t i n g world, i t must, then 
correspond t o a l i m i t w i t h i n thought. 
F i n a l l y , Shelley's v i n d i c a t i o n of "the i n d u c t i v e system of Lord 
Bacon" has two i m p l i c a t i o n s . Bacon had become the figurehead o f 
B r i t i s h science and philosophy i n the 18th century. What i s now 
designated as "Anglo-Saxon Empiricism" found i t s r o o t s i n Bacon's 
o p p o s i t i o n t o the Ramist d o c t r i n e of a simple correspondence 
between the mind and the world tantamount t o a transparent order 
of t h i n g s . (36) I n c o n t r a s t , the Baconian method emphasised the 
l i m i t a t i o n placed upon the mind's i n t u i t i v e apprehensions, and 
the r o l e of experiment and i n d u c t i o n i n c o r r e c t i n g the mind's 
tendency t o mix up i t s own nature w i t h the nature of t h i n g s . (37) 
Shelley's r e j e c t i o n of a d i s t i n c t i o n between mental and e x t e r n a l 
r e a l i t y need not prevent him from v i n d i c a t i n g Bacon's a u t h o r i t y . 
On the c o n t r a r y , r i g o r i n the a t t e n t i o n t o f a c t s , and i n 
deduction independently of the i m p o s i t i o n of mental 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s , could be used i n the service of a view which d i d 
not d i s t i n g u i s h between the two, since one set of terms could be 
used i n the place of the other. On the other hand, and as Timothy 
Clark has c o n v i n c i n g l y argued, Shelley also denounced the forms 
of philosophy which based the v a l i d i t y of t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s merely 
on the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the use of words, as i s the case w i t h 
Thomas Reid's School of Common Sense.(38) Whereas, f o r Reid, 
u n i v e r s a l r u l e s could be obtained through the i n d u c t i v e method 
w i t h i n the confines of mechanics, astronomy or o p t i c s , (39) the 
v a l i d i t y of the mental was based only on the c o n v i c t i o n s which 
the i n d i v i d u a l found w i t h i n h i mself: 
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What convinces myself t h a t I have an idea of power i s , 
t h a t I am conscious t h a t I know what I mean by t h a t 
word...(40) 
The appeal t o u n v e r i f i a b l e c o n v i c t i o n , r e l y i n g only on a pre-
e x i s t e n t consensus about words, was the paradoxical outcome of 
the Baconian concern t o avoid the i m p o s i t i o n of a s i n g l e method 
upon both nature and the mind (an i m p o s i t i o n i m p l i e d i n Ramist 
d o c t r i n e ) . On the c o n t r a r y , and as has been suggested e a r l i e r , 
Shelley combines the apparently a n t i t h e t i c a l notions of 
metaphysics and of the Baconian system, because, f o r him, 
metaphysics no longer equals u n v e r i f i a b l e knowledge. Far from 
applying a method t o a domain f o r which i t had not been intended, 
Shelley cannot assume the d i s t i n c t i o n between the moral and the 
m a t e r i a l domains. Shelley r e t a i n s the n o t i o n of sure knowledge 
of o b j e c t s which are commensurate w i t h the human mind, but the 
l i m i t upon the scope of knowledge which t h i s n o t i o n i m p l i e s , has 
become p r o v i s i o n a l and i n d e f i n i t e l y expandable, t o the p o i n t of 
c o n t a i n i n g the "whole catalogue of existence", because i t i s not 
a l i m i t which can be imposed from outside upon the mind. 
Metaphysics i s a word which has been so long a p p l i e d 
t o denote an i n q u i r y i n t o the phenomena of mind, t h a t 
i t would j u s t l y be considered presumptuous t o employ 
another. But e t y m o l o g i c a l l y i t i s very i l l adapted t o 
express the science of mind. I t asserts a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the moral and the m a t e r i a l universe which i t 
i s presumptuous t o assume. Metaphysics may be defined 
as the science of a l l t h a t we know, f e e l , remember and 
b e l i e v e inasmuch as our knowledge, sensations, memory 
and f a i t h c o n s t i t u t e the universe considered 
r e l a t i v e l y t o human i d e n t i t y . (41) 
The l i m i t , i f any, which Shelley sets t o human knowledge seems 
more i n l i n e w i t h the conception voiced by Fontenelle, f o r whom 
knowledge can be measured by the e x t e n t of the human world: "Our 
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knowledge has c e r t a i n l i m i t s beyond which the human mind was 
never able t o go... the r e s t i s f o r other worlds where t h i n g s we 
know are unknown." (42) I n the process, Shelley has reclaimed the 
domain of physics i n t o metaphysics, t u r n i n g the d e f i n i t i o n of 
metaphysics as the concern w i t h a p r i o r i knowledge not s u b j e c t 
to s h i f t i n g e m p i r i c a l perceptions i n t o i t s opposite, or, which 
amounts t o the same t h i n g , making perceptions, memory e t c , as 
c e r t a i n as a p r i o r i knowledge. While these views oppose the 
conception of e x t e r n a l substance, Shelley's atheism also excludes 
any n o t i o n of a Berkeleyan a l l - w i s e S p i r i t r e g u l a t i n g the whole 
system of being. 
I n t h i s respect, Shelley's views can be compared w i t h those of 
Jacobi, who disputed Kant's separation between appearances and 
things i n themselves, because, Jacobi claimed, Kant would have 
needed a higher standpoint from which t o separate them. This 
casts doubt on the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of being which p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
systems can o f f e r because " p h i l o s o p h i c a l understanding does not 
reach beyond i t s own production." (43) As Shelley states above, 
metaphysics i s nothing but the universe "considered r e l a t i v e l y 
to human i d e n t i t y " . He appears, at l e a s t i n t h i s passage, t o 
eschew such concerns as Jacobi's w i t h " t h a t which cannot be 
explained" as the f i n a l purpose of explanation, (44) and would, 
presumably, no longer be r e l a t i v e t o human i d e n t i t y . 
Shelley's statement t h a t "we can t h i n k of nothing which we have 
not perceived" seems t o support Locke's d o c t r i n e of knowledge, 
according t o which ideas are deri v e d from sensations, as long as 
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objects of pe r c e p t i o n are not understood as p r e - e x i s t i n g t h e i r 
p e r c e p t i o n . The n o t i o n o f " d e r i v a t i o n " was a t the core o f the 
misrepresentation o f Locke's d o c t r i n e as sensationalism. (45) With 
Shelley's c l a i m t h a t the mental and the e x t e r n a l universe could 
not be d i s t i n g u i s h e d , there could be no d e r i v a t i o n i n the sense 
of causation, since n e i t h e r term i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p can be 
declared p r i o r t o the other. 
Cause. Motive, and Meaning. 
The r o l e given t o the sensory o r i g i n of ideas i n Shelley's 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of empiricism serves t o oppose the dualism between 
mind and matter as the basis f o r an explanation of perc e p t i o n . 
The a t t a c k on such dualism was the aspect i n Hume and i n 
Drummond's Academical Questions (1805) which, as Pulos has 
demonstrated, appealed t o Shelley. Deleuze's remark underlines 
the f u n c t i o n of the sensory o r i g i n of ideas i n Hume' s own 
tr a n s f o r m a t i o n of empiricism: 
The p o i n t of view on the o r i g i n [ o f i d e a s ] , according 
t o which any idea i s deri v e d from a p r e - e x i s t i n g 
impression and stands f o r i t , i s not as important as 
i t has g e n e r a l l y been taken t o be. I t merely gives the 
mind a simple o r i g i n , and i t prevents ideas from 
r e p r e s e n t i n g t h i n g s , w i t h which one could h a r d l y 
understand how ideas might bear any resemblance. (46) 
The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e theory of ideas, according t o which ideas 
represent p r e - e x i s t i n g t h i n g s , i s under a t t a c k through the n o t i o n 
of d e r i v a t i o n . On the other hand, the emphasis on the p e r c e i v i n g 
mind should not be taken as a step towards the m a t e r i a l i s t i c 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of men seen only as matter under d i f f e r e n t 
s i t u a t i o n s . As Yolton has shown, even La M e t t r i e ' s extreme 
m a t e r i a l i s m , as i n h i s L'Homme machine, (1798) cannot be 
understood i n those terms : 
the body machine i s not the same as l'homme machine" 
the l a t t e r i s the body machine a f t e r i t has acquired 
the "human" p r o p e r t i e s of thought and f e e l i n g . The 
one-substance language he [La M e t t r i e ] sometimes uses 
does not r e s u l t i n a r e d u c t i o n of a l l p r o p e r t i e s t o 
one s o r t . (47) 
I n other words, the dependence of mental events upon 
p h y s i o l o g i c a l events, which a m a t e r i a l i s t l i k e La M e t t r i e 
b e l i e v e d i n , does not mean "a metaphysical monism of q u a l i t i e s . " 
(48) 
I f , as i s the case f o r the m a t e r i a l i s t s , the soul i s i n t r u t h the 
body i n i t s aspects of t h i n k i n g , f e e l i n g and w i l l i n g , then, t o 
b e l i e v e and t o judge are as n a t u r a l as t o breathe and t o walk. 
Reason has become, as i t has f o r Hume, 'a q u i e t k i n d of passion 1 . 
Shelley's d e f i n i t i o n of metaphysics as "the science of a l l t h a t 
we know, f e e l , remember, and b e l i e v e " can be understood i n terms 
of a s i m i l a r l e v e l l i n g down of reason, w i t h o u t , however, 
a s c r i b i n g a determining r o l e t o sensory perceptions. The most 
re d u c t i v e conception of the mind was o f f e r e d by Hume, who saw the 
mind as a mere f l u x of perceptions, and describes ideas as 
"contents of awareness". I f according t o Hume, "nothing i s ever 
r e a l l y present w i t h the mind but i t s perceptions" (49) then, 
consequently "there can be no mind w i t h o u t some idea." (50) Yet 
the f a c t t h a t the dependence of ideas on sensory perceptions 
leads Hume t o describe the mind as a f l u x , i e , as the prey of 
s h i f t i n g impressions, i n d i c a t e s the extent t o which Hume s t i l l 
saw i n the mind some k i n d of f a c u l t y a c t i n g as a centre or basis 
which i s s t a t i c enough t o undergo s h i f t and movement. I n 
'Speculations on Metaphysics", Shelley casts no doubt on the 
mind's perceptions i n themselves, since the mind cannot t e s t 
i t s e l f against t h a t which i s not the mind. 
When the e m p i r i c i s t view of the mind i s taken t o i t s f u l l 
consequences, the issue of causation and motive does not i n v o l v e 
f r e e w i l l , but i s r a t h e r a matter of accumulating explanatory 
f a c t s d e s c r i b i n g r e g u l a r i t i e s . Such was Shelley's view i n 1811, 
when he wrote Queen Mab: 
The word l i b e r t y , as a p p l i e d t o mind, i s analogous t o 
the word chance as applied t o matter: they s p r i n g from 
an ignorance of the c e r t a i n t y of the c o n j u n c t i o n of 
antecedents and consequents...(51) 
This conception of the human w i l l opposed the n o t i o n of v o l i t i o n 
as u l t i m a t e l y independent of the perception of determining 
motives, where, as i n Godwin's necessarian philosophy, motive 
means "the discerned goodness of a p a r t i c u l a r end." (52) Freedom 
consists i n obeying a determining motive. This 'necessarian' 
conception ascribed e f f i c a c y t o such a perception, which i t d i d 
not d i s t i n g u i s h from understanding. I n t h i s respect, t o be 
perceived meant t o be understood. 
These views can be seen as c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o those which Shelley 
held i n 'Speculations on Metaphysics,* i n d i c a t i n g the c o n t i n u i t y 
of h i s thought. F i r s t , they imply t h a t , as v o l i t i o n can be 
e n t i r e l y r e d u c i b l e t o observable r e g u l a r i t i e s , the word l i b e r t y 
only stands f o r the ignorance of t h a t which has not been 
explained i n t h i s way y e t . L i b e r t y , then, only names the l i m i t 
of a system of explanation or a r t i c u l a t i o n which the mind's 
movement d i s p l a y s , but i t cannot be o b j e c t i f i e d i n t o an 
independent capacity i n man. More i m p o r t a n t l y , l i b e r t y can also 
be seen as naming the "ignorance of the c e r t a i n t y " of any system 
of explanation t o the extent t h a t , as a system, i t cannot e x p l a i n 
how i t " r e l a t e [ s ] t o the world outside [ i t s ] axioms." (53) This 
also means t h a t our knowledge does not allow us t o a n t i c i p a t e 
t h a t which i s unknown t o us, or t h a t which the mind can achieve. 
However, agency, and, more g e n e r a l l y , psychological acts, could 
not be explained by a s i n g l e law of a s s o c i a t i o n of sense 
impressions, such as the 18th-century philosopher H a r t l e y had 
proposed w i t h h i s mechanist theory of v i b r a t i o n s . As Yolton has 
p o i n t e d out, t h i s theory could not e x p l a i n how v i b r a t i o n s can 
have meaning, t h a t i s , "how they can represent f o r us the o b j e c t s 
t o which we want t o r e f e r . " (54) I n c o n t r a s t t o H a r t l e y ' s 
p o s i t i o n , Hume's systematic examination of human nature took the 
n o t i o n of the s o c i a l l y agreed meaning of actions as i t s b a s i s . 
The study of the motives of men's actions was the study o f the 
meaning of t h e i r ideas. Consequently, men's actions also embodied 
t r u t h claims, but t r u t h was not based on the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
theory of the resemblance between ideas and t h e i r o b j e c t s , but 
on the d i s t i n c t i o n between ideas. 
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The n o t i o n of "discernment" i s present i n the more l i t e r a r y 
context of Shelley's review of T.J. Hogg's Memoirs of Prince 
Alexy Haimatoff (1814): 
The science of mind t o which h i s t o r y , poetry, biography 
serve as the m a t e r i a l s c o n s i s t s i n the discernment of 
shades and d i s t i n c t i o n s where the unenlightened discover 
nothing but a shapeless and meaningless mass. The f a c u l t y 
f o r t h i s discernment d i s t i n g u i s h e s genius from 
dullness.(55) 
I n t h i s passage, Shelley sees the science of mind as an 
enlightenment, i n c o n t r a s t w i t h which "the unenlightened" can be 
compared w i t h those who, i n the Age of Reason, were r u l e d by 
unexamined and mostly r e l i g i o u s p r i n c i p l e s . What t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
k i n d of enlightenment reveals, are "shades and d i s t i n c t i o n s " as 
opposed t o "a shapeless and meaningless mass". By v i r t u e o f the 
p a r a l l e l which Shelley makes here, the apparent a e s t h e t i c import 
of t h a t which i s revealed (conveyed by the notions of shade and 
shape as opposed t o "dullness") i s given a status t h a t i s 
equivalent t o t h a t of Reason i n the age of s e c u l a r i z a t i o n as a 
guide i n the understanding of the world. Simultaneously, i t may 
be argued t h a t the v i s i o n of the world which the science of mind 
allows i s not s p e c i f i c a l l y a e s t h e t i c , as the terms "discernment", 
" d i s t i n c t i o n s " and "discover" may equally apply t o sensory 
perception, mental judgment or a e s t h e t i c a p p r e c i a t i o n . This 
r e c a l l s the equivalence between a l l f a c u l t i e s which Shelley 
proposes i n some passages of 'Speculations on Metaphysics', as 
p r e v i o u s l y discussed. At the same time, t h i s suggests t h a t the 
v i s i o n - any v i s i o n , t h a t i s , any frame of understanding -
whereby a world r a t h e r than a "meaningless mass" may be 
envisaged, i s already a e s t h e t i c . Discernment i s an a c t i v i t y o f 
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shaping t h a t i s e q u i v a l e n t t o the discovery of m a t e r i a l which i s 
commensurate w i t h the human mind. This view i s close t o Kant's 
p o i n t t h a t f o r knowledge t o be something else than a mere 
accumulation of data, i t had t o be u n d e r l a i d by a u n i t y which 
i t s e l f could not be deriv e d from t h a t which i s known. However, 
there i s no h i n t t h a t t h i s u n i t y may be embraced as a whole. 
The i n s u f f i c i e n c y of the mechanist theory of p e r c e p t i o n , 
according t o which perception i s caused d i r e c t l y by what i s 
perceived, also appears i n Shelley's account of the idea of other 
i n d i v i d u a l minds i n the 'Speculations on Metaphysics'. I n the 
co n s i d e r a t i o n of the problem of the existence of other minds, the 
danger of s o l i p s i s m was encountered by many philosophers, among 
whom Descartes and Locke, who admitted t h a t o b j e c t s of sense 
experience are mind-dependent. Shelley also alludes t o t h i s issue 
i n the f o l l o w i n g passage: 
Our evidence, w i t h respect t o the existence of other 
minds, i s founded upon a very complicated r e l a t i o n of 
ideas which i t i s f o r e i g n t o [ t h e ] purpose of t h i s 
t r e a t i s e t o anatomise. The basis of t h i s r e l a t i o n i s 
undoubtedly, a p e r i o d i c a l recurrence of masses of 
ideas, which our own v o l u n t a r y determinations, have, 
i n one p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n , no power t o circumscribe 
or t o a r r e s t , and against the recurrence of which they 
can only i m p e r f e c t l y provide. The i r r e s i s t i b l e laws o f 
thought c o n s t r a i n us t o b e l i e v e t h a t the precise 
l i m i t s of our a c t u a l ideas are not the a c t u a l l i m i t s 
of possible ideas; the laws according t o which these 
deductions are drawn, i s c a l l e d analogy; and t h i s i s 
the foundation of a l l our inferences, from an idea t o 
another, inasmuch as they resemble each other. (56) 
I n the second sentence of t h i s account, Shelley maintains a 
Humean d e f i n i t i o n of c a u s a l i t y , as the perception of a mere 
r e c u r r i n g r e g u l a r i t y ( c o n j u n c t i o n of ideas) upon which 
'voluntary i n t e r v e n t i o n ' has no i n f l u e n c e . I n t h i s passage, i t 
i s c l e a r t h a t ideas, such as the idea of other minds, are c l e a r l y 
not seen as the mental representations of p r e - e x i s t i n g o b j e c t s , 
but, i n p a r t , as i n d i c a t i v e of tendencies which cannot be helped. 
I t i s also suggested t h a t t h i s does not c o n s t i t u t e a l i m i t a t i o n 
on thought, but i s inherent i n i t . Shelley suggests t h a t ideas 
i n v o l v e considerations other than t h e i r pure i d e a t i o n a l content. 
The mind does not r u l e i t s thoughts i n the sense t h a t i t c o u l d 
t h i n k as i t wishes, or according t o motives which are transparent 
t o i t . The thoughts of the mind c o n s t i t u t e a world which r e f l e c t s 
the lack of transparency of thoughts, and which, f o r t h i s very 
reason, i s s u c e p t i b l e of manipulation. That some ideas are 
compelling i s not the opposite of l i b e r t y . On the c o n t r a r y , t h i s 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t they p a r t i c i p a t e i n communal p r a c t i c e s at a deeper 
l e v e l than can be d i c t a t e d . Shelley's l a s t p o i n t i n t h i s passage, 
t h a t "the precise l i m i t s of our a c t u a l ideas are not the a c t u a l 
l i m i t s of possible ideas", may be r e l a t e d t o the n o t i o n t h a t the 
mind cannot apprehend the scope of i t s c a p a c i t i e s . Shelley t u r n s 
the s c e p t i c a l suspension of b e l i e f and knowledge i n t o an 
i r r e p r e s s i b l e movement ("constrain us t o b e l i e v e " ) away from the 
a c t u a l , and suggests t h a t i t i s inherent i n the nature of 
thoughts t h a t they are evocative of other thoughts. 
D i v e r s i t i e s . I n t e r s t i c e s , and Language. 
Shelley does not need t o r e s o r t t o the n o t i o n of an inner sense, 
such as " s e n s i b i l i t y " , i n order t o account f o r the existence o f 
moral or a e s t h e t i c agreements. Ideas t e s t i f y t o the context (the 
" S p i r i t of the Age") i n which they are produced, w i t h o u t t h i s 
context being c o n s t r a i n i n g i n r e t u r n . Moreover, as the meaningful 
thoughts h e l d by s u b j e c t s , they represent an extension from 
a c t u a l t o p o s s i b l e ideas. Thought can, t h e r e f o r e , be s a i d t o be 
i m a g i n a t i v e . Shelley does not seem t o envisage the k i n d o f gap 
between the mind and experience, or between phenomenon and 
noumenon, which the German i d e a l i s t s , f o r t h e i r p a r t , f e l t the 
need t o b r i d g e , o f t e n by c l a i m i n g "the a u t h o r i t y of an absolute, 
the knowledge of an e s s e n t i a l or 'noumenal' i d e n t i t y . " (57) The 
connection between the knower and the objects which are known 
need not be sanctioned by the a u t h o r i t y of an absolute. This i s 
made apparent i n the f o l l o w i n g passage from 'Speculations on 
Metaphysics': 
we see t r e e s , f i e l d s , l i v i n g beings i n our shape, and 
i n shapes more or less analogous t o our own. These are 
p e r p e t u a l l y changing the mode of t h e i r existence 
r e l a t i v e l y t o us. To express the v a r i e t i e s of these 
modes, we say, we move, they move; and as t h i s motion 
i s c o n t i n u a l , though uniform, we express our 
conception o f the d i v e r s i t i e s of i t s course by - i t 
has been, i t i s , i t s h a l l be. These d i v e r s i t i e s are 
events or objects and are e s s e n t i a l , considered 
r e l a t i v e l y t o human i d e n t i t y , f o r the existence of the 
human mind. For i f the i n e q u a l i t i e s , produced by what 
has been termed the operations of the e x t e r n a l 
universe were l e v e l l e d by the perception of our being, 
u n i t i n g and f i l l i n g up t h e i r i n t e r s t i c e s , motion and 
mensuration, and time and space; the elements of t h e 
human mind thus abstracted, sensation and imagination 
cease. Mind cannot be considered pure. (58) 
Change, d i f f e r e n c e s and d i v e r s i t i e s are not p r e - e x i s t e n t i n the 
a l l e g e d l y outside world. Nor are they merely the p r o j e c t i o n s or 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n s of the mind. The d i v e r s i t i e s which are 
perceived cannot be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from the p e r c e p t i o n o f 
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d i v e r s i t i e s . As a r e s u l t , the mind may appear l i k e a Humean f l u x 
of perceptions, b u t , i n t h i s passage, t h i s motion i s n e i t h e r a 
c o n s t r a i n t nor a d e f i c i e n c y , but r e q u i r e d from the perspective 
of the mind, o r , " r e l a t i v e l y t o human i d e n t i t y " . This "motion" 
cannot be ascribed t o the perceived o b j e c t any more than t o the 
p e r c e i v i n g mind. The l a s t sentence of the 1840 e d i t i o n , f o l l o w i n g 
a cancelled passage of the manuscript d e f i n i n g metaphysics as "an 
i n q u i r y concerning those things belonging t o , or connected w i t h , 
the i n t e r n a l nature of mind," r e i n f o r c e s t h i s view: 
I t i s s a i d t h a t mind produces motion; and i t might as 
w e l l have been s a i d t h a t motion produces mind. (59) 
As there i s no c r i t e r i o n measuring t h i s motion, i t i s n e i t h e r 
t r u e nor untrue. I f t h i s can be c a l l e d , i n the Kantian 
terminology, the wo r l d of c o n d i t i o n s , where i t i s po s s i b l e t o 
describe the chain o f c o n d i t i o n s of the subject's necessary way 
of seeing the world, then, t h i s may also be read as Shelley's 
statement t h a t such a chain may not n e c e s s a r i l y be a s s i m i l a t e d 
w i t h "the curse which binds us t o be subjected t o the accident 
of surrounding impressions," as s t a t e d i n A Defence of Poetry. 
(60). That surrounding impressions may be r e i f i e d as a c o n s t r a i n t 
and a curse i s already the sig n of t h e i r d e c l i n e . On the oth e r 
hand, i n the passage quoted from 'The Mind', nothing i n the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between mind and world i s l e f t t o be de s i r e d or 
unaccounted f o r , e i t h e r i n the o b j e c t , which i s a l l there i s t o 
perceive, or i n the sub j e c t , who does a l l the p e r c e i v i n g 
p o s s i b l e . 
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The absence of an e x t e r i o r c r i t e r i o n deciding on the i n c l u s i o n 
of ideas w i t h i n , or t h e i r e x c l u s i o n from, the "catalogue of 
existence i s also conveyed i n Shelley's c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
language. The apparently a r b i t r a r y and conventional d i s t i n c t i o n s 
of tense and persons, which are conveyed w i t h i n language, are not 
simply imposed upon what Shelley r e f e r s t o as the 'motion' of the 
outside world. Nor i s t h i s motion merely the product o f the 
flawed perception of a f i n i t e p e r c e i v i n g mind, and a mind t o 
which the u n d e r l y i n g u n i t y of the world would not be accessible. 
I n the passage quoted p r e v i o u s l y , Shelley describes the process 
by which the mind provides i t s e l f w i t h the w o r l d i n which the 
mind f i n d s i t s place ( " r e l a t i v e l y t o us", " r e l a t i v e l y t o human 
i d e n t i t y " ) . The mind and the world are interdependent terms, and 
t o t h i n k of a world t h a t i s not perceived by the mind would be 
a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . Thus, the " i n e q u a l i t i e s " or " d i v e r s i t i e s " t o 
which Shelley r e f e r s do not i n d i c a t e a f a u l t or a lack. On the 
c o n t r a r y , Shelley suggests t h a t they are p a r t and p a r c e l o f the 
laws of thought. The mind produces them, and they are a l s o the 
m a t e r i a l w i t h which the mind has t o deal. I n t h i s way, the mind 
may be described as an a r t i c u l a t i o n of i t s e l f , where the two 
strands of the chain r e s u l t from a s i n g l e t w i n i n g movement, and 
where the passage from one strand t o the other cannot be l o c a t e d . 
I n t h i s passage from the 'Speculations on Metaphysics', i t i s 
made c l e a r t h a t language cannot be s a i d t o be f a l s e because i t 
i n d i c a t e s d i s t i n c t i o n s where there are none. Language could o n l y 
be h e l d t o be d e c e p t i v e l y a r b i t r a r y i f , on the one hand, a r e a l 
s t a t e of t h i n g s outside of language could be envisaged, and i f , 
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on the other hand, language was mistaken f o r t h i n g s . On the 
co n t r a r y , and as noted by Terence Alan Hoagwood, "Shelley denies 
signs independent o n t o l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y " (61): 
The d i f f e r e n c e i s merely nominal between those two 
classes of thoughts which are v u l g a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
by the names of ideas and of e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . (...) 
The words, I , you, they, are not signs of any a c t u a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s u b s i s t i n g between the assemblage of 
thoughts thus i n d i c a t e d , but are merely marks 
employed t o denote the d i f f e r e n t m o d i f i c a t i o n s of the 
one mind. (...) The words I , and you, and they are 
grammatical devices invented simply f o r arrangement 
and t o t a l l y devoid of the intense and exclusive sense 
u s u a l l y attached t o them. (62) 
Words should not be mistaken f o r t h i n g s . Conversely, the f a c t 
t h a t these d i f f e r e n c e s are nominal does not make them f i c t i t i o u s 
or deceptive. Hoagwood has poi n t e d out t h a t "where Shell e y 
encloses knowledge w i t h i n the circumference of ideas (thoughts, 
p e r c e p t i o n s ) , he also encloses the issue very s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h i n 
the s t r u c t u r e of the discourse i t s e l f . " (63) Language i s t o be 
understood i n terms of embedded communal conceptions. The use of 
words i s not meant t o make any c l a i m as t o the a c t u a l or 
"exclusive" existence of t h a t t o which the words are supposed t o 
r e f e r . This explains why Shelley denounces Home Tooke's ambition 
t o demonstrate the dependence of thought on language i n h i s study 
of etymology: 
The d i s c o v e r i e s of Home Tooke i n p h i l o l o g y do not, as 
he has asserted, throw l i g h t upon Metaphysics, they 
only render the instrument r e q u i s i t e t o i t s p e r c e p t i o n 
more exact and accurate. (64) 
Shelley sees an unbridgeable gap between words, which are "the 
instruments of mind", but "are not mind" nor "portions o f the 
mind," (65) and "Metaphysics", which i s the science of the f a c t s 
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of the mind. These f a c t s are the r e l a t i o n s between thoughts i n 
the mind, which the mere denominations of language cannot change: 
The r e l a t i o n s of t h i n g s remain unchanged by whatever 
system. By the word t h i n g s i s t o be understood any 
o b j e c t of thought, t h a t i s , any thought upon which any 
other thought i s employed, w i t h an apprehension of 
d i s t i n c t i o n . The r e l a t i o n s of these remain unchanged; 
and such i s the m a t e r i a l of our knowledge. (66) 
For Shelley p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems are c o n f i g u r a t i o n s which have 
not got the power t o a l t e r the r e l a t i o n s of t h ings which they 
describe. I t may be i n f e r r e d from t h i s t h a t the same thought may 
take d i f f e r e n t names, p o s s i b l y as the requirements of t h e age 
d i c t a t e . There may be no new thoughts, but only new combinations 
of the same thoughts. I n t h i s respect, the progress which S h e l l e y 
sees the mind as capable o f , does not b r i n g i n new m a t e r i a l i n t o 
the mind, but t o the extent t h a t these are the thoughts o f the 
mind, i e "the m a t e r i a l of our knowledge", they are a matter of 
constant r e l a t i n g w i t h i n the mind. 
According t o Hoagwood, "Shelley uses the phrase 'one mind' t o 
designate not the o n t o l o g i c a l u n i t y i n t o which a l l human minds 
are subsumed, but r a t h e r the epistemological u n i t y of thoughts 
i n an i n d i v i d u a l mind." (67) Hugh Roberts discusses t h i s passage 
from 'On L i f e ' , and disputes Hoagwood's s c e p t i c a l understanding 
of the 'one mind' f o r which the l a t t e r uses the support of 
Drummond's Academical Questions. (68) I n t h i s case, Roberts 
appears t o reverse the o n t o l o g i c a l a s s e r t i o n of the existence of 
d i s t i n c t i n d i v i d u a l minds, i n t o the o n t o l o g i c a l r e f u t a t i o n of 
t h i s existence. Shelley does not so much deny the existence of 
d i s t i n c t i n d i v i d u a l minds as i n d i c a t e t h a t the assemblage of 
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thoughts does not warrant "the intense and exclusive sense" 
commonly attached t o t h i s idea. One of the f a c t s of the mind or 
laws of thought t o the study of which Shelley c a l l s , (69) i s t h a t 
thought i s no respecter of d i s t i n c t minds. The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
c i r c l e by which i t i s t o be understood t h a t i t i s meaningless t o 
oppose the mind t o an a l l e g e d l y outside world (a c i r c l e whose 
circumference i s everywhere), so t h a t the mind may be d e f i n e d as 
a domain of i t s own (the one mind), allows us t o grasp t h a t the 
idea of mind means one and the same mind. The u n i t y of the mind 
i s t h e r e f o r e a f u n c t i o n of i t s i n a b i l i t y t o measure i t s e l f 
against t h a t which l i e s outside i t , r a t h e r than the r e s u l t of 
transcending our h a b i t u a l view of the s p a t i a l and temporal w o r l d , 
and of grasping the u n i v e r s a l i n the p a r t i c u l a r . (70) 
This law of the mind also determines the k i n d of world i n which 
such a mind f i n d s i t s place, because the ideas which the mind 
holds manifest a meaningful world f o r the s u b j e c t . The f o l l o w i n g 
passage from the 'Speculations on Metaphysics' o f f e r s a way of 
considering Nature which i s most s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n accordance 
w i t h the operations of the human mind described above: 
By considering a l l knowledge as bounded by p e r c e p t i o n , 
whose operations may be i n d e f i n i t e l y combined, we 
a r r i v e a t a conception of Nature i n e x p r e s s i b l y more 
magnificent, simple and t r u e , than accords w i t h t h e 
o r d i n a r y systems of complicated and p a r t i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . (71) 
"the o r d i n a r y systems of complicated and p a r t i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n " 
can be understood as the p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s which make 
e i t h e r the o b j e c t or the subject as the r e v o l v i n g p o i n t of t h e i r 
systems, and take them as t h i n g s r a t h e r than names. T h i s , f o r 
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Shelley, already separates t h a t which the mind does not separate 
i n t h i n k i n g . 
The harmony between the world which the mind can conceive o f , and 
the mind which conceives of such a world, has an obvious 
a e s t h e t i c aspect t o i t , as the term "magnificent" suggests. This 
may be compared w i t h the harmony of the f a c u l t i e s which Kant sees 
i n the a e s t h e t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p . Nothing i s missing i n knowledge, 
which i s a mode of f i t t e d e n e s s of the mind w i t h i t s e l f . A passage 
of a l e t t e r t o Peacock, d e s c r i b i n g Pompei, dated from January 
1819, evokes a landscape of the mind, which may be proposed as 
a model of the mind's cre a t i o n s which the i n t e l l e c t u a l philosophy 
could o f f e r : 
This scene was what the Greeks beheld. (...) They 
l i v e d i n harmony w i t h nature, & the i n t e r s t i c e s o f 
t h e i r incomparable columns, were p o r t a l s as i t were t o 
admit the s p i r i t of beauty which animates t h i s 
g l o r i o u s universe t o v i s i t those whom i t i n s p i r e d . 
(72) 
I n t h i s passage, the columns can be taken as the symbol o f the 
Greeks' shaping of the world, and of the Greek mind's o p e r a t i o n . 
The s h a f t s of the columns measure space, and l e t the space 
between them measure them. I n t h i s way, they evoke a shaping 
which i s not adverse t o being discontinuous, i n the same way as 
act u a l ideas c a l l f o r p o s s i b l e ideas. 
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The Mind's L i m i t . 
I n 'Speculations on Metaphysics' Shelley o f f e r s a n o t i o n o f the 
mind which cannot be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from t h a t which the mind 
knows, o r , i n Shelley's words, "the m a t e r i a l of our knowledge". 
As has been argued above, t h i s i s so because knowledge cannot 
warrant i t s own t r u t h : i t never p o i n t s a t anything else but more 
" m a t e r i a l of our knowledge." (73) Knowledge can then be seen as 
the movement of the mind as i t endlessly a r t i c u l a t e s i t s e l f . This 
does not make knowledge r e l a t i v e but, r a t h e r , never completely 
transparent. I n t h i s respect, Shelley's views can be compared 
w i t h Hume's. The meaning of ideas was the basis of Hume's 
examination of human nature i n A Treatise on Human Nature (1740), 
and t h i s was also one of Shelley's concerns. According t o 
Deleuze, Hume's d o c t r i n e was p r i m a r i l y a c r i t i q u e of forms of 
r a t i o n a l i s m which put ideas w i t h i n reason, and f o r which ideas 
represented o b j e c t s . As argued e a r l i e r , t h i s may also be seen as 
Shelley's c o n t e n t i o n : 
I n making r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a c r i t e r i o n , and i n p u t t i n g 
the idea w i t h i n reason, r a t i o n a l i s m combined w i t h i n 
the idea t h a t which cannot be c o n s t i t u t e d i n the f i r s t 
sense of experience, and cannot be given i n an idea 
w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i o n : the g e n e r a l i t y of the idea 
i t s e l f and the existence of the o b j e c t , t h a t i s , the 
very content of the words "always u n i v e r s a l , necessary 
or t r u e " . Rationalism t r a n s f e r r e d the determination o f 
the mind t o outside o b j e c t s , thereby c u t t i n g 
philosophy out from the meaning and the understanding 
both of p r a c t i c e and of the sub j e c t . (74) 
The i n t e r f e r e n c e of " p r a c t i c e and of the subject" w i t h i n the 
domain of knowledge does not cast doubt on the p u r i t y of 
knowledge. I t i s r a t h e r the sign t h a t ideas are s i g n i f i c a n t of 
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a context, which cannot, however, be completely surveyed. Hume's 
d o c t r i n e ' d i s t i n g u i s h e s ' ideas i n the sense t h a t they are t o be 
considered independently of a r e a l i t y t h a t i s outside o f the 
mind. On the c o n t r a r y , mental operations are sensations which 
have been transformed. No r u p t u r e takes place from the one t o the 
other. This absence of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s common t o Shelley, and 
t o a m a t e r i a l i s t t h i n k e r l i k e C o n d i l l a c , whose views are quoted 
here f i r s t : 
I f we t r a c e step by step the genesis of the operations 
of the mind and the process of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of sense 
elements which these operations i n v o l v e , then we see 
t h a t there i s never any c l e a r l i n e of demarcation 
between i n d i v i d u a l phases of mental a c t i v i t y , but t h a t 
these phases i m p e r c e p t i b l y melt i n t o one another. (75) 
A scale might be formed, graduated according t o the 
degrees of a combined r a t i o of i n t e n s i t y , d u r a t i o n , 
connexion, periods of recurrence, and u t i l i t y , which 
would be the standard, according t o which a l l ideas 
might be measured and an u n i n t e r r u p t e d chain of n i c e l y 
shadowed d i s t i n c t i o n s would be observed from the 
f a i n t e s t impression on the senses, t o the most 
d i s t i n c t combinations of knowledge which, i n c l u d i n g 
our own nature, c o n s t i t u t e s what we c a l l universe. 
(76) 
Despite the s i m i l a r i t y between the two passages, the i n t e n t of 
each of them i s very d i f f e r e n t . The absence of a m a t e r i a l i s t i c 
framework i n Shelley f o r b i d s him t o provide the k i n d of 
explanation which i s a v a i l a b l e t o C o n d i l l a c . The m a t e r i a l i s t 
C ondillac emphasises the lack of d i s t i n c t i o n between the phases 
of mental operations i n order t o reach the conclusion t h a t 
thought i s b a s i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h sense impressions. Shelley, 
on the other hand, cannot step outside the c i r c l e of the mind, 
but i s l e d t o consider a "chain of n i c e l y shadowed d i s t i n c t i o n s " . 
That t h i s chain i s " u n i n t e r r u p t e d " also means t h a t i t allows f o r 
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always more d i s t i n c t i o n s . Observation does not discover pre-
e x i s t i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s , and, t h e r e f o r e , i t can never reduce the 
d i s t i n c t i o n s which i t introduces i n the movement of observing 
them. Each idea can be r e f e r r e d t o the ideas t o which i t i s 
r e l a t e d , but, also each idea i s productive of these r e l a t i o n s . 
This passage describes the p o i n t where the separation of 
observation from i t s purported o b j e c t becomes a r e l a t i o n from 
which i t cannot disengage i t s e l f . Shelley describes an 
observation which f o l l o w s so c l o s e l y i t s o b j e c t t h a t i t f i n d s 
i t s e l f a f u n c t i o n of not merging w i t h i t . As empiricism 
contended, the mind can f u l l y exercise i t s c a p a c i t i e s , such as 
observation, but, f o r Shelley, i t seems t h a t these c a p a c i t i e s can 
be exercised up t o the l i m i t where they cease being under the 
subject's c o n t r o l . 
As was suggested i n the b r i e f examination of Shelley's view of 
language, there can be no o b j e c t i o n against, and no consequence 
from, adopting one set of terms, whether m a t e r i a l or moral, as 
a s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r an understanding o f the world, as long as 
these are taken f o r names and not f o r t h i n g s . This merely amounts 
to e n t e r i n g the mind, or universe, from one end, which w i l l lead 
t o the other end. I f a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i s necessary t o any 
systematic (or p h i l o s o p h i c a l ) understanding of the world, then, 
Shelley's view leads t o the n o t i o n t h a t the system i s bound t o 
equal, or be caught up by, t h a t of which i t claims t o be the 
system. However the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i n coming f u l l c i r c l e , the 
system may become s e l f - e x p l i c a t i o n i s not open f o r Shelley. I f 
the mind i s seen as a self-generated universe, whose m a t e r i a l 
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does not precede the knowledge of i t , and where d i s t i n c t i o n s 
always provide more of t h a t which can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d or 
thought, then, the mind must be located on the outer l i m i t o f the 
world which enables i t t o ho l d the thoughts which i t does. This 
may be the "verge" which i s r e f e r r e d t o i n the f o l l o w i n g passage 
from 'On L i f e ' (1819): 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d terms adequately t o express so 
su b t l e a conception as t h a t t o which the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
philosophy has conducted us. We are on t h a t verge 
where words abandon us, and what wonder i f we grow 
dizzy t o look down the dark abyss of - how l i t t l e we 
know. (77) 
The progress of the mind, on which Shelley i n s i s t e d , i s i n f i n i t e 
because i t cannot be measured by a p r e - e x i s t i n g content. The mind 
can, then, be both the f u l l e xtent of the universe, and very 
" l i t t l e " . The universe which i s obtained, and produced, by 
i n f i n i t e d i s t i n c t i o n s or fragmentation can also, by v i r t u e o f the 
same p r i n c i p l e , dangerously c o n t r a c t i n t o a pure i n t e r r u p t i o n , 
noted here by an hyphen. The p r i n c i p l e s behind Shelley's 
epistemology, according t o which there can be no mind w i t h o u t 
some ideas and the mind cannot be considered pure, make i t 
impossible f o r the mind t o be di s s o l v e d . Instead, t h a t which i s 
c a l l e d the mind remains as the i r r e d u c i b l e margin described 
above. The e m p i r i c i s t r o o t s of Shelley's epistemology close the 
opt i o n of idealism's a s s e r t i o n t o him, but, as Shelley 
c o n s i s t e n t l y appears t o r e v e l i n the endless p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the 
world which are the combinations of the mind's s e l f - a r t i c u l a t i o n , 
he i s also aware t h a t , i n p r o t e c t i n g the mind from s e l f -
d i s s o l u t i o n , the same p o s s i b i l i t i e s l a y the mind open t o a more 
a n t a g o n i s t i c aspect: 
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No e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between any one of these 
ideas, or any class of them, i s founded on a c o r r e c t 
observation of the nature of t h i n g s , but merely on a 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of what thoughts are most i n v a r i a b l y 
subservient t o the s e c u r i t y and happiness of l i f e 
(78) 
This a n t a g o n i s t i c aspect i s c e n t r a l t o the i n s t r o s p e c t i v e 
examination of the mind, which i s p a r t of Shelley's science of 
mind, and t o which t h i s a n a l y s i s w i l l t u r n i n the next Chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
* Speculations on Metaphysics' and Alastor (1815) 
This Chapter w i l l analyse Alastor as a d e p i c t i o n of a psychic 
journey whose v i c i s s i t u d e s apparently c o n t r a s t w i t h the t r u s t 
which Shelley places i n h i s science of mind, (1) and w i t h the 
p r o j e c t of s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n which he envisages i n ' D i f f i c u l t y of 
Analyzing the Human Mind,' except f o r the c e n t r a l passage of t h i s 
essay which describes thought i n terms which r e c a l l the 
na v i g a t i o n of the f i g u r e of the Alastor Poet: 
I t i s l i k e a r i v e r whose r a p i d and perpetual stream 
flows outwards; _ l i k e one i n dread who speeds through 
the recesses of some haunted p i l e , and dares not look 
behind. The caverns of the mind are obscure, and 
shadowy; or pervaded w i t h a l u s t r e , b e a u t i f u l l y b r i g h t 
indeed, but s h i n i n g not beyond t h e i r p o r t a l s . (2) 
This a n a l y s i s f o l l o w s the examination of Shelley's views on 
knowledge, which has shown the r o l e of empiricism i n drawing the 
notions of knowledge and t r u t h away from a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t h e o r y , 
and toward the n o t i o n of s t r u c t u r a l coherence. As was i n d i c a t e d 
i n the previous Chapter, Shelley r e f r a i n s from f o l l o w i n g the path 
of post-Kantian i d e a l i s m i n aiming a t a self-grounding system of 
knowledge or philosophy, as h i s view on knowledge i s also r u l e d 
by the s c e p t i c a l n o t i o n t h a t i t i s impossible t o conceive of 
nature as a closed system which we could know f u l l y , since we 
cannot stand outside i t . This may be seen a t the r o o t of 
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Shelley's a s s e r t i o n t h a t "we can t h i n k of nothing which we have 
not perceived". The subject can never take a f u l l view of the way 
i n which he or she perceives. The mind i s not disengaged from the 
way i n which d i s t i n c t i o n s are made. This i s the d i r e c t i o n of 
Shelley's thoughts, as expressed i n the f o l l o w i n g passage from 
'Speculations on Metaphysics': 
By c o n s i d e r i n g a l l knowledge as bounded by perception, 
whose operations may be i n d e f i n i t e l y combined, we 
a r r i v e a t a conception of Nature i n e x p r e s s i b l y more 
magnificent, simple and t r u e , than accord[s w i t h ] the 
o r d i n a r y systems of complicated and p a r t i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Nor does a contemplation of the 
Universe, i n t h i s comprehensive and s y n t h e t i c a l view, 
exclude the s u b t l e s t analysis of i t s m o d i f i c a t i o n s and 
p a r t s . (3) 
The " s y n t h e t i c a l view" r e f e r s t o the f a c t t h a t a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s , 
such as the d i s t i n c t i o n between the m a t e r i a l and the moral 
universe, remain w i t h i n the c i r c l e of the mind. I t also r e f e r s 
to the mind's i n a b i l i t y t o encounter anything, the provenance of 
which the mind could knowingly d i f f e r e n t i a t e from i t s e l f . This 
aspect o f Shelley's n o t i o n of knowledge i s comparable t o the 
p o s i t i o n t o which the Jena romantics were l e d as a r e s u l t o f the 
lack of a f i n a l ground on which t o base the system of knowledge. 
As Andrew Bowie, has argued, the lack of a standpoint from which 
to assess the r e l a t i v i t y of our knowledge makes t h i s r e l a t i v i t y 
undemonstrable. (4) 
According t o t h i s n o t i o n of knowledge which i s common, then, t o 
Shelley and the Jena romantics, the world i s known i n t h i s way 
because i t i s also meaningful i n t h i s way, t h a t i s t o say, more 
than the mere c o r r e l a t i v e of our own c u r r e n t concepts. I t may 
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then be argued t h a t Shelley's use of the terra " s y n t h e t i c " i n h i s 
"comprehensive and s y n t h e t i c view" propounds a view t h a t i s 
s i m i l a r t o t h a t of F r i e d r i c h Schlegel i n the f o l l o w i n g statement 
from h i s Notebooks on Philosophy: "Massive mistake, t h a t o n l y one 
d e f i n i t i o n i s possible of every concept- Rather i n f i n i t e l y many, 
r e a l s y n t h e t i c [ d e f i n i t i o n s ] . " (5) Shelley's "view" and 
Schlegel's " d e f i n i t i o n s " are s y n t h e t i c i n the sense t h a t they 
simultaneously i n d i c a t e t h a t there i s no grounding absolute 
p r o p o s i t i o n , and no view of t h i n g s t h a t would be wrong f o r 
f a i l i n g t o comply w i t h such a p r o p o s i t i o n . Just as f o r Schlegel, 
there r e a l l y i s no e r r o r since "only i f one had a founding 
absolute p r o p o s i t i o n could any subsequent t r u t h not be seen as 
merely the r e f u t a t i o n of a preceding t r u t h , " (6) s i m i l a r l y , f o r 
Shelley, "Our whole l i f e i s thus an education of e r r o r . " (7) 
However, the f a c t t h a t the Absolute can only be known n e g a t i v e l y , 
does not mean t h a t one "gives way t o an indeterminate l o n g i n g f o r 
the impossible." (8) I n a s i m i l a r movement, Shelley asserts t h a t 
his "comprehensive and s y n t h e t i c a l view" does not "exclude the 
s u b t l e s t analysis of i t s m o d i f i c a t i o n s and p a r t s . " (9) Although 
analysis appears t o f l y i n the face of "what i s most fundamental 
about ourselves [and] seems ina c c e s s i b l e t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , " (10) 
Shelley i n d i c a t e s t h a t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l philosophy i s not a 
matter of a v a i l i n g oneself of another, t r u e r c a pacity o f the 
mind, which simply i l l u m i n a t e s what r e f l e c t i v e thought does n ot, 
as i f i t had access t o "a strange region s i t u a t e d beyond the 
world". (11) To b e l i e v e t h a t a e s t h e t i c consciousness (12) has 
access t o such a counter-world i s t o repeat the b e l i e f t h a t one 
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can "proceed from the world t o a r t . " (13) This i s why, i n t h i s 
a n a l y s i s of ' D i f f i c u l t y of Analyzing the Human Mind', i t w i l l be 
possib l e t o connect Shelley's view on the work of s e l f - i d e n t i t y 
t o the side of Blanchot's theory of w r i t i n g whereby i t i s 
markedly d i s s o c i a t e d from any n o t i o n of d i r e c t s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n . 
For the Jena romantics, the f a i l u r e of the I t o "grasp i t s e l f as 
the highest p r i n c i p l e " (14) i n r e f l e c t i v e thought leads t o 
Schlegel's view t h a t "every person i s only a piece of 
themselves," (15) i . e . , a fragment t h a t i s s t i l l understood i n 
r e l a t i o n t o a whole. Novalis's s o l u t i o n t o t h i s f a i l u r e i s 
contained i n h i s statement: " I f the character of a given problem 
i s i t s i n s o l u b i l i t y , then we solve the problem by rep r e s e n t i n g 
i t s i n s o l u b i l i t y . " (16) However, t h i s does not seem t o be the 
r e s o l u t i o n intended by Shelley's p r e s e n t a t i o n of a mind whose 
a c t i v i t y i s r e s i s t a n t t o r e f l e c t i v e thought. Shelley must see 
some v i r t u e i n probing i n t o the aporias of r e f l e c t i v e thought 
other than reaching the negative t r u t h t h a t the s e l f - p o s i t i n g I 
t e s t i f i e s t o the f a c t t h a t every person i s only a piece of 
themselves. 
The D i f f i c u l t y of Thought 
The previous remarks concerning Shelley's view of knowledge and 
the s i m i l a r i t i e s which have been noted w i t h the Jena Romantics' 
understanding of the n o t i o n of t r u t h , lead t o the need t o 
consider Shelley's s t r a t e g y , i . e . , h i s way of understanding the 
assertions t h a t are made w i t h i n an e s s e n t i a l l y ambiguous view on 
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t r u t h c l a i m s , as i s suggested by the use of the c o n d i t i o n a l 
framing the essay. S h e l l e y feigns the stance of the s c e p t i c a l 
reader, who c a s t s doubt upon the v e r a c i t y and accuracy of the 
" h i s t o r y " t h a t could be put to him: " I f i t were p o s s i b l e t h a t a 
person should give a f a i t h f u l h i s t o r y of h i s being, from the 
e a r l i e s t epochs of h i s r e c o l l e c t i o n . . . But thought can with 
d i f f i c u l t y v i s i t the i n t r i c a t e chambers which i t i n h a b i t s . " I n 
t h i s way, S h e l l e y i n d i c a t e s t h a t the b a s i s on which the s t o r y or 
h i s t o r y i s accepted and p o s s i b l e as a h i s t o r y , namely, the f a c t 
t h a t i t has cut i t s e l f o f f from being, i s a l s o the reason f o r 
which i t can be put i n t o doubt. S h e l l e y questions a p r o j e c t which 
would proceed from an i n t e n t i o n a l d e c i s i o n , and r e l y on the 
assumption of a p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - c o i n c i d e n c e w i t h i n man, whereby 
"a person" could "give a f a i t h f u l h i s t o r y of h i s being": 
I f i t were p o s s i b l e t h a t a person should give a 
f a i t h f u l h i s t o r y of h i s being, from the e a r l i e s t 
epochs of h i s r e c o l l e c t i o n , a p i c t u r e would be 
presented such as the world has never contemplated 
before. A mirror would be held up to a l l men i n which 
they might behold t h e i r own r e c o l l e c t i o n s , and i n dim 
p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e i r shadowy hopes and f e a r s , _ a l l t h a t 
they dare not, or t h a t daring and d e s i r i n g , they cou l d 
not expose to the open eyes of day... I f i t were 
p o s s i b l e to be where we have been, v i t a l l y and indeed 
_ i f , a t the moment of our presence there, we could 
d e f i n e the r e s u l t s of our experience,_ i f the passage 
from s e n s a t i o n to r e f l e c t i o n _ from a s t a t e of p a s s i v e 
perception to v o l u n t a r y contemplation, were not so 
d i z z y i n g and so tumultuous, t h i s attempt would be l e s s 
d i f f i c u l t . (17) 
The arguments which go a g a i n s t g i v i n g one's a s s e n t to such a 
h i s t o r y i n v o l v e the notion of a s u b j e c t t h a t i s present to i t s e l f 
and s e l f - s u p p o r t i v e . These are the aspects which have been 
t h e o r i z e d as enabling conscious r e f l e c t i v e thought, and which l i e 
at the b a s i s of r e f l e c t i v e p h i l o s o p h i e s from Descartes to Kant. 
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(18) The observation or s e l f - r e v e r t i n g a c t to which S h e l l e y 
a l l u d e s here i n v o l v e s a s u b j e c t who, i n Rodolphe Gasche's words, 
i s " l i f t e d out of i t s immediate entanglement i n the world," (19) 
and f r e e from a l l unmediated r e l a t i o n to being. T h i s a t t a c k on 
mediation a l s o h i t s the notion of an immediate r e l a t i o n to 
o n e s e l f . The aim of r e f l e c t i v e p h i l o s o p h i e s i s to have us accept 
t h a t we have the "being" i n the h i s t o r y . This i s the c o n f l a t i o n 
to which S h e l l e y r e f e r s dubiously, where the " r e c o l l e c t i o n " of 
h i s " e a r l i e s t epochs" are to be taken as h i s r e c o l l e c t i o n "from 
h i s e a r l i e s t epochs." 
The grounds on which the "autobiographical pact" (20) may, then, 
be r e j e c t e d , leading to the suspension of the b e l i e f t h a t we may 
"be where we have been", prove to be the same as the grounds on 
which a commonsense grasp of r e a l i t y , where we forget the i m p l i e d 
d i s t a n c e from which evidences appear to us, and where r e f l e c t i o n 
a c t s simply as the mind's eye, i s accepted. I t i s a stance which 
invo l v e s a s e p a r a t i o n between observer and o b j e c t , and which does 
not i n t e r f e r e but i s enabling. (21) T h i s i s the point where the 
work of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n i s completely 
s u c c e s s f u l , s i n c e i t does not engage the a t t e n t i o n , but, on the 
contrary, disappears i n t o the evidence which i t has fashioned. 
S h e l l e y ' s c r i t i q u e a l s o i m p l i e s t h a t the premises of the 
conception based on the correspondence between h i s t o r y and being 
beg the question which the p r o j e c t i s meant to f u l f i l , s i n c e i t 
i s the correspondence between meanings which have p r e v i o u s l y been 
a t t r i b u t e d to both h i s t o r y and being. Such p r i o r meanings would, 
then, r e q u i r e an absolute language, of the kind which Hugh 
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Roberts d e s c r i b e s as f o l l o w s : a "language t h a t names the world 
a b s o l u t e l y , i n a l l i t s d e t a i l s , . . . [ a language] i n which an 
absolute s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s of the world might express i t s e l f , " 
so t h a t "the world and our language d e s c r i b i n g the world become 
one and the same t h i n g . " (22) Roberts's d e s c r i p t i o n takes p l a c e 
i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the tensions which presented themselves to 
Sh e l l e y i n the w r i t i n g of The Revolt of Islam, and, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , the attempt to break from t r a d i t i o n without 
r e p l i c a t i n g i t , which i s arguably a t the root of r e s o r t i n g to 
r e f l e c t i o n . T h i s p r o j e c t of s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n a l s o runs a g a i n s t the 
same type of c o n t r a d i c t i o n as does the understanding of the work 
of a r t as a c c e s s to the tra n s c e n d e n t a l l e v e l where i t s u n i t y i s 
re v e a l e d and can be surveyed. The correspondence on which such 
an understanding of the p r o j e c t r e l i e s i m p l i e s t h a t , u n l e s s a 
person has found a point from which h i s being can make up a 
h i s t o r y , such a h i s t o r y cannot be given. Yet, i n order to f i n d 
t h i s p o i n t , t h i s person has to go through a process which should 
be j u s t i f i e d as leading to t h i s p o i n t . I t i s such a point which 
Blanchot d e f i n e s i n r e l a t i o n to the moment of death as the moment 
of l i f e ' s c l o s u r e : 
t h a t r i g h t moment which alone w i l l balance our l i f e by 
p l a c i n g opposite i t on the s c a l e s a s o v e r e i g n l y 
balanced death can be grasped only as the unknowable 
s e c r e t : only as t h a t which could never be e l u c i d a t e d 
u n l e s s , a l r e a d y dead, we could look a t ou r s e l v e s from 
a p o i n t from which i t would be granted us to embrace 
as a whole both our l i f e and our death. (23) 
To probe i n t o the assumptions which a l l o w us to give our a s s e n t 
to a h i s t o r y i s to probe i n t o the assumptions which allow us to 
accept r e a l i t y without f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s . R e f l e c t i v e thought i s 
96 
of i n t e r e s t because i t i s able to behave as i f i t were f i n i s h e d , 
and because the p r o j e c t of p o r t r a y i n g oneself i m p l i e s t h a t the 
p o r t r a i t must a l r e a d y be there, but t h a t thought must be b l i n d 
or o b l i v i o u s to i t i n order to give i t . R e f l e c t i v e thought f o r c e s 
the s u b j e c t to see d i f f e r e n t l y and to cease see i n g what i s more 
r e a d i l y v i s i b l e . T h i s i s the i n t e r r u p t i o n of o r d i n a r y 
understanding, which S h e l l e y next d e s c r i b e s : 
But thought can with d i f f i c u l t y v i s i t the i n t r i c a t e 
and winding chambers which i t i n h a b i t s . I t i s l i k e a 
r i v e r whose r a p i d and perpetual stream flows outwards; 
_ l i k e one i n dread who speeds through the r e c e s s e s of 
some haunted p i l e , and dares not look behind. The 
caverns of the mind are obscure, and shadowy; or 
pervaded with a l u s t r e , b e a u t i f u l l y b r i g h t indeed, but 
s h i n i n g not beyond t h e i r p o r t a l s . 
T h i s passage may then be taken as the d e p i c t i o n of the c h a s t i s i n g 
chaos which r e f l e c t i v e thought unleashes i n f a i l i n g to see the 
p o r t r a i t which the being already makes up, and i n n e g l e c t i n g 
"what i s most fundamental about o u r s e l v e s " . I t i s r e f l e c t i o n 
which, i n i t s concern to s e t l i m i t s , introduces death i n t o being. 
But i t i s a l s o the d e s c r i p t i o n of thought's f a i l u r e from the 
point of view of l i n e a r , l o g i c a l thought. I n t h i s passage, the 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of consciousness upon i t s e l f i s conveyed by the f a c t 
t h a t i t s a c t i o n s ( " v i s i t " , "speeds") precede what consciousness 
might c o n s i s t i n , i . e . "chambers", " r e c e s s e s " . R e f l e x i v e thought, 
whereby an i n d i v i d u a l i s a fragment of themselves, does not 
merely d i s c o v e r "the s e p a r a t i o n which from the s t a r t d i s t a n c e s 
us from o u r s e l v e s by s e p a r a t i n g us from a l l power of i d e n t i t y , " 
(24 ) , but produces i t , j u s t as the romantic fragment produces the 
absence of the Work. The double movement of p u r s u i t and escape 
which makes e i t h e r f u s i o n or immersion impossible, i s , i n 
Blanchot's words "the approach of what allows us to depart," (25) 
which i s another d e f i n i t i o n of worklessness. Thought d i s c o v e r s 
t h a t i t i s able to experience something which i t d i d not expect 
to be able to experience. T h i s i s not only the p o i n t where the 
s u b j e c t ' s c a p a c i t i e s and consciousness cannot be e x e r c i s e d , but 
a l s o the point where they experience t h i s i n c a p a c i t y . I n 
d e s c r i b i n g a c e r t a i n f a i l u r e of r e f l e c t i v e thought, S h e l l e y has 
a l s o d e s c r i b e d where thought cannot go, an experience of "the 
impossible", which, f o r Blanchot "escapes our very power to 
experience i t , but whose experience we cannot escape." (26) 
R e f l e x i v e thought i s , then, not merely governed by the need to 
impose order upon a chaos unleashed by i t s f a i l u r e to see t h a t 
the p o r t r a i t i s a l r e a d y t h e r e . R e f l e x i v e thought a l s o d i s c o v e r s 
that i t i s able to s u s t a i n the tumult of the " r a p i d and p e r p e t u a l 
stream", and t h a t i t i s s u s c e p t i b l e to chaos. I n t h i s adequacy 
of r e f l e x i v e thought and chaos to each other, chaos becomes an 
order of i t s own, s i n c e thought can experience i t . I n t h i s way, 
and d e s p i t e the pretence of o b j e c t i o n s o u t l i n e d p r e v i o u s l y , i t 
i s v e r i f i e d t h a t "thought can with d i f f i c u l t y " v i s i t i t s 
chambers. To a t t a c k the work of consciousness f o r being a work 
and not presence i n i t s p u r i t y and o r i g i n a l i t y , or to blame the 
h i s t o r y f o r being u n f a i t h f u l and not v i t a l i t y i t s e l f , i s to blame 
them f o r claims which they are never able to make, hence 
S h e l l e y ' s use of the c o n d i t i o n a l mode throughout the e s s a y , 
except f o r the c e n t r a l d e s c r i p t i o n , which was quoted a t the 
beginning of t h i s a n a l y s i s , and i s r e m i n i s c e n t of Alastor. (27) 
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The v i r t u e which S h e l l e y may, then, see i n engaging i n a n a l y s i s 
and r e f l e x i v e thought i s the l i b e r a t i n g aspect involved i n 
observing t h a t "we are never the u n r e f l e c t i v e s u b j e c t t h a t we 
seek to be." (28) R e f l e c t i o n i s the way of no longer undergoing 
things as they a r e . (29) On the other hand, S h e l l e y p o i nts a t the 
danger of d e v a s t a t i n g r e f l e c t i o n , which i s the absence of 
o r i e n t a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n the middle p a r t of the essay. R e f l e c t i o n 
i s a l s o d e v a s t a t i n g when i t becomes t h i s passage which nothing 
which i t r e f l e c t s can a r r e s t , because i t can n e i t h e r a s s i m i l a t e 
chaos to order, i . e . , r e f l e c t completely, nor be overtaken by 
chaos. To r e l y on r e f l e c t i o n does not even amount to s e e i n g 
"things the wrong way round" on the evidence of the I being 
"subsequent to i t s b a s i s " , (30) because the experience which 
S h e l l e y d e s c r i b e s i s the l o s s of any b a s i s w i t h i n r e f l e x i v e 
thought, r a t h e r than the d i s c o v e r y of an order t h a t i s c o n t r a r y 
to the order imposed by r e f l e x i v e thought. Between the wish to 
witness the r e a l beginning of thought, and the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t , 
i n N o v a l i s ' s words, "Every r e a l beginning i s a secondary 
movement," (31) thought p e r s i s t s , unacknowledged. There i s 
t h e r e f o r e no b l i n d n e s s , no i n t e r v a l w i t h i n r e f l e c t i v e thought, 
i n the same sense as S c h l e g e l could c l a i m t h a t there i s no 
fragmentary genre, but, r a t h e r , the detour a l l o w i n g the s e a r c h 
or quest, which i s c e n t r a l to Blanchot's understanding of the 
work of l i t e r a t u r e : 
I f man d i d not i n some sense a l r e a d y belong to t h i s 
detour t h a t he most often employs to t u r n himself away 
from i t , how could he s e t out along t h i s path t h a t 
soon disappears _ having i n view t h a t attainment of 
what escapes both aim and s i g h t , advancing as though 
backward toward a point he only knows he w i l l not 
reach i n person. (32) 
99 
I t i s , then, p o s s i b l e to understand the d i r e c t i o n of S h e l l e y ' s 
s c i e n c e of mind. S h e l l e y r e l i e s on a t t e n t i o n as the crux of t h i s 
s c i e n c e , as both i t s requirement and the means to f u l f i l i t : 
The s c i e n c e of mind possesses eminent advantages over 
every other with regard to the c e r t a i n t y of the 
c o n c l u s i o n s which i t a f f o r d s . I t r e q u i r e s indeed f o r 
i t s e n t i r e development no more than minute and 
accurate a t t e n t i o n to f a c t s . Every student may r e f e r 
to the t e s t i m o n i a l s which he bears w i t h i n himself to 
a s c e r t a i n the a u t h o r i t i e s upon which any a s s e r t i o n 
r e s t s . I t r e q u i r e s no more than a t t e n t i o n to p e r c e i v e 
p e r f e c t s i n c e r i t y i n the r e l a t i o n of what i s 
p e r c e i v e d . . . We are o u r s e l v e s then d e p o s i t o r i e s of the 
evidence of the s u b j e c t which we consider. (33) 
However, he could not r e l y on a t t e n t i o n i n t h i s way, i f , d e s p i t e 
the danger involved, he were not tempted by the " e q u a l i t y " of 
a t t e n t i o n to i t s e l f , as Blanchot d e s c r i b e s i t : "mystery i s the 
center of a t t e n t i o n when a t t e n t i o n , being equal and p e r f e c t l y 
equal to i t s e l f , i s the absence of any center: thus beyond a l l 
r e g u l a r i t y , a l l evenness." (34) The i m p l i c a t i o n of S h e l l e y ' s 
essay i s not t h a t , i n the terms of C l a r k ' s h e l p f u l formulation, 
the " a c t of s e l f - p o s i t i n g i s i n c o n c e i v a b l e without a c o n s t i t u t i v e 
r e l a t i o n to an a l t e r i t y whose n e c e s s i t y must ch a l l e n g e the 
e g o c e n t r i c i t y " of r e f l e x i v e thought ( i . e . , the model of F i c h t e ' s 
thought, and of r e f l e x i v e p h i l o s o p h i e s i n general) (35) but, 
r a t h e r , t h a t e g o c e n t r i c i t y becomes a f u n c t i o n of the r e l a t i o n t o 
t h i s a l t e r i t y . 
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Alastor 
Alastor (1815) has been understood w i t h i n the coherent 
p e r s p e c t i v e of the 1816 eponymous volume, i n which S h e l l e y i s 
seen as p l a y i n g a comparatively v i s i o n a r y p e r s p e c t i v e supporting 
h i s p u b l i c concerns, a g a i n s t a more p e s s i m i s t i c view of man's 
l i m i t a t i o n s and t r a n s i e n c e ( 3 6 ) . Alongside t h i s understanding 
concerning S h e l l e y ' s a l l e g e d p o l a r i z e d impulses, (37) the 
c o l l e c t i o n has a l s o been seen as e n t e r t a i n i n g more s c e p t i c a l 
views on the p o s s i b i l i t y of reaching o b j e c t i v e knowledge about 
the world. The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l concerns about the l i m i t a t i o n s 
which are placed on knowledge, and which lead to the t r o u b l i n g 
r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the search f o r knowledge forces the mind back 
upon i t s e l f , are common to both Speculations on Metaphysics and 
Alastor. (38) 
T h i s may be a u s e f u l p e r s p e c t i v e from which to r e c o n s i d e r a 
number of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Alastor which, i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r 
emphasis on the d i s t a n c i n g e f f e c t of the Preface, take t h e i r cue 
from i t , and see the poem as a c r i t i q u e of the e x c l u s i v e r e l i a n c e 
on the mind's c r e a t i o n s and of the tendency to abandon human 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ( 3 9 ) The core of these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i s the f a c t 
t h a t the Poet's d e s i r e to possess h i s i d e a l maiden leads him to 
undervalue l i f e as he pursues her i n t o death. T h i s type of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be broadly defined as s e t t i n g a s p i r a t i o n , or 
c r e a t i v e imagination, a g a i n s t r e a l i t y or "nature".(40) Although 
these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s see the Poet's a s p i r a t i o n as the product 
of both d e l u s i o n and d i s i l l u s i o n , r e f l e c t i n g the Poet's p u r s u i t 
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as both a quest and an escape, they tend to introduce a c a u s a l 
r e l a t i o n between these two as p e c t s , which the poem does not 
corroborate. However, they a l s o thereby draw a t t e n t i o n to a 
number of paradoxes which are c e n t r a l to the poem. 
F i r s t , the Poet's a l l e g e d disappointment i s seen to r e s u l t i n 
s c e p t i c i s m about a phenomenal world which cannot provide c e r t a i n 
knowledge about the u l t i m a t e t r u t h s demanded by the mind. Yet, 
and as examined p r e v i o u s l y , S h e l l e y ' s s c e p t i c i s m d i f f e r s 
fundamentally from t j i i s type of r e a c t i v e s c e p t i c i s m which r e l i e s 
on a notion of the world t h a t p r e - e x i s t s the mind. Second, t h i s 
l i n e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n takes the view t h a t the Poet's r e j e c t i o n 
of the world stems from h i s disappointment a t not f i n d i n g the 
o b j e c t of h i s v i s i o n . Yet, i n t h i s case, the Poet cannot p e r s i s t 
i n being disappointed without p e r s e v e r i n g i n h i s quest. The f a c t 
t h a t d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n does not even represent a d e t e r r e n t f o r the 
Poet can then only be seen as a confirmation of h i s f o l l y . I n 
whichever way the Poet's divorce from the world i s t a c k l e d , 
whether the world i s the o b j e c t of r e j e c t i o n , or a refuge a g a i n s t 
i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , the Poet can only be presented as i n e v i t a b l y 
making matters worse, and as being the v i c t i m of an i n e x p l i c a b l e 
mistake, which was contained i n the very p r i n c i p l e of the quest. 
However, while the Poet's mistake i s denounced, h i s i n t e n t 
deserves some esteem. The poem appears to denounce a mistake 
which i s derived from the Poet's mind, i n a volume which, as 
F r a i s t a t notes, upholds the power of poetry to defy change, s i n c e 
the b e s t products of man's mind a r e not mortal.(41) Even as i t 
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s e a l s the Poet's f a t e i n a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , t h i s l i n e of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t disappointment i s not only to be 
considered as ensuing from the quest, but as i n t r i n s i c to i t . I n 
f a c t , the Poet w i l l be proved wrong i f i t i s v e r i f i e d t h a t the 
v e i l e d woman of h i s dreams i s only a n a r c i s s i s t i c p r o j e c t i o n : 
t h a t i s to say, merely r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h i s a s p i r a t i o n . However, 
at no point i n the poem i s the Poet's v i s i o n confuted, and the 
outcome of the quest provides no evidence a g a i n s t the r e a l i t y of 
h i s imaginary v i s i o n . The quest cannot t e s t the v a l i d i t y of the 
v i s i o n , s i n c e , on the con t r a r y , i t i s the dream which supposedly 
t r i g g e r s h i s p u r s u i t . I n other words, the Poet's not f i n d i n g the 
ob j e c t of h i s v i s i o n i s no argument a g a i n s t s e a r c h i n g f o r i t , i n 
f a c t q u i t e to the c o n t r a r y . 
The purpose of the present a n a l y s i s w i l l be, i n the f i r s t 
i n s t a n c e , to examine the kind of de l u s i o n of which the Poet i s 
s a i d to be the v i c t i m , s i n c e the poem does not confute i t . I f the 
Poet a c t s under the i n f l u e n c e of a v i s i o n which can have no 
e x i s t e n c e on e a r t h , then i t may be suggested t h a t the quest i s 
the process which v e r i f i e s t h i s f a c t r a t h e r than remedies i t . 
This a n a l y s i s w i l l , then, consider the quest as the process which 
cannot provide the v i s i o n , and which p e r s i s t s i n the lack of i t s 
o b j e c t . By v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t i t must take place as an 
i n t e r v e n i n g quest, t h i s i s a p u r s u i t which avoids r e a c h i n g the 
dreamed o b j e c t i n the process of pursuing i t . J u s t as i n the case 
of r e f l e x i v e thought progressing towards the moment of i t s 
in c e p t i o n , i t may be argued t h a t , from the moment the Poet 
embarks on a such a quest, he a l s o engages i n a process which, 
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seeking the response t h a t w i l l put an end to i t , a l s o seeks to 
be undone. T h i s a l s o i m p l i e s a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the claim t h a t , 
through the f i g u r e of the poet, S h e l l e y i s c r i t i c i z i n g an 
e x c e s s i v e form of s o l i t u d e . I n t h i s case, i t appears t h a t , i n the 
same way as r e f l e x i v e thought does i n r e l a t i o n to r e f l e c t i o n , the 
Poet's quest both provides and r e s i s t s a r t i c u l a t i o n . I t w i l l , 
then, be nece s s a r y to examine the r o l e of the Narrator i n t h i s 
connection. 
1. Departure 
The dream s e t out between l i n e s 151 and 191 of Alastor can h a r d l y 
be seen as the rupture inaugurating the poet's wandering quest. 
The dream and the quest are l i n k e d n e i t h e r c a u s a l l y nor 
c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y , because the f i r s t mention of the poet's 
departure takes p l a c e e a r l i e r i n the poem: 
When e a r l y youth had passed, he l e f t 
His c o l d f i r e s i d e and a l i e n a t e d home 
To seek strange t r u t h s i n undiscovered lands. 
(11. 75-77) 
N e i l F r a i s t a t has underlined the mirror e f f e c t between the two 
phases of the V i s i o n a r y ' s c a r e e r , i e , between h i s a c t i v e s e a r c h 
for knowledge, which takes p l a c e between l i n e s 78 and 128, and 
h i s f l i g h t deathward. (42) The poem, then, seems to c a l l f o r a 
connection to be made between the impulse to a c t i v e l y look f o r 
knowledge, and the departure on a quest which depletes the world 
of meaning. For example, some of the terms used to d e s c r i b e the 
former could a l s o apply to the l a t t e r ("Has l u r e d h i s f e a r l e s s 
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s t e p s " , 1. 79, "making the w i l d h i s home", 1. 99). The s e a r c h f o r 
knowledge which the Poet undertakes cannot, i n i t s turn, be s a i d 
to be motivated by a l a c k of knowledge: 
By solemn v i s i o n , and b r i g h t s i l v e r dream, 
His infancy was nurtured. Every s i g h t 
And sound from the v a s t e a r t h and ambient a i r , 
Sent to h i s h e a r t i t s c h o i c e s t impulses. 
The fountains of d i v i n e philosophy 
F l e d not h i s t h i r s t i n g l i p s , and a l l of great, 
Or good, or l o v e l y , which the s a c r e d past 
I n t r u t h or f a b l e c o n s e c r a t e s , he f e l t , 
And knew. 
(11. 67-75). 
On the contrary, t h i s passage d e s c r i b e s the s a t i s f a c t i o n of 
someone who l a c k s nothing, who wishes f o r nothing, and who, 
because of t h i s , can be the r e c i p i e n t of everything. This i s so 
much so t h a t , s a t i s f a c t i o n , i n which p o s s i b l e or f u t u r e 
f r u s t r a t i o n can be evoked only n e g a t i v e l y ("The fountains of 
d i v i n e philosophy / F l e d n o t . . . . " ) , seems to a n t i c i p a t e any need 
on the Poet's p a r t ("...his t h i r s t i n g l i p s " , 11. 70-1). I f the 
s t a t e of harmony, from which there i s no reason f o r the poet to 
depart, cannot j u s t i f y an understanding of the s e a r c h f o r 
knowledge as a response to a l a c k , conversely, the s e a r c h f o r 
knowledge may be seen as another m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the 
u n s e l f c o n s c i o u s harmony with the world d e s c r i b e d i n the passage 
quoted above. On t h i s b a s i s , the quest deathward might a l s o be 
seen as a form of adequacy to the world i n which i t takes p l a c e , 
i e , a world t h a t has become an image, r a t h e r than a d i v o r c e from 
a world i n which the v i s i o n of h i s dream cannot be found. 
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I n the opening s e c t i o n of the poem, the Narrator d e s c r i b e s the 
Poet's admirable c a r e e r , and h i s s e n s i t i v i t y to a meaning to 
which he, a l b e i t u n w i t t i n g l y , makes h i s audience s e n s i t i v e : 
He l i v e d , he died, he sung, i n s o l i t u d e . 
Strangers have wept to hear h i s passionate notes, 
And v i r g i n s , as unknown he passed, have pined 
And wasted f o r fond love of h i s w i l d eyes. 
(11. 60-63) 
At t h i s stage, s o l i t u d e , f a r from being o b j e c t i o n a b l e , commands 
admiration f o r the s t e r e o t y p i c a l f i g u r e of the Poet, who i s 
depicted as a wondrous being. The c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y of the f i g u r e 
of the Poet arguably verges on parody here, owing to the 
r e a c t i o n s which i t provokes, and which, compared to the Poet's 
own unresponsiveness, appear over-impassioned. From the o u t s e t , 
the Narrator's account of the Poet's d e a l i n g s with h i s f e l l o w 
human beings i s marked by a discrepancy between the r e a c t i o n s 
which he provokes, and h i s unresponsiveness. Yet, the Poet does 
not r e j e c t h i s audience's r e a c t i o n s any more than he does the 
world around him. He i s simply the u n w i t t i n g r e c i p i e n t of 
addresses which escape him ("as unknown he passed") as they a r e 
not meant f o r him. He can only r e f r a c t them, even as they 
c o n t r i b u t e to t u r n him i n t o a s e d u c t i v e mystery. I t could be 
i n f e r r e d t h a t the Poet's audience f a l l s v i c t i m to the same 
mistake as t h a t which some commentators have a s c r i b e d to the Poet 
himself, namely, t h a t of f i x a t i n g an enigma upon a f i g u r e who 
merely conveys i t . Yet the audience i s not deceived i n p e r c e i v i n g 
the e x i s t e n c e of mystery, s i n c e the Poet cannot undeceive them. 
I t must t h e r e f o r e be acknowledged t h a t i f there i s to be some 
mystery i n the Poet, t h i s comes mainly from the f a c t t h a t he 
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cannot speak f o r himself about i t . I t i s p o s s i b l e to argue t h a t 
the Poet's audience i s no more deluded by the Poet's i n d i f f e r e n c e 
which turns i n t o a seductive mystery, than the Poet i s mistaken 
about a v i s i o n a g a i n s t which the world provides no evidence. 
The kind of communication which i s e f f e c t e d between the Poet and 
h i s audience, i s a l s o repeated i n the episode of the dream. The 
dream which i s supposed to p r e c i p i t a t e the Poet's r u i n cannot be 
s a i d to take p l a c e w i t h i n a context of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . As a 
r e s u l t , i t becomes d i f f i c u l t to see the quest as an attempt to 
look f o r , or p o s s i b l y compensate f o r , what has been l o s t . I t i s 
p o s s i b l e to advance J u d i t h Chernaik's statement that the poet 
"looks f o r he knows not what" (43) one step f u r t h e r , and to 
suggest t h a t the poet might be engaged i n a quest which i s not 
only aimed at f i n d i n g something. The purposefulness of the Poet's 
quest a l s o appears undermined by the f a c t t h a t , as the p r e v i o u s 
a n a l y s i s has suggested, events are l i a b l e to a r e t r o s p e c t i v e 
reading, where the quest f o l l o w i n g the event of the dream sheds 
a new l i g h t on the preceding s e a r c h f o r knowledge. 
2. The dream. 
The poet can be seen as excluded from the world because of h i s 
c h i m e r i c a l dream. I t has been argued t h a t the poet does not see 
the Arab maiden because she i s overshadowed by the i d e a l of h i s 
dream.(44) T h i s c l a i m obviously d i s r u p t s the p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
events, and t h i s d i s r u p t i o n may even be a s c r i b e d to the p e r v a s i v e 
r e v i s i o n to which the occurrence of the dream seems to s u b j e c t 
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events. The dream i s p r e c i s e l y an occurrence which takes p l a c e 
o u t s i d e of r e a l i t y . However, the poem suggests a coincidence 
between the dream and r e a l i t y , even i f the a n t i t h e t i c a l n a ture 
of the two makes i t impossible f o r t h i s coincidence t o be 
observed, except by the Narrator who i s , alone, able to r e l a t e 
i t . I f the Arab maiden watches over the poet's s l e e p , the poet 
a l s o , i n some sense, watches over the maid. The two f o l l o w i n g 
passages seem to b r i n g the poet and the maid together, through 
a kind of communication which i s not based on r e c i p r o c i t y or 
a c t u a l exchange: 
Meanwhile an Arab maiden brought h i s food 
Enamoured, y e t not daring f o r deep awe 
To speak her love: _ and watched h i s n i g h t l y s l e e p , 
S l e e p l e s s h e r s e l f , to gaze upon h i s l i p s 
P arted i n slumber 
(11. 130; 133-7) 
He dreamed a v e i l e d maid 
Sate near him, t a l k i n g i n low solemn tones. 
Her v o i c e was l i k e the v o i c e of h i s own s o u l 
Heard i n the calm of thought; 
(11. 151-4) 
The dream allows a p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u l a r i t y to take p l a c e between 
the poet and the maid. Not only are the dream maiden's "tones" 
l i k e "the v o i c e of [the poet's] s o u l " , but they seem to be the 
message coming from the s l e e p i n g poet's " l i p s / Parted i n 
slumber," a message which the Arab maiden h e r s e l f dare not 
speak. The i r o n y of the dream l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t i t e f f e c t s 
a connection which cannot be e f f e c t i v e o u t s i d e the dream. Thanks 
to the dream, the maid need not speak to be understood and the 
Poet need not l i s t e n to hear t h a t which cannot be u t t e r e d . The 
Poet i s able to hear h i s own v o i c e i n such a way as the s t a t e of 
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conscious s e l f - c o i n c i d e n c e cannot permit. I t follows t h a t the 
r e l a t i o n a l i t y of the maid to the Poet can be s t r e s s e d only i f the 
maid i s a l s o seen as a l l o w i n g the Poet a r e l a t i o n to h i m s e l f 
which s e l f - c o i n c i d e n c e o b l i t e r a t e s . 
The dream ends i n exhaustion. The i n t e n s i t y permeating the dream 
goes beyond anything t h a t can be s u s t a i n e d or s u f f e r e d , and i s 
e v e n t u a l l y reduced i n t o i n s e n s i b i l i t y and s e n s e l e s s n e s s , as the 
double meaning of " d i s s o l v i n g " suggests: 
she drew back a w h i l e , 
Then, y i e l d i n g to the i r r e s i s t i b l e joy, 
With f r a n t i c gesture and s h o r t b r e a t h l e s s c r y 
Folded h i s frame i n her d i s s o l v i n g arms. 
(11. 184-7) 
The e f f e c t of a c t i v e disappearance, which the term " d i s s o l v i n g " 
conveys, t r a n s l a t e s the maid's power of being 
Soon the solemn mood 
Of her pure mind k i n d l e d through a l l her frame 
A permeating power: w i l d numbers then 
She r a i s e d . . . 
(11. 161-4) 
I n these passages, the maid appears as a presence which 
simultaneously comes c l o s e r and draws back. The maid's v e i l or 
d i s s i m u l a t i o n , symbolising her r e s t r a i n t , m a t e r i a l i s e s i n t o a 
body: 
At the sound he turned, 
And saw by the warm l i g h t of t h e i r own l i f e 
Her glowing limbs beneath the sinuous v e i l 
Of woven wind, her outspread arms now bare 
(11. 174-7) 
Th i s a c t i v i t y w i t h i n being can be equated with Blanchot's n o t i o n 
of "l'immediat" (the immediate), which he a l s o c a l l s "the r e a l i t y 
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of sensible presence." (45) The immediate escapes a p p r o p r i a t i o n : 
"the too-present t o which access i s denied because i t i s always 
clos e r than any approach, r e v e r s i n g i t s e l f t o become absence." 
(46) The e t h e r e a l aspect of the maid stems, t h e r e f o r e , from a 
p h y s i c a l i t y which prevents her from being f i x e d and turned i n t o 
an o b j e c t which can be grasped. I n i t s a b i l i t y t o become a 
phenomenon, the dream maiden i s also an instance of Blanchot's 
n o t i o n of "image", where the distance which h a b i t u a l l y allows us 
t o see a t h i n g i s , here, " i n the heart of the t h i n g " , so t h a t , 
"having become image, i n s t a n t l y i t has become t h a t which no one 
can grasp, the u n r e a l , the impassive". (47) The c l a i m t h a t the 
maid's i n a b i l i t y t o take on a p h y s i c a l r e a l i t y betrays her mere 
r e l a t i o n a l i t y t o the Poet can be reversed i n t o the c l a i m t h a t , 
on the c o n t r a r y , her sensuousness f o r b i d s her from being merely 
comprehended as a being. (48) The i m p o s s i b i l i t y of grasping the 
maid i s due t o her lack of d e f i n i t i o n , and t o the extent t o which 
she involves the poet. This explains why the poet cannot but hope 
t o reach the o b j e c t of h i s dream. (49) 
The rapport between the poet and the dream maiden i n v o l v e s no 
f u s i o n , but, on the c o n t r a r y , a meeting of non-coincidence. As 
Tim Clark has suggested, the d i f f i c u l t y which the poet i s f a c i n g 
cannot be understood i n terms of an inadequacy between the 
imaginative mind and e x t e r i o r r e a l i t y . I n h i s a n a l y s i s of 
'Alastor', Clark s t a t e s t h a t i t i s "not so much t h a t the mind's 
inner resources have f a i l e d so t h a t nature... i t s e l f appears 
barren," nor i s i t "an issue of the mind tempering i t s e l f t o an 
i n t r a n s i g e n t r e a l i t y t h a t cannot answer the poet's want." (50) 
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The dream maiden i s a r e a l i t y which cannot be segmented or 
shaped, and which reveals the f u l f i l m e n t of the Poet's d e s i r e i n 
i t s deferment. The s o l i p s i s t i c consequences of the poet's dream, 
and the f a c t t h a t the poet does not seem able t o go beyond 
himself i n order t o meet o t h e r s , can only be recognized i f i t i s 
also agreed t h a t the apparent self-centeredness of the poet 
implies a r a d i c a l dispossession. 
The quest w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , have t o be seen as a process t h a t i s 
s u f f i c i e n t unto i t s e l f , and whose essence l i e s i n not f i n d i n g 
t h a t which i t seeks, or, which amounts t o the same, i n being 
f u l f i l l e d as a searching process. The passion which animates the 
poet's quest i s also analogous t o the underlying stream of mental 
a c t i v i t y _ the d i f f i c u l t y of thought _ which animates the 
analysing e n t e r p r i s e i n ' D i f f i c u l t y of Analyzing the Mind 1. The 
Poet has not steered away from the search f o r knowledge which 
took him t o the b i r t h of time, but the knowledge which i s now 
gained can no longer be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from t h a t of which i t i s 
the knowledge. 
3. R e f l e c t i o n s . 
The Poet i s not so much awakened by the e x t i n c t i o n of the dream 
as by the spasm, i n between dreamlike v i s i o n and wakefulness, 
which t h i s e x t i n c t i o n creates. The Poet i s awakened by the 
u n c o n t r o l l a b l e energy of imageless sleep, which had been e c l i p s e d 
by the dream, and whose metaphorical d e s c r i p t i o n as "a dark 
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f l o o d " heralds one of the m o t i f s of the landscape which the Poet 
w i l l s a i l over: 
sleep, 
l i k e a dark f l o o d suspended i n i t s course, 
Rolled back i t s impulse on h i s vacant b r a i n . 
Roused by the shock he s t a r t e d from h i s trance 
(11 . 189-92) 
Wh i l s t , i n the dream, the Poet experiences sensuousness t o the 
p o i n t of senselessness, hence i t s e x t i n c t i o n , conversely, i n t h i s 
passage, he experiences the o b l i v i o n of sleep as an a c t i v e s t a t e . 
I f the o b l i t e r a t i o n of consciousness can be experienced i n t h i s 
way, then wakefulness may be h e l d as a symmetrical k i n d of 
o b l i t e r a t i o n . I t i s p r e c i s e l y because wakefulness and sleep 
i n t e r r u p t and m i r r o r each other t h a t n e i t h e r can be used as a 
c r i t e r i o n against the other. This i s also the case f o r i l l u s i o n 
and r e a l i t y , which the Narrator would l i k e t o be able t o p i t 
against each other, as w i l l now be examined. 
At the outset of the quest (11. 211-9), the Narrator encapsulates 
the Poet's undertaking w i t h i n a number of p r o p o s i t i o n s between 
which there i s p r e c i s e l y n othing t o choose, as they m i r r o r one 
another, and cannot provide the c r i t e r i o n which would decide 
between them. I f "the dark gate of death / Conduct (s) t o 
[Sleep's] mysterious paradise" ( 1 . 211-3) describes the Poet's 
desire t o be d e l i v e r e d from the mirage of l i f e i n order t o be 
r e u n i t e d w i t h h i s v i s i o n , then, t h i s v e r s i o n t a l l i e s w i t h the 
view t h a t , even the ephemeral phenomena of nature, i n t h e i r 
suggestive d u p l i c i t y , such as "the b r i g h t arch of rainbow clouds 
/ and pendent mountains seen i n the calm of lake," ( 1 . 213-4) 
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w i l l d r i v e him along the path beyond the merely n a t u r a l . I n f a c t , 
n a t u r a l phenomena can no longer be c a l l e d merely n a t u r a l , b u t are 
already the accomplishment of suggestiveness t o which the Poet 
responds. The Poet who experiences h i s v i s i o n as a r e a l i t y w i l l 
not, then, be made t o encounter the a l l e g e d r e a l i t y of the "black 
and watery depth" (1.215), which the b e a u t i f u l r e f l e c t i o n s of 
nature may hide, since i t i s i t s e l f p a r t of the i l l u s i o n which 
would make l i f e a mirage. I n the Poet's quest, there i s no "black 
and watery" r e a l i t y which can r e f u t e h i s undertaking and 
undeceive the Poet from h i s supposed i l l u s i o n . I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
the "day" i s "detested" ( 1 . 218) i f i t repels the "shade which 
the f o u l grave exhales", an ugliness which, i n Rajan's terms, 
"ceases t o be a r e a l i t y as soon as we move beyond the m a t e r i a l 
world". (51) R e f e r r i n g t o the same passage, Wasserman und e r l i n e s 
the "paradox of the c o n t r a d i c t o r y faces of the same o b j e c t , the 
equivocal image t h a t , l i k e the blue v a u l t t h a t i s e i t h e r sky or 
tomb, y i e l d s opposing meanings depending on the pe r s p e c t i v e i n 
which i t i s viewed." (52) Wasserman sees t h i s paradox as 
conveying the lack of ground f o r a f f i r m i n g e i t h e r t h a t human 
l i f e , or the v i s i o n of transcendence, i s an i l l u s i o n . According 
to my a n a l y s i s , however, the c o n t r a d i c t o r y faces of the same 
ob j e c t are not an a l t e r n a t i v e between which a choice i s open, but 
each belongs t o a l o g i c which does not al l o w one t o catch s i g h t 
of t he other. 
The Poet holds the tormenting death i n l i f e i n t o which h i s search 
seems t o t u r n l i f e as the c o n f i r m a t i o n of h i s p u r s u i t r a t h e r than 
i t s r e f u t a t i o n . As a r e s u l t , the i r o n y whereby he i s made t o 
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encounter the i n e r t vacancy of nature which h i s quest seeks t o 
avoid, i s undone. On the c o n t r a r y , i t might be p r e c i s e l y a t the 
p o i n t where the Poet i s reduced t o the s t a t u s of a mere 
r e f l e c t i o n of a n a t u r a l o b j e c t t h a t , nature being no longer 
merely n a t u r a l , h i s v i s i o n reaches i t s accomplishment: 
His wan eyes 
Gaze on the empty scene as vacantly 
As Ocean's moon looks on the moon i n heaven 
(11. 200-2) 
I n the next s e c t i o n of t h i s a n a l y s i s , I i n t e n d t o examine the 
ways i n which the Poet's quest i s i r o n i c a l l y misconstrued by the 
Narrator's outside perspective. I f the Poet gives the impression 
of looking f o r something beyond nature, t h i s i s i n f a c t because 
nature i t s e l f has taken on the speculative aspects of the Poet's 
quest. Nature i s not merely the l o c a l e of the quest, but 
corresponds t o the f u l l scope of i t , as the w o r l d which the quest 
opens up. The Poet moves v a i n l y w i t h i n the space of the quest, 
and i s "wandering", i n the sense which Blanchot gives t o the 
term, under the i n f l u e n c e of the e r r o r which nature as an image 
has become: "Error means wandering, the i n a b i l i t y t o abide and 
stay. For where the wanderer i s , the c o n d i t i o n s of a d e f i n i t i v e 
here are l a c k i n g " . (53) Therefore, the apparent d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 
of the Poet which the Narrator observes, i s the persistence of 
h i s searching process t o i t s o r i g i n . I n the process o f the 
n a r r a t i v e , the Narrator w i l l be the r e c i p i e n t of a r e a l i t y which 
may be awesome only t o him, as, f o r the Poet, i t i s the imaginary 
experienced as the depth of v i s i o n . 
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4. Poet and Narrator 
The i r o n y w i t h i n the f o l l o w i n g passage c o n s i s t s i n the f a c t t h a t 
the same terms w i t h which the Narrator may be understood as 
denouncing the f a l l a c y of the v i s i o n by c o n t r a s t i n g i t w i t h the 
e x i s t i n g outside world ( i n the n a r r a t o r ' s view, there i s no 
S p i r i t but v i s i b l e nature) might p r e c i s e l y be those which apply 
t o the Poet's v i s i o n of nature as imbued w i t h a S p i r i t : 
A S p i r i t seemed 
To stand beside him _ c l o t h e d i n no b r i g h t robes 
Of shadowy s i l v e r or e n s h r i n i n g l i g h t , 
Borrowed from aught the v i s i b l e world a f f o r d s 
Of grace, or majesty, or mystery;_ 
But, u n d u l a t i n g woods, and s i l e n t w e l l , 
And leaping r i v u l e t , and evening gloom 
Now deepening the dark shades, f o r speech assuming, 
Held commune w i t h him, as i f he and i t 
Were a l l t h a t was 
(11. 479-88) 
Consequently, n e i t h e r f o r the Narrator, nor f o r the Poet, can i t 
be disputed t h a t "he and i t / Were a l l t h a t was". I n other words, 
the same S p i r i t which, the Narrator b e l i e v e s , d r i v e s the Poet 
away from nature may i n f a c t be, f o r the Poet, nature i t s e l f . 
This i s suggested by the m o t i f of the " s t a r " w i t h i n t h i s passage 
of the poem. The reference t o "some inconstant s t a r .. . t w i n k l i n g 
f a i r " ( 11. 463-4) c o n t r a s t s w i t h the Poet's own "wan l i g h t , " ( 1 . 
470) and serves t o s t r e s s the i s o l a t i o n of the Poet from the 
surrounding world, whose encompassing r e f l e c t i o n shimmers on the 
surface of a w e l l (11. 457-68). On the other hand, the l a t e r 
d u p l i c a t i o n of the s i n g l e "inconstant s t a r " i n t o eyes, leads t o 
the suggestion t h a t , what the Narrator takes as inconstancy, 
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becomes, f o r the Poet, the very basis of a meaningfulness which 
beckons him on h i s quest: 
only... when h i s regard 
Was r a i s e d by intense pensiveness, ...two eyes, 
Two s t a r r y eyes, hung i n the gloom of thought, 
And seemed w i t h t h e i r serene and azure smiles 
To beckon him. 
(11. 488- 92) 
As a r e s u l t , the p o t e n t i a l l y i n f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n of the 
surrounding world, i n c l u d i n g the " s t a r t w i n k l i n g f a i r " , from 
which the Poet seemed separated, takes on an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . This may now be seen as the landscape which the 
Poet a c t u a l l y contemplates since 
H i t h e r the Poet came. His eyes beheld 
Their own wan l i g h t through the r e f l e c t e d l i n e s 
Of h i s t h i n h a i r , d i s t i n c t i n the dark depth 
Of t h a t s t i l l f o u n t a i n 
(11. 469-72) 
I n t h i s case, the q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the Poet's l i g h t as "wan" 
would only be due t o the Narrator's i n a b i l i t y t o see through the 
Poet's eyes. This passage has been construed as a t y p i c a l l y 
n a r c i s s i s t i c stance, c h a r a c t e r i z i n g an "archaic s o l i p s i s m , unable 
t o accept a l i e n a t i o n i n the f i e l d of the s e l f . " (54) However, i t 
i s c l e a r t h a t , i f the Poet's s o l i p s i s m i s an enclosure upon the 
s e l f , t h i s s e l f i s not a p o i n t t o r e v e r t back t o , and n o t h i n g 
which he possesses. The Poet i s so f a r from possessing h i s s e l f , 
t h a t he cannot recognize i t when he looks a t i t , an aspect o f the 
myth of Narcissus which Blanchot underlines, and which he 
connects t o h i s n o t i o n of the image i n L'Ecriture du desastre: 
"But the aspect of the myth which Ovid e v e n t u a l l y f o r g e t s , i s 
t h a t Narcissus, bending over the s p r i n g , does not recognize 
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himself i n the f l u i d image t h a t the water sends back t o him. I t 
i s thus not h i m s e l f , not h i s perhaps non-existent ' I ' t h a t he 
loves or, even i n h i s m y s t i f i c a t i o n - d e s i r e s . " (55) A l i e n a t i o n 
i s then nothing t o "accept," when there i s no self-possessed 
i n t e r i o r i t y t o be a l i e n a t e d . The n a r r a t o r i s then confronted w i t h 
the mystery which the Poet's v i s i o n c o n s t i t u t e s f o r him, and t h i s 
mystery r e p l i c a t e s the Poet's o b j e c t l e s s quest. 
I n the gesture of opposing the Poet t o v i s i b l e nature, and of 
de s c r i b i n g the Poet's own mind as a f a l l a c i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e w o r l d , 
the N arrator cannot, however, prevent the Poet's world from being 
taken f o r the only world t h a t i s v i s i b l e . The Narrator would then 
u n w i t t i n g l y confirm t h a t the Poet i s not lo o k i n g f o r something 
other than nature, but t h a t nature has become something t h a t 
beckons him. The essence of the Poet's quest i s v e r i f i e d every 
time the Narrator stresses the separation of the Poet's v i s i o n a r y 
c r e a t i o n s from the world ( 1 1 . 296-8; 304), or nature's impassive 
unresponsiveness t o the quest's t u r m o i l (11. 386, 393, 576-7). 
For the Poet, there i s no vacancy i n nature which i s not already 
the animation t o which h i s impassioned quest i s the testimony. 
5. Wandering and the desert. 
Just as thought, i n i t s attempted a n a l y s i s , i s both chasing and 
chased, because i t s r e f l e c t i n g process depends on f a l l i n g s h o r t 
of r e f l e c t i n g e n t i r e l y , s i m i l a r l y , the poet's journey i s 
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presented, i n the n a r r a t o r ' s terms, as both a search, and an 
escape: 
He eagerly pursues 
Beyond the realms of dream t h a t f l e e t i n g shade; 
He overleaps the bounds. 
(11. 205-7) 
The l i t t l e boat 
S t i l l f l e d before the storm; s t i l l f l e d , l i k e foam 
Down the steep c a t a r a c t of a w i n t r y r i v e r 
(11. 344-6) 
The poet i s "pursuing" t o the very same extent as he i s 
" f l e e i n g " . For t h i s reason, the desert or "wilderness", i n which 
h i s e r r a t i c movement takes place, can be seen n e i t h e r simply as 
the d e n i a l of r e a l i t y on the p a r t of the deceived poet, nor as 
the symbol of the loss of touch w i t h r e a l i t y from which the poet 
would s u f f e r . The desert i s the only space f o r the poet's 
paradoxical quest t o take place. I t i s the open space t h a t i s 
p r e r e q u i s i t e t o i t , and the v e r i f i c a t i o n t h a t the v i s i o n i s 
absent from the world. I t i s the vast space which the poet's 
journey covers, and, simultaneously, devastates, and lays bare, 
pushing the quest ever f u r t h e r onwards. The poet does not simply 
go nowhere, but nowhere has taken on a s p a t i a l r e a l i t y , the 
r e a l i t y of the desert, where the Poet t r u l y "mak[es] the w i l d h i s 
home" ( 1 . 99). The quest devastates the space i n which i t must 
be pursued, i n the same way as thought i s pushed t o the p o i n t 
where i t cannot t h i n k anymore. I t can, t h e r e f o r e , be argued t h a t 
the Poet i s l u r e d f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r i n t o h i s own mind, i f i t 
i s also understood t h a t " h i s own mind" has f i l l e d the dimension 
of the world of the quest. 
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L o g i c a l l y , the poet i s never submerged i n the i l l u s i o n t o which 
he has apparently f a l l e n prey: 
Seized by the sway of the ascending stream, 
With diz z y s w i f t n e s s , round, and round, and round, 
r i d g e a f t e r r i d g e the s t r a i n i n g boat arose, 
T i l l on the verge of the extremest curve, 
Where, through an opening of the rocky bank, 
The waters overflow, and a smooth spot 
Of glassy q u i e t mid those b a t t l i n g t i d e s , 
I s l e f t , the boat paused shuddering. _ S h a l l i t s i n k 
Down the abyss ? S h a l l the r e v e r t i n g stress 
Of t h a t r e s i s t l e s s g u l f embosom i t ? 
Now s h a l l i t f a l l ? 
(11. 387-97) 
The poet's progress towards t h i s e x t r e m i t y can o n l y be 
i n d e f i n i t e , as the emphasis on c i r c u l a r i t y i n the above passage 
makes c l e a r . I n t h i s c e n t r i f u g a l movement, the pressure which 
keeps the boat on the periphery of the w h i r l p o o l also keeps i t 
n e c e s s a r i l y w i t h i n i t . Therefore, f a r from " o v e r l e a p [ i n g ] the 
bounds" ( 1 . 207), the poet s t r i c t l y f o l l o w s a l i m i t which cannot 
be crossed, because i t recedes as the poet comes c l o s e r t o i t . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t the Poet's quest i s of no a v a i l , and t h a t h i s 
voyage could be considered as the e q u i v a l e n t of s t a s i s . I t i s 
al s o a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t the r o l e of the Narrator needs t o be 
examined f u r t h e r , since h i s t a l e needs the Poet's undertaking t o 
lend i t s e l f t o a n a r r a t i o n , which i n e r t i a jeopardizes. A p a r a l l e l 
can be e s t a b l i s h e d between the Narrator's need t o s u s t a i n h i s 
t a l e , and the Poet's need t o s u s t a i n h i s quest. As Raj an argues, 
the paradox of the Poet's voyage stems equ a l l y from the 
d i f f i c u l t y inherent i n the quest, and from i t s a r t i c u l a t i o n i n t o 
a n a r r a t i v e . (56) I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , necessary t o examine t h e ways 
i n which the Poet's and the Narrator's f a t e s are interdependent. 
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I f the Poet i s seen as undervaluing l i f e , i . e . , as being b l i n d 
and deaf t o the elements, ( 1 . 289) and set apart from the 
brotherhood which the Narrator upholds, then the Poet i s merely 
unresponsive t o a l i v e l i n e s s which stems from the Narrator's 
perspective. The Narrator's p o i n t of view creates the Poet's 
i s o l a t i o n , and supplies the "world of unconscious relatedness 
which i s a l i e n t o the self-conscious s t r i v i n g of man". (57) I n 
t h i s case, nature's unconsciousness corresponds t o the Poet's 
blindness t o i t . The Narrator i r o n i c a l l y supplies an analogue of 
the Poet's i s o l a t i o n , and l i t e r a l l y provides the landscape o f the 
Poet's devastating quest. I n t h i s l i g h t , the Narr a t o r ' s 
d e s c r i p t i o n s simultaneously r e p e l and i n v i t e the ravaging power 
of the Poet's quest. However, they also f a i l t o do so, as i t can 
be argued t h a t the Poet's process puts the Narrator's own 
n a r r a t i v e process under s t r a i n . 
The n a r r a t i v e seems t o be pushed t o the l i m i t s of d e s c r i p t i o n as 
i t t a c k l e s the t u r m o i l which the Poet encounters i n h i s voyage, 
and as the v i o l e n c e of the storm i s i n t e n s i f i e d by the Poet's 
boat hugging the wind: 
A w h i r l w i n d swept i t on, 
With f i e r c e gusts and p r e c i p i t a t i n g f o r c e , 
Through the white ridges of the chafed sea. 
(11. 320-3) 
Calm and r e j o i c i n g i n the f e a r f u l war 
Of wave r u i n i n g on wave, and b l a s t on b l a s t 
Descending, and black f l o o d on w h i r l p o o l d r i v e n 
With dark o b l i t e r a t i n g course, he sate 
(11. 326- 9) 
I n these passages, the "dark o b l i t e r a t i n g course" might be 
ascribed as much t o the tumult which the Poet's quest unleashes, 
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and which d r i v e s i t t o the verge of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , as t o the 
n a r r a t i v e which, i n s u s t a i n i n g t h i s t umult, stumbles over 
r e p e t i t i o n ( 1 . 327), and generates entropy i n d e s c r i b i n g i t . The 
l i m i t s of d e s c r i p t i o n also seem t o be reached i n the episode of 
the cave i n l i n e s 374- 384. This time, "the boat moved s l o w l y " , 
but the surrounding landscape has taken on the chaotic aspect 
which speed and movement created e a r l i e r on. I n t h i s landscape, 
height and depth are no longer opposites, but simultaneously 
c h a r a c t e r i s e the same ob j e c t s i n a clash of perspectives, so t h a t 
no l e v e l ground i s l e f t t o measure ascending and descending 
movements ("the mountain" exposed "depths", 11. 374-5, "the 
flood's enormous volume f e l l " 1. 376, "the mass / F i l l e d . . . a l l 
t h a t ample chasm" 11. 378-9). 
As both the quest and the d e s c r i p t i o n are brought t o a pause ("A 
pool of treacherous and tremendous calm", 1. 386), i t becomes 
apparent t h a t the Poet's quest and the Narrator's n a r r a t i v e must 
be described i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h each other. The Narrator engages 
w i t h the Poet's torment t o the same extent t h a t the l a t t e r 
exposes the n a r r a t i v e t o h i s o r d e a l . Conversely, the n a r r a t i v e 
subjects the Poet t o an inhuman world by v i r t u e of a r t i c u l a t i n g 
a chaos which defies human endurance. As w i l l now be examined, 
t h i s i s the case whether the d e s c r i p t i o n tends towards exhaustion 
or p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 
A c o n t r a s t can be e s t a b l i s h e d between the Poet's i s o l a t i o n , 
conveyed i n the l i n e s 469-72, and the m u l t i f a r i o u s r e l a t i o n s 
e x h i b i t e d by the n a t u r a l w orld, which may be taken as an instance 
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of the pervasive meaningfulness which escape the Poet, and from 
which he appears t o be excluded: 
the p a r a s i t e s , 
Starred w i t h ten thousand blossoms, f l o w around 
The grey t r u n k s , and, as gamesome i n f a n t s ' eyes, 
With g e n t l e meanings, and most innocent w i l e s , 
Fold t h e i r beams round the hearts of those t h a t love, 
These twine t h e i r t e n d r i l s w i t h the wedded boughs 
U n i t i n g t h e i r close union; the woven leaves 
Make network of the dark blue l i g h t of day 
(11. 439-46) 
Nature e x h i b i t s a relatedness which the Poet i s a l l e g e d l y unable 
to achieve. Yet the lushness of t h i s landscape c o n s i s t s i n a mesh 
of p o t e n t i a l l y i n f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s , whose pervasive b i n d i n g a c t i o n 
meets as l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e as i t i s unobtrusive, given the 
p l e o n a s t i c phrase " U n i t i n g t h e i r close union" ( 1 . 445). These 
bonds p r o l i f e r a t e t o the p o i n t of d i s s o l v i n g , as was the case 
w i t h the dream maiden's embrace, and the treacherous connotations 
are here underlined, j u s t as they had been w i t h the loss o f the 
dream ("Alas! Alas! / Were limbs, and breath, and being 
i n t e r t w i n e d / Thus treacherously?", 11. 207-9). I t i s c l e a r , 
then, t h a t t h i s b i n d i n g movement m i r r o r s the Poet's own a p o r e t i c 
and p a r a d o x i c a l l y s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g quest. However, the N a r r a t o r 
cannot d e l i n e a t e these profuse and w a s t e f u l t w i n i n g s , as b e f i t s 
" p a r a s i t e s " , w i t h o u t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n d i s p l a y i n g the same 
p a r a s i t i c tendency t o be generated out of i t s own m a t e r i a l ( 1 . 
445), and t o take over from the Poet's process. The Poet has been 
drawn i n t o the space of wandering and e r r o r , i n search f o r a 
v i s i o n , "a prototype of h i s conception," which, i f i t c o u l d be 
possessed, would grant the t r u e a r t of i n v e n t i o n . I n a word, the 
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Poet belongs t o the c o n t r a d i c t i o n of "the work as o r i g i n " , as 
Blanchot defines i t : 
No one who does not belong t o the work as o r i g i n , who 
does not belong t o t h a t other time where the work i s 
concerned f o r i t s essence, w i l l ever create a work. 
But whoever does belong t o t h a t other time also 
belongs t o the empty p r o f u n d i t y of i n e r t i a where 
nothing i s ever made of being. (58) 
In t h i s case, i t i s then p o s s i b l e t o say t h a t , through h i s 
n a r r a t i v e , the n a r r a t o r comes as close as possible t o the r i s k s 
which the Poet runs i n h i s quest. His n a r r a t i v e i s endangered, 
and a t t r a c t e d , by the same i n e r t i a , according t o the law o f the 
" r e c i t " , or n a r r a t i o n , which Blanchot describes as f o l l o w s : 
N a r r a t i o n i s movement towards a p o i n t which i s not only 
unknown, ignored and strange but such t h a t i t seems t o have 
no p r i o r r e a l i t y apart from t h i s movement, yet i s so 
compulsive t h a t the n a r r a t i o n ' s appeal depends on i t t o the 
extent t h a t i t cannot even 'begin' before i t has reached 
i t , w h i l e i t i s only n a r r a t i o n , and the u n p r e d i c t a b l e 
movement of the n a r r a t i o n which provide the space where 
t h i s p o i n t becomes r e a l , powerful and appealing. (59) 
Simultaneously, the Narrator's n a r r a t i v e , i n the very 
a r t i c u l a t i o n i n which i t presents the Poet's process, s u b j e c t s 
i t t o the treacherous movement of the quest.(60) For example, the 
p o r t r a i t of the poet i n l i n e s 469-475 may be understood as the 
d e p i c t i o n of h i s exhaustion from the very v i t a l i t y of nature 
which the Narrator l a v i s h l y describes, b r i n g i n g h i s own n a r r a t i v e 
t o the verge of d i s s o l u t i o n . The Poet himself may appear as the 
v i c t i m of the Narrator's t a l e , f o r the sake of i t s t e l l i n g . I n 
t h i s case, the mystery of the Poet's v i s i o n remains untouched, 
since there may be no other torment than the one which the 
n a r r a t o r introduces. 
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The dilemma which the n a r r a t i v e represents f o r the N a r r a t o r i s 
revealed, as he seems t o deplore the unheeded loss of the Poet 
i n an u n f e e l i n g world: 
But thou a r t f l e d 
L ike some f r a i l e x h a l a t i o n ; which the dawn 
Robes i n i t s golden beams, ah! thou hast f l e d ! 
The brave, the g e n t l e , and the b e a u t i f u l , 
The c h i l d of grace and genius. Heartless t h i n g s 
Are done and s a i d i ' the world, and many worms 
And beasts and men l i v e on, and mighty Earth 
From sea and mountain, c i t y and wilderness, 
I n vesper low or joyous o r i s o n , 
L i f t s s t i l l i t s solemn voice 
(11. 688-96) 
At the p o i n t where the n a r r a t i v e has been i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the 
process of b r i n g i n g the Poet t o the f o r e t o l d end of h i s journey, 
i t i s po s s i b l e t o perceive a h i n t of se l f - r e p r o a c h (11. 710-2) 
i n the Narrator's r e g r e t , which m i r r o r s h i s emphasis on the 
unresponsiveness of the surrounding world. As the Narrator's t a l e 
seems t o have m i r r o r e d the i n t r a c t a b l e and impassive power 
unleashed by the Poet's search, i t becomes the same t h i n g t o say 
t h a t the Poet has f a l l e n v i c t i m t o t h i s i n t r a c t a b l e f o r c e , and 
to the Narrator's a r t i c u l a t i o n of i t . This i s why the Na r r a t o r 
seems t o h o l d the p r i n c i p l e of the Poet's nemesis when he 
s u c c i n c t l y surveys the elements of the landscape ("worms... 
beasts ... men", "sea and mountain, c i t y and wilderness", "and 
mighty Earth") a f i n a l time. 
Whilst t h i s landscape i s about t o engulf the Poet (11. 546- 53), 
confirming t h a t the mind's desire was a t the r o o t of i t s own 
undoing, on the other hand, i t can also be considered as the 
cond i t i o n s a l l o w i n g the Poet t o run h i s course: 
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Thou canst no longer know or love the shapes 
Of t h i s phantasmal scene, who have t o thee 
Been purest m i n i s t e r s 
(11. 696-8) 
These "have ... been purest m i n i s t e r s " t o the Poet i f i t i s 
understood t h a t , i n s u s t a i n i n g the Poet's exhausting quest, they 
have also made the moment of h i s f i n a l d e s t r u c t i o n u n s p e c i f i e d . 
I n the f o l l o w i n g passages, the "brooding care / That ever f e d on 
i t s decaying flame" (11. 246-7), the f r e n z y of the quest denying 
t h a t r e s t i s f i n a l , p e r s i s t s as the Poet's pulse s u s t a i n i n g the 
n a r r a t i v e , and as he t u r n s i n t o a t a l e : 
no mortal pain or fear 
Marred h i s repose, the i n f l u x e s of sense, 
And h i s own being unalloyed by p a i n , 
Yet f e e b l e r and more fe e b l e , calmly f e d 
The stream of thought 
The Poet's blood, 
That ever beat i n mystic sympathy 
With nature's ebb and f l o w , grew f e e b l e r s t i l l : 
t i l l the minutest ray 
Was quenched, the pulse yet l i n g e r e d i n h i s h e a r t . 
I t paused_it f l u t t e r e d . 
(11. 640-4; 11. 651-3; 11. 657-9) 
The Poet's s u r v i v a l w i t h i n h i s quest sustains the Narrator's 
voice. The l a t t e r becomes, then, also the voice of nature beyond 
the merely n a t u r a l , t e l l i n g , " [ I ] n vesper low or joyous 
o r i s o n " ( 1 . 694), t h a t the Poet l i v e s on ("babbling r i v u l e t " 1. 
524, "ten thousand various tongues" 1.549, "one voice / Alone 
i n s p i r e d i t s echoes" 1. 590-1). I f the landscape i s the Poet's 
process turned i n t o a v i s i b l e world which i s a r t i c u l a t e d and 
depicted by the Narrator, then, the Poet i s r e u n i t e d w i t h h i s 
v i s i o n as he surrenders t o i t ( 1 . 594- 601). This symbolic 
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landscape, which the Poet has prepared f o r himself as he went 
along h i s search, contains a symbol of the Poet: 
A pine, 
Rock-rooted, s t r e t c h e d athwart the vacancy 
I t s swinging boughs, t o each inconstant b l a s t 
Y i e l d i n g one only response, a t each pause 
I n most f a m i l i a r cadence, w i t h the howl 
The thunder and the h i s s of homeless streams 
Min g l i n g i t s solemn song 
(11. 561-7) 
The pine spans, and i s the measure o f , the vacancy r e l a t i n g the 
Poet t o eve r y t h i n g from which he has been separated. As Vincent 
Newey has noted, t h i s image "unites r e a l i s m and a s p i r a t i o n , " (61) 
and t h i s vacancy i s pr o d u c t i v e of a n a t u r a l language, whereby 
speechless elements can speak. The Poet has then become the 
mediator of nature's speech. (62) While i t i s possi b l e t o say, 
t h a t , w i t h h i s v i s i o n , the Poet may have experienced "meaning," 
on the other hand, i t i s not the case t h a t "the connection 
between meaning and language eludes him." (63) On the c o n t r a r y , 
he experiences the absence of such a connection, and, as Raj an 
suggests, (64) i n Alastor, Shelley faced the sense t h a t t h e r e 
might be no ground behind language. 
The loss of the Poet has shaken the Narrator's sense of being 
p a r t of the brotherhood of Nature. N e i l F r a i s t a t notes t h a t , 
s t a r t i n g w i t h an hymn, he ends w i t h an elegy, and t h a t loss 
enters h i s vocabulary. (65) The r e v e r s a l of the n a r r a t o r ' s image 
of i n s p i r a t i o n ("And moveless, as a l o n g - f o r g o t t e n l y r e / 
Suspended i n the s o l i t a r y dome", 11. 42-3, "A f r a g i l e l u t e , on 
whose harmonious s t r i n g s / The breath of heaven d i d wander", 11. 
667-8) i n t o a metaphor of death ("and those d i v i n e s t lineaments, 
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/ Worn by the senseless wind, s h a l l l i v e alone" 11. 704-5 ) 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t he has no confidence t h a t despair a r i s i n g from 
transience i s an i d l e thought. The Narrator's sense t h a t h i s 
t a l e , which i s preserved from the pathless depths i n t o which the 
Poet's e r r a t i c process seemed t o draw i t , seals the Poet's f a t e , 
and can only exacerbate the sense of loss ("Thou hast f l e d ! " 11. 
688, 695). I n h i s escape from the Poet's f a t e , the Narrator i s 
a defeated s u r v i v o r f o r whom the Poet's demise becomes the 
supreme achievement, p a r a d o x i c a l l y v i n d i c a t i n g h i s i l l u s o r y 
quest: 
A r t and eloquence, 
And a l l the shows o' the world are f r a i l and v a i n 
To weep a loss t h a t t u r n s t h e i r l i g h t s t o shade. 
(11. 710-2) 
However, the i d e a l i z a t i o n of the Poet by the Narrator may be as 
mistaken as h i s e a r l i e r d e p i c t i o n of the quest as i l l u s o r y , and 
t h i s s u s p i c i o n , even i f the t a l e has changed the Narrator, makes 
Alastor an ambiguous poem. 
*** 
Alastor i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the r e v e r s a l whereby i n s p i r a t i o n , 
which i s d e r i v e d from a v i s i o n a r y moment, does not allow the poet 
t o r e s o r t t o c r e a t i o n as a power which he could use. Shelley's 
poem presents the epitome of the paradox whereby, i n an i n v e r s i o n 
of c r e a t i v e genius, t o renounce making the p o e t i c a l work i s taken 
as the p o e t i c a l accomplishment par excellence. Yet, i n Alastor 
Shelley also depicts the extent t o which the absence of a work, 
127 
which i s thus i d e a l i z e d t o the p o i n t of suggesting the e f f e c t of 
a transcendence, i s also a workless-ness. I t i s on t h i s basis 
t h a t , as analysed, the poem allows us, f o r instance, t o d i s p u t e 
the view t h a t the dream-union leads the Poet t o know the 
p o t e n t i a l r e l a t i o n of h i s s e l f t o some transcendence. 
Transcendence and the i d e a l i z a t i o n of the absence of a f i n i t e 
work are s u b s t i t u t e d f o r the absence of work which Blanchot c a l l s 
worklessness and which, according t o t h i s a n a l y s i s , i s 
represented by the process of the Poet's quest understood as a 
c r e a t i v e act t h a t never takes place f o r lack of an i n t e r r u p t i o n 
of the movement i n d e f i n i t e l y leading t o i t . The i d e a l i z a t i o n t o 
which the Narrator y i e l d s a t the end of the poem would lead t o 
the view expressed i n A Defence o f Poetry (1820), t h a t "the most 
g l o r i o u s poetry t h a t has ever been communicated t o the w o r l d i s 
probably a feeble shadow of the o r i g i n a l conception of the poet" 
(66) t o be taken as a v a l o r i z a t i o n of the i n e f f a b l e . However, 
such a v a l o r i z a t i o n of the i n e f f a b l e tends t o o b s t r u c t the f a c t 
t h a t the f i n i t e , l i m i t e d work t h a t i s made, i s not the 
c a n c e l l a t i o n of t h i s movement " i n t o a space where t r u t h l a c k s , 
where l i m i t s have disappeared," (67) but, on the c o n t r a r y the 
b l a t a n t m a n i f e s t a t i o n of i t . I t i s possible t o suggest t h a t i n 
Alastor Shelley shows h i s awareness t h a t the work of l i t e r a t u r e 
reclaims the powerlessness w i t h i n " l e souci r e a l i s a t e u r " 
(purposeful a c t i o n ) . (68) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Julian and Maddalo (1819) 
This Chapter w i l l examine Julian and Maddalo (1819). As a number 
of c r i t i c s have argued, the debates i n Alastor and Julian and 
Maddalo are very s i m i l a r . I t i s p o s s i b l e t o see the poem i n terms 
of the usual psychic s t r i f e around the v a l i d i t y of the mind's 
a s p i r a t i o n s . According t o Wasserman, " J u l i a n and Maddalo are 
Shelley's d i v i d e d and c o n f l i c t i n g selves s k e p t i c a l l y c o n f r o n t i n g 
each other, as they do i n Alastor; and the poem, i n e f f e c t , i s 
Shelley's debate w i t h h i m s e l f " ( 1 ) . Tim Clark also suggests the 
existence of a strong l i n k between the two poems: 
the debate between J u l i a n and Maddalo, concerning t h e 
mind's power t o r e a l i 2 e the apprehension o f the good, 
i s a c o n t i n u a t i o n on an i n t e r p e r s o n a l l e v e l , of the 
i n t r a p e r s o n a l debates on the mind's p o t e n t i a l power 
over i t s e l f conducted i n Shelley's work during 1815-
16. (2) 
On top of these concerns, Julian and Maddalo also explores the 
r e l a t i o n between r e a l i t y and the p e c u l i a r derangement which t h i s 
r e a l i t y i s supposed t o undergo i n poetry, which the f i g u r e of the 
Maniac may be understood t o convey. With some c r i t i c a l d i s t a n c e , 
the poem r e f l e c t s the debate between Shelley and Byron around 
t h e i r d i f f e r i n g p o e t i c a l p r a c t i c e s and shared i n t e r e s t i n the 
f i g u r e of Torquato Tasso, as "the u n j u s t l y persecuted poet." (3) 
This analysis w i l l examine the dichotomy between t h e non-
a l i e n a t e d world of s a n i t y , represented by J u l i a n and Maddalo, and 
the a l i e n a t e d world of the Maniac, and the questions i n v o l v e d i n 
the paradox of s a n i t y g i v i n g voice t o i n s a n i t y . Bearing i n mind 
Blanchot's statement t h a t the "absence of work ... i s the other 
name f o r madness," (4) t h i s study w i l l explore the ways i n which 
Julian and Maddalo i l l u m i n a t e s Shelley's conception of p o e t i c a l 
c r e a t i o n . 
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and M i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
The issue of the tensio n between i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and 
m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n l i e s a t the core of Julian and Maddalo, because 
the framing s t r u c t u r e of the conversation poem i s foregrounded. 
This issue r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y t o the double status of the p o e t i c a l 
work as product and process, the u n i t y of which i t was one o f the 
aims of romantic l i t e r a r y theory t o conceptualize. I t concerns 
the way i n which we conceive the r e l a t i o n s between the t h r e e 
characters as the product of the poem, and the way i n which we 
use the poem i n order t o b u i l d such an understanding, i n which 
case the process of the poem i s the main focus. The encounter 
between the sane and the insane may be a way t o t e s t the f r o n t i e r 
between the two. Qualms concerning the i m p o s i t i o n of the order 
of the sane world upon i n s a n i t y t e s t i f y t o an anxi e t y not t o take 
the conceptions of the sane world f o r granted, which i s another 
way of wishing f o r a r e a l d i v i s i o n between s a n i t y and i n s a n i t y . 
Tracy Ware has underlined the danger of such an i m p o s i t i o n i n her 
analysis of J u l i a n and Maddalo's " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " of the Maniac's 
ravings: 
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Therefore the poem promises t o c o n f i r m Fish's 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n always operates 
according t o p r i o r assumptions, and t h a t i t s operation 
i s s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g : ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s not the a r t of 
c o n s t r u i n g but the a r t of c o n s t r u c t i n g - ' ( 5 ) 
This a n x i e t y concerns the f a c t t h a t the use of the Maniac as a 
case i n p o i n t , and f o r the b e n e f i t of an argument, as J u l i a n and 
Maddalo appear t o do, i s a way of f i t t i n g him w i t h i n a 
p r e e x i s t e n t framework. The next stage i n t h i s framing s t r u c t u r e , 
i s i n h e rent i n the f a c t t h a t s a n i t y and madness may be c o n t r a s t e d 
w i t h the r e s u l t of i r o n i c a l l y exchanging places. And the next 
stage again, w i t h i n t h i s endless s e r i e s of m i r r o r i n g e f f e c t s , can 
be found i n the instance of the "mocking ra p p o r t " between the 
insane and the sane, as mentioned by McLennan i n h i s a n a l y s i s of 
v i s i t s t o madhouses i n the eighteenth century: 
the d i s p l a y of madness as a spectacle f o r those 
v i s i t i n g New Bethlem promoted a self-consciousness and 
s e l f - r e f e r r i n g p l a y on madness: [th e inmates of 
Bedlam] may w e l l have 'acted crazy' t o e s t a b l i s h a 
mocking ra p p o r t w i t h the sane, t u r n i n g a l l i n t o a 
g a l l e r y of d i s t o r t i n g m i r r o r s . ( 6 ) 
I n many ways, Julian and Maddalo prepares f o r the scenario of a 
misunderstanding of the Maniac by J u l i a n and Maddalo, and tempts 
the reader w i t h the n o t i o n t h a t , faced w i t h the raw f a c t of 
emotion (the Maniac), r a t i o n a l i z i n g thought ( J u l i a n versus 
Maddalo) can o n l y be h e l p l e s s . 
J u l i a n and Maddalo agree on the existence of a gap between men's 
a s p i r a t i o n s and the w o r l d as i t i s . Their d i f f e r e n c e l i e s i n the 
f a c t t h a t J u l i a n b e l i eves t h a t such a gap can be bridged through 
man's power over h i s mind (11. 182-6), whereas Maddalo sees man 
131 
as weak and i n e v i t a b l y f r u s t r a t e d i n a world which i s governed 
by i r r a t i o n a l forces (11. 120-30). I n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n , J u l i a n 
and Maddalo b e l i e v e themselves t o be poles a p a r t , and t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n s are indeed symmetrical. I n t h e i r conversation, they do 
not so much t r y t o disprove each other's theory, as r e a d i l y 
s u b s t i t u t e each other i n the Maniac's place, i n order t o each 
confirm h i s own theory. The paradox c o n s i s t s , on the one hand, 
i n Maddalo seeing i n s a n i t y as the outcome of J u l i a n ' s i d e a l i s t i c 
a t t i t u d e i n a world dominated by i r r a t i o n a l f o r c e s : 
I knew one l i k e you 
Who t o t h i s c i t y came some months ago, 
With whom I argued i n t h i s s o r t , and he 
I s now gone mad, _ and so he answered me,_ 
Poor f e l l o w ! 
(11. 195-9) 
On the ot h e r hand, J u l i a n a t t r i b u t e s the Maniac's madness t o h i s 
w i l f u l p r i d e and impatience, t h a t i s , t o Maddalo's flaws i n 
J u l i a n ' s eyes: 
' I hope t o prove the i n d u c t i o n otherwise, 
And t h a t a want of t h a t t r u e theory, s t i l l , 
Which seeks a "soul of goodness" i n things i l l 
Or i n himself or o t h e r s , has thus bowed 
His being _ there are some by nature proud, 
Who p a t i e n t i n a l l else demand but t h i s _ 
To love and be beloved w i t h gentleness; 
And being scorned, what wonder i f they d i e 
Some l i v i n g death ? t h i s i s not des t i n y 
But man's own w i l f u l i l l . ' 
( 1 1. 202-11) 
F i r s t , J u l i a n and Maddalo pass judgment before even seeing the 
Maniac, whom they both i n t e n d t o use as an example. They can, 
t h e r e f o r e , be s a i d t o be d e a l i n g , a t l e a s t at t h i s stage, o n l y 
w i t h an a b s t r a c t i o n , t h a t i s , w i t h t h e i r own preconception o f 
madness. J u l i a n and Maddalo merely frame each other w i t h i n t h e i r 
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own wo r l d view. To t h i s e xtent they misunderstand each ot h e r , and 
i t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t , before v i s i t i n g the Maniac, they 
are l i a b l e t o misunderstand him. For each of them, madness can 
only a f f e c t the other. The f a c t t h a t each p e r f e c t l y f i t s the r o l e 
of p o t e n t i a l maniac i n the other's world view, w i t h o u t t h i s 
b r i n g i n g some home t r u t h s t o e i t h e r , also suggests t h a t the 
conversation i s i n f a c t a dialogue of the deaf. There i s no way 
i n which J u l i a n and Maddalo, who are so s i m i l a r , can meet on any 
ground. As a matter of f a c t , n e i t h e r character a c t u a l l y s h i f t s 
h i s grounds i n order t o meet h i s 'adversarius' i n h i s own terms. 
Maddalo merely p o i n t s at "a b e t t e r s t a t i o n " ( 1 . 87). The debate, 
being s t a t i c , can h a r d l y be conclusive. 
However, such conclusion i s presented as i r r e l e v a n t . The issue 
of the v a l i d i t y of i d e a l i s m as an adequate response t o the human 
c o n d i t i o n seems t o be no longer t o the p o i n t by the end o f the 
poem, as J u l i a n and Maddalo have f o r g o t t e n t h e i r debate. As Ware 
has noted, the Maniac " c o n f l a t e s " J u l i a n ' s and Maddalo's 
apparently opposed t h e o r i e s , and f u r t h e r quoting Wasserman, she 
notes: "Shelley has drawn the Maniac as both a Utopian t h e o r i s t 
l i k e J u l i a n and an imp a t i e n t i d e a l i s t l i k e Maddalo." (7) The 
Maniac being a c o n f l a t i o n of both of them, i t i s s u r p r i s i n g t h a t 
each does not, i n s t e a d , f e e l confirmed i n h i s p o s i t i o n . The 
breakdown of the o p p o s i t i o n between J u l i a n and Maddalo r u i n s any 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the poem which favours one p o i n t of view over 
the other: 
then we l i n g e r e d not, 
Although our argument was q u i t e f o r g o t , 
But c a l l i n g the attendants, went t o dine 
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At Maddalo's; y e t n e i t h e r cheer nor wine 
could give us s p i r i t s , f o r we t a l k e d of him 
And nothing e l s e , t i l l d a y l i g h t made sta r s dim; 
And we agreed h i s was some d r e a d f u l i l l 
(11.519-25) 
Whereas the v i s i t t o the Maniac can be presented as a t e s t f o r 
Ju l i a n ' s and Maddalo's views of human l i f e , the o p p o s i t i o n which 
i s g e n e r a l l y seen between them does not f u l l y account f o r the 
f a c t t h a t they are both equ a l l y and s i m i l a r l y touched by the 
Maniac. Despite the doubts cast on t h e i r perception o f the 
madman, a t no p o i n t i s i t suggested t h a t they do misunderstand 
him. They are touched i n a way f o r which they know t h e i r words 
cannot account ('And we agreed h i s was some d r e a d f u l i l l / 
Wrought on him b o l d l y , y e t unspeakable,/ By a dear f r i e n d ' , 11. 
525-7). J u l i a n and Maddalo have encountered an embodiment of the 
term which they so r e a d i l y throw a t each other, which they 
r e f r a i n from doing, a f t e r the v i s i t t o the Maniac. 
The issue of the adequacy of J u l i a n and Maddalo's perce p t i o n of 
the Maniac remains u n s e t t l e d since, as suggested, there i s no way 
of measuring adequacy or inadequacy other than against the 
evidence of the Maniac's speech i t s e l f . I t i s p o s s i b l e , f o r 
instance, t o s t r e s s the ambiguity of the two f r i e n d s ' 
understanding of the madman, which l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t , 
although they both s t r e s s the Maniac's a l t e r a t i o n , they cannot 
help seeing aspects i n him which show t h a t he has, t o some 
extent, remained as he was: 
'Nay, t h i s was k i n d of you _ he has no claim, 
As the world says'_ 'None _ but the very same 
Which I on a l l mankind were I as he 
F a l l e n t o such deep reverse 
134 
(11. 262-5) 
he had st o r e 
Of f r i e n d s and f o r t u n e once, as we could guess 
From h i s nice h a b i t s and h i s gentleness 
(11. 534-6) 
The ambiguity of the two f r i e n d s " p o s i t i o n f i n d s i t s epitome i n 
Maddalo's compassionate gesture: 
so I f i t t e d up f o r him 
Those rooms beside the sea, t o please h i s whim 
and sent him busts and books and urns f o r f l o w e r s , 
Which had adorned h i s l i f e i n happier hour, 
And instruments of music 
(11. 252-6) 
For Maddalo, the Maniac has not changed so much t h a t he cannot 
appreciate t h a t which he used t o , and the Maniac i s not so 
d i f f e r e n t from Maddalo himself t h a t the l a t t e r cannot imagine 
" f a l l [ i n g ] t o such deep reverse" ( 1 . 265). This may confirm the 
c r i t i c a l r o l e of i n s a n i t y upon s a n i t y , since the sane r e a d i l y 
i d e n t i f y w i t h the insane. On the other hand, the Maniac may 
simply be misunderstood by the two f r i e n d s , who u n w i t t i n g l y 
c onstruct h i s persona on the basis of t h e i r own experience and 
knowledge. Maddalo's g i f t s t o the Maniac i r o n i c a l l y resemble the 
objects which J u l i a n sees as p a r t of h i s s e l f - i n d u l g e n t e x i l e : 
books are th e r e , 
P i c t u r e s , and casts from a l l those statues f a i r 
Which were twin-born w i t h poetry 
(11. 554-6) 
As a r e s u l t , the Maniac might be locked i n the madhouse p r e c i s e l y 
because J u l i a n and Maddalo b e l i e v e so e a s i l y t h a t they can 
i d e n t i f y w i t h him, j u s t as they could put each other i n the r o l e 
of p o t e n t i a l madman. Madness appears t o be a l l the more e a s i l y 
cut o f f and locked i n , as i t i s measured by common norms, and 
appropriated by the world of reason. J u l i a n and Maddalo would 
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then be accomplices t o p u t t i n g an end t o the hope of ever 
understanding the Maniac on h i s own grounds. 
According t o the same l o g i c r u l e d by m i r r o r e f f e c t s between 
s a n i t y and i n s a n i t y , i t i s po s s i b l e t o say t h a t a l i e n a t i o n and 
e x i l e c h a r a c t e r i z e a l l three personae, a l b e i t t o d i f f e r e n t 
extents. Maddalo i s a stranger i n h i s own country ("COUNT MADDALO 
i s a Venetian noblemen of ancient f a m i l y and of great f o r t u n e , 
who w i t h o u t mixing much i n the s o c i e t y of h i s countrymen, resides 
c h i e f l y a t h i s magnificent palace i n t h a t c i t y " ) , (8) and J u l i a n 
apparently enjoys a c u l t i v a t e d e x i l e away from England (1 1 . 548-
58). The two f r i e n d s ' l i b e r a l views imply a c r i t i c a l distance 
from t h e i r s o c i e t i e s . Maddalo could have been "the redeemer o f 
his degraded country." J u l i a n i s "passionately attached t o those 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l notions which assert the power of man over h i s 
mind, and the immense improvements of which, by the e x t i n c t i o n 
of c e r t a i n moral s u p e r s t i t i o n s , human s o c i e t y may be y e t 
susc e p t i b l e " . As f o r the Maniac, he has become a stranger t o the 
world a l l e g e d l y through an i n i t i a l sense of loss and abandonment: 
'he came 
To Venice a dejected man, and fame 
Said he was wealthy, or he had been so; 
Some thought the loss of f o r t u n e wrought woe; 
A lady came w i t h him from France, and when 
She l e f t him and returned, he wandered then 
About yon l o n e l y i s l e s of desert sand 
T i l l he grew w i l d 
(11. 232-5, 246-9) 
The m i r r o r i n g e f f e c t s between the Maniac and h i s v i s i t o r s lead 
to the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t J u l i a n and Maddalo debating outside t h e i r 
communities ( t o which they do not address themselves, and which 
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cannot hear them, except i n the case of J u l i a n ' s present 
n a r r a t i v e ) , are not so d i s s i m i l a r from the Maniac endlessly 
r a v i n g w i t h i n the confines of h i s p r i s o n . J u l i a n and Maddalo 
would be sane t o the extent t h a t they can manage an i s o l a t i o n 
which i s a t o r t u r e t o the Maniac. S i m i l a r l y , J u l i a n ' s e x a l t a t i o n 
d u r i n g the horse r i d e , foreshadows the devastation o f the 
Maniac's c o n d i t i o n . The f a c t t h a t J u l i a n s e n t i m e n t a l l y enjoys 
" a l l waste" ( 1 . 16) underlines h i s d i f f e r e n c e from the Maniac, 
since i n h i s comfortable e x i l e , J u l i a n i s only r e l a t i v e l y a t odds 
w i t h s o c i e t y . The boundlessness and barrenness of the landscape, 
which J u l i a n i s able t o enjoy i s also a reversed image f o r the 
Maniac's p r i s o n . The conversational s t y l e which c h a r a c t e r i z e s 
J u l i a n ' s speech p r o t e c t s him from the a c t u a l danger which a term 
l i k e "waste" i n v o l v e s . The Maniac's c o n d i t i o n r e f l e c t s on the 
c o n d i t i o n of the two f r i e n d s as the tame versi o n of h i s own. The 
poem, then, lends i t s e l f t o a regress of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s f o r lack 
of a p o s i t i o n from which the o p p o s i t i o n between s a n i t y and 
i n s a n i t y could be explained and j u s t i f i e d . 
I t i s apparent t h a t the example o f the Maniac has not s e t t l e d the 
f r i e n d s ' debate on the grounds on, nor i n the terms i n which, i t 
had been conducted - so much does the term " f o r g o t " suggest. When 
i t comes t o concluding on the Maniac's s t a t e , both J u l i a n and 
Maddalo agree on a negative, i f vague, judgment ("some d r e a d f u l 
i l l " ) . They stand by the versi o n of unrequited love : 
And we agreed h i s was some d r e a d f u l i l l 
Wrought on him b o l d l y , yet unspeakable, 
By a dear f r i e n d ; some deadly change i n love 
Of one vowed deeply which he dreamed not o f ; 
For whose sake he, i t seemed, had f i x e d a b l o t 
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Of falsehood on h i s mind which f l o u r i s h e d not 
But i n the l i g h t of a l l - b e h o l d i n g t r u t h ; 
And having stamped t h i s canker on h i s youth 
She had abandoned him 
(11. 525 - 33) 
The vague term " i l l " does not so much e x p l a i n the Maniac's 
p l i g h t , as t e s t i f i e s t o the two f r i e n d s ' emotional r e a c t i o n t o 
i t . This q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the Maniac's s i t u a t i o n appears both 
t a u t o l o g i c a l ( i t adds nothing t o an understanding of the Maniac) 
and i n a p p r o p r i a t e . The oppositions around which J u l i a n 
a r t i c u l a t e s h i s summary do not so much e x p l a i n the Maniac's 
madness, as e x p l a i n i t away. I n t h e i r b r e v i t y and abruptness, 
they cannot account f o r the Maniac's long-winded and ever t o be 
repeated o s c i l l a t i o n s from emotion t o emotion. The attempt a t 
r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s as i n e f f e c t u a l as the Maniac's ravings are. 
Yet, as suggested, the poem does not i n d i c a t e t h a t J u l i a n and 
Maddalo misunderstand the Maniac, even i f , as Cronin, p o i n t s out, 
"there i s no way i n which the f r i e n d s can a s s i m i l a t e such an 
out b u r s t w i t h t h e i r comfortably serious debate." (9) However, t o 
" a s s i m i l a t e " the Maniac i s p r e c i s e l y the danger t o which, as Ware 
p o i n t s o u t , the two f r i e n d s are also exposed. Whichever way 
J u l i a n and Maddalo's r e a c t i o n i s construed, the two characters 
are i n e v i t a b l y subjected t o the c o n t r a d i c t o r y demand of 
understanding w i t h o u t o b j e c t i f y i n g , t h a t i s , of grasping 
uniqueness. 
The grounds on which the characters may be said t o decipher the 
Maniac, are the means by which they are taken i n by a web of 
m i r r o r e f f e c t s b u i l t by the poem, and, also, the means by which 
the reader c o n s t r u c t s an understanding of t h e i r apprehension. As 
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the few examples given above i n d i c a t e , the poem allows an 
i n f i n i t e number of r e l a t i o n s , connections, comparisons and 
c o n t r a s t s t o be made, as an e f f e c t of b r i n g i n g the three personae 
together. The three personae are i n f i n i t e l y r e l e v a n t t o one 
another. There i s nothing or no-one t h a t cannot be r e l a t e d t o 
something or someone el s e . To suggest t h a t such r e l a t i o n s 
i n e v i t a b l y s l i g h t or ignore the uniqueness of each, and, i n t h i s 
case, p r i m a r i l y of the Maniac, i s t o b e l i e v e i n the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a transparent understanding, a transparent r e l a t i o n between 
words and o b j e c t s , and absolute knowledge. This i s p r e c i s e l y the 
demand t o which the reproach t h a t J u l i a n and Maddalo f a i l t o 
a s s i m i l a t e the madman's extreme s i t u a t i o n subjects them. To 
"understand" the Maniac would, then, presumably, r e q u i r e J u l i a n 
to embrace the whole scope of the Maniac's emotional 
f l u c t u a t i o n s , which the terms of h i s summary (11. 52 5-3 6) 
a l l e g e d l y f a i l t o convey. The demand f o r wholeness i s best 
e x e m p l i f i e d by Cronin's argument t h a t "The b e l i e f s of J u l i a n and 
Maddalo [as presented i n the conversation p a r t of the poem] are 
inadequate because the f e e l i n g s on which they are based are 
l i m i t e d , they do not comprehend t h e i r complete experience of 
l i f e . Their t h e o r i e s are t h e r e f o r e at odds w i t h t h e i r p r a c t i c e . " 
(10) I t would r e q u i r e J u l i a n and Maddalo t o step outside of 
themselves i n order t o witness the extent t o which the l a t t e r " s 
s t a r k view of humanity c o n t r a s t s w i t h h i s easy conversation, and 
the former's professed love of humanity i s easy t o c u l t i v a t e i n 
s o l i t u d e . The mere f a c t of i d e n t i f y i n g the Maniac's p a r t i c u l a r 
c o n d i t i o n w i t h f a i r l y o r d i n a r y circumstances, the mere f a c t o f 
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a s s i m i l a t i n g i t t o a norm, proves any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t , and 
any gl o s s , t o be wide of the mark. 
However, the u n s u i t a b i l i t y of t h e i r words, which f a i l t o assess 
the e x t ent of the Maniac's p l i g h t , does not escape the two 
f r i e n d s ("and how much more / Might be h i s woe, we guessed n o t , " 
11. 533-4). J u l i a n and Maddalo's perception of the Maniac may be 
i n h e r e n t l y d e f e c t i v e , and the b l a t a n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which the 
Maniac i s powerless t o resolve may w e l l be missed by s o - c a l l e d 
sane i n d i v i d u a l s such as J u l i a n and Maddalo. However, the 
adoption of such misgivings regarding t h i s p a r t i c u l a r issue would 
amount t o a misreading of J u l i a n ' s and Maddalo's r e c e p t i o n o f the 
Maniac's speech. The demand by c e r t a i n c r i t i c s t h a t the two 
f r i e n d s ' understanding be i n t e r p r e t e d as adequate t o i t s o b j e c t , 
t h a t i s , t o the Maniac's speech, would req u i r e a d i r e c t access 
to t h e i r immediate hearing of t h i s speech, exempt from the 
reproach t h a t i t i s merely an i n d i r e c t a p p r o p r i a t i o n of i t . As 
suggested, i t would, f o r instance, r e q u i r e J u l i a n t o go over the 
whole scope of the Maniac's emotional f l u c t u a t i o n s . Yet, t h i s i s 
p r e c i s e l y the demand which the poem meets i n making J u l i a n ' s 
older s e l f give voice t o an insane speech, which he overheard. 
On the other hand, the Maniac r e s i s t s understanding, and, t o t h i s 
e x tent, r e f l e c t s , and f i t s the p u t a t i v e inadequacy of any attempt 
to understand him only too w e l l , leaving no p o s s i b i l i t y of 
i n d i c a t i n g the measure t o which the understanding i s inadequate. 
In any case, J u l i a n seems t o f o r e s t a l l the reproach of unduly 
imposing h i s own r a t i o n a l framework upon the Maniac, since he 
withdraws from passing judgment, thereby a d m i t t i n g t h a t h i s 
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i n t e r v e n t i o n i s inc o n s e q u e n t i a l : "the unconnected exclamations 
of h i s agony w i l l perhaps be found a s u f f i c i e n t comment f o r the 
t e x t of every h e a r t . " (11) The paradox o f t h i s poem i s t h a t the 
debate i n i t i a l l y t a k i n g place, and r e v o l v i n g around notions o f 
power, mastery and achievement, i s overshadowed by the f i g u r e of 
the Maniac, who i s apparently the a n t i t h e s i s of such n o t i o n s . To 
l i s t e n t o the Maniac's s o l i l o q u y amounts t o the challenge of 
understanding i t on i t s own grounds. 
Uniqueness. 
Contrary t o Tracy Ware's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , which sees the Maniac 
as e n t e r t a i n i n g misconceived thoughts ("His account o f h i s 
c o n d i t i o n i s already an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t , but the account i s 
incoherent because i t i s t o r n by c o n f l i c t i n g assumptions," 12) 
the Maniac's speech i s not t o be taken as an account o f the 
events which took place between the lady and him. I n t h i s sense, 
i t i s not even p a r t i a l i n the sense t h a t i t would present only 
one side of the s t o r y . The same phenomenon which t u r n s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t o an endless s e r i e s of m i r r o r i n g e f f e c t s , 
a f f e c t s the r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Maniac's p l i g h t . For instance 
Bernard A. Hirsch argues: " [ t h e Maniac] has f a i t h f u l l y f o l l o w e d 
a v i s i o n which, because i t was w i t h i n h i s power t o perceive, 
seemed t r u t h i t s e l f . That v i s i o n has now become the 'pain' which 
shadows him, kept a l i v e by the persistence of h i s ima g i n a t i o n . " 
(13) The i m p o s s i b i l i t y of p i n n i n g down a cause or o r i g i n i s 
i l l u s t r a t e d i n Hirsch's a n a l y s i s . The o r i g i n of the Maniac's 
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p l i g h t l i e s , according t o Hirsch, i n h i s excessive i d e a l i z a t i o n 
of h i s v i s i o n of the lady, and i n h i s endeavour t o maintain t h i s 
i l l u s i o n i n s p i t e o f "the i n f e s t a t i o n of experience." Such an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t the Maniac's madness r e s u l t s from a 
tensio n between h i s de s i r e and the world as i t i s , which the 
Maniac somehow does not f a i l t o perceive. This leads Hirsch t o 
draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between the Maniac's " s p i r i t mate", as he 
i d e a l i z e d her, and "as she i s " : "[S]he has proven t o be a f a l s e 
v i s i o n , a "mockery" and i n t h a t sense i s dead t o him." I f the 
Maniac i s deceived, he also cannot be undeceived. As the 
d i f f e r e n t versions of the "lady" are both depicted w i t h i n the 
Maniac's discourse, no i n d i c a t i o n can d i s t i n g u i s h the ' r e a l ' lady 
from the i d e a l i z e d one. 
Notwithstanding the f a c t t h a t a l l these versions might even r e f e r 
t o d i f f e r e n t persons, i f the Maniac's speech i s the outcome of 
h i s misguided i d e a l i s m , then so are both versions of the lady. 
The "mockery" i s not p a r t of r e a l i t y "as i t i s " , but no less 
i d e a l than the " s p i r i t ' s mate". According t o t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
also, the Maniac i s not so mad t h a t he does not perceive the gap 
between h i s desire and r e a l i t y , but only refuses t o acknowledge 
i t . Hirsch's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n reintroduces i n t e r v a l s of l u c i d i t y 
w i t h i n the Maniac's speech so as t o r a t i o n a l i z e h i s madness, 
whereas such i n t e r v a l s are already p a r t o f , and cannot be 
d i s s o c i a t e d from, the Maniac's speech. I t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t the 
causal status of the fantasy which Hirsch i d e n t i f i e s i s undone 
i n the course of h i s a n a l y s i s . Because of t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f 
i d e a l i s m and madness, Hirsch i s l e d t o a k i n d of r e v e r s a l o f h i s 
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account. At f i r s t , he i d e n t i f i e s deceptive i d e a l i s m as a cause 
f o r madness, then i t seems t h a t madness i s an i n d i c a t o r o f the 
Maniac's i d e a l i s m : "his very f o l l y t e s t i f i e s t o the s t r e n g t h of 
his commitment t o her." (14) I n the end, the causal r e l a t i o n 
between the two has collapsed: i d e a l i s m i s madness, and v i c e 
versa. This i m p l i e s t h a t any i d e a l i s t i s a madman, whether h i s 
a s p i r a t i o n s have been denied by r e a l i t y or not. I f madness i s 
independent from r e a l i t y ' s s anction, then i t cannot d e r i v e from 
the disappointment of misplaced expectations, or, r a t h e r such 
expectations can never be v e r i f i e d as being misplaced. This i s 
p r e c i s e l y the Maniac's p l i g h t . The cause of h i s i n s a n i t y i s 
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the persistence of i t s power t o a f f e c t . 
I f the terms of J u l i a n and Maddalo's understanding o f the 
Maniac's p l i g h t , which are also those of Hirsch's a n a l y s i s 
mentioned e a r l i e r , are something t o go by, then i t i s not o n l y 
the Maniac's "own i d e a l i z e d conceptions" which are "the cause of 
his g r i e f , " (15) and have prepared him f o r madness, but a l s o the 
sudden loss of them which have a l t e r e d him r a d i c a l l y . The 
explanation loses i t s g r i p on the problem, as the Maniac's speech 
supplies the elements which simultaneously make and un-make h i s 
t a l e , w i t h o u t r e s o l u t i o n . 
From h i s account of h i s misfortune, i t i s impossible f o r an 
outside observer t o l o c a l i z e the p o i n t at which he p a r t e d from 
r e a l i t y . As Felman, i n her account of Foucault's Histoire de la 
folie, remarks: "the mad subject cannot s i t u a t e himself w i t h i n 
h i s f i c t i o n . " (16) The Maniac's speech i s a speech which cannot 
e x p l a i n i t s reasons or i t s cause. Events, as they took place, are 
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i r r e t r i e v a b l e . To a t t r i b u t e a cause or o r i g i n i s t o r e i n t r o d u c e 
i t s e f f e c t everywhere. To re i n t r o d u c e i t everywhere i s t o be 
unable t o p i n i t down as cause. The cause (the lady) i s 
i n c r i m i n a t e d through i t s enduring e f f e c t despite i t s 
disappearance. The Maniac's world i s not even r u l e d by the law 
of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n . The negation of d i s i l l u s i o n has not 
a f f e c t e d the memory of h i s dream. Negation seems t o have l o s t any 
l o g i c a l meaning. (17) 
For a l l h i s madness, the Maniac i s i n the p o s i t i o n of the s u b j e c t 
who, as Hirsch puts i t , because of h i s power t o perceive 
something, i . e . , a v i s i o n i n the absence of an o b j e c t t o support 
i t , takes i t as a t r u t h . As i n the s i t u a t i o n where o r d i n a r y 
consciousness a p p l i e s , he f a i l s t o make the departure between h i s 
mind and the o u t s i d e , because there i s no c r i t e r i o n by which t o 
a t t r i b u t e h i s perce p t i o n t o h i s own c r e a t i o n . 
The prominent aspect of the Maniac's s o l i l o q u y i s the Maniac's 
o s c i l l a t i o n from emotion t o c o n t r a r y emotion, and not so much the 
adequacy of e i t h e r f e e l i n g t o the addressee. That the Maniac 
appears t o appeal t o various personae only emphasizes the 
f l u c t u a t i o n of h i s emotions. The Maniac's speech goes through a 
whole range of abuse and s e l f - h u m i l i a t i o n w i t h i n the space of t e n 
l i n e s : 
'Nay, was i t I who wooed thee t o t h i s breast 
Which, l i k e a serpent, thou envenomest 
As i n repayment of the warmth i t l e n t ? 
(11. 398-400) 
Never one 
Humbled himself before, as I have done I 
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Even the i n s t i n c t i v e worm on which we t r e a d 
Turns, though i t wounds not_then w i t h p r o s t r a t e head 
Sinks i n the dust and w r i t h e s l i k e me-and dies ? 
No: wears a l i v i n g death of agonies ! 
(11. 410-6) 
As i s apparent i n the previous passage, not only does the Maniac 
f l u c t u a t e from reproach t o self-debasement, but emotions can also 
be transformed i n t o t h e i r opposite, as self-debasement i s used 
as a way of self-aggrandizement. 
The Maniac's p l i g h t i s also c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a p e c u l i a r 
acknowledgement of the terms which he sees the lady apply t o 
himself, so t h a t nothing seems t o remain of him but the words 
which have been used t o c h a r a c t e r i z e him. When he r e p o r t s the 
lady's words as they were addressed t o him, the Maniac i r o n i c a l l y 
sounds as i f he claimed her abusive terms " deep p o l l u t i o n " and 
"loathed embrace" as h i s own : 
'That you had never seen me_never heard 
My v o i c e , and more than a l l had ne'er endured 
The deep p o l l u t i o n of my loathed embrace 
(11. 420-2) 
I n the next l i n e , as the hyphens i n d i c a t e , the reference o f the 
pronoun 'you' may have changed from f i r s t person pronoun i n 
repo r t e d speech t o the status of h a l l u c i n a t e d addressee whom the 
Maniac apostrophizes ("That your eyes ne'er had l i e d love i n my 
face" 1. 423). However, the d i f f e r e n c e i n the use of the same 
pronoun i s b l u r r e d so as t o suggest t h a t the lady h e r s e l f 
r e g r e t t e d " l y i n g love i n [ t h e Maniac's] face". The ambiguity 
about the speaker of the f o l l o w i n g l i n e s continues: 
That, l i k e some maniac monk, I had t o r n out 
The nerves of manhood by t h e i r bleeding r o o t 
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With mine own q u i v e r i n g f i n g e r s 
( 1 . 424-6) 
M u t i l a t i o n can be c a l l e d upon the Maniac by the lady, or by the 
Maniac upon h i m s e l f . I n the l a t t e r case, the term "maniac", used 
w i t h an i r o n i c t i n g e by the madman, appl i e s t o him as i n a double 
i r o n y . On the other hand, the Maniac might be speaking a t r u t h 
t o which he i s himself b l i n d , because, immersed as he i s i n h i s 
own world, he can take no distance from i t . Such would be, i n the 
end, the r o o t of h i s madness: u n l i k e J u l i a n and Maddalo, the 
Maniac cannot t a l k about h i s p o s i t i o n , he can only speak through 
i t . He i s e x t e r i o r t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of punctual self-presence. 
Like the Poet of Alastor, the Maniac can be s a i d t o be i n the 
'desert' as Blanchot understands i t : "the desert i s the e x t e r i o r 
i n which one cannot remain, since t o be there i s always already 
t o be o u t s i d e . " ( 1 8 ) . 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y the lack of punctual self-presence which prevents 
the Maniac from s e t t l i n g i n a balanced r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
lady: a r e l a t i o n s h i p i n which the s e l f - i d e n t i t y of each o f them 
would be preserved. Yet, such reserve i s open t o suspicion, w h i l e 
the collapse of reserve leads t o i n d i s c r i m i n a t e reproach. I n the 
f o l l o w i n g passage, i d e n t i t i e s have been b l u r r e d , before being 
u n i t e d _ t o be i n s t a n t l y " d i s u n i t e [ d ] " i n the f i r s t person p l u r a l : 
so t h a t ne'er 
Our hearts had f o r a moment mingled there 
To d i s u n i t e i n h o r r o r 
(1 1 . 426-8) 
Agreement i n h o r r o r has been reached by the two personae: the 
lady supposedly f e e l i n g h o r r o r f o r the Maniac, and the l a t t e r 
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f e e l i n g h o r r o r a t her r e j e c t i n g him. Both coincide i n t h e i r 
d i s j u n c t i v e f e e l i n g s . E v e n t u a l l y , the Maniac seems t o be 
i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h h i s punishment: 
' I t were 
A c r u e l punishment f o r one most c r u e l , 
I f such can love, t o make t h a t love the f u e l 
Of the mind's h e l l 
(11. 438-41) 
The Maniac might be seen t o endorse or even j u s t i f y the lady's 
"scorn" ( 1 . 355, 356), when he compares himself t o a worm ( 1 . 
412-9). His a b i l i t y t o i d e n t i f y w i t h and t o be embodied i n the 
words used t o describe him, goes hand i n hand w i t h h i s c a p a c i t y 
t o somehow become the lady as she speaks through h i s mouth. The 
Maniac and the lady appear interchangeable i n the two echoing 
passages: 
I thought 
That thou wert she who s a i d , "You k i s s me not 
Ever, I fear you do not love me now" _ 
I n t r u t h I loved even t o my overthrow 
Her, who would f a i n f o r g e t these words: but they 
C l i n g t o her mind, and cannot pass away. 
(11, 403-7) 
these were not 
With thee, l i k e some suppressed and hideous thought 
which f l i t s athwart our musings, but can f i n d 
No r e s t w i t h i n a pure and gentle mind... 
Thou sealedst them w i t h many a bare broad word, 
And searedst my memory o'er them,_for I heard 
And can f o r g e t not 
Just as the Maniac cannot f o r g e t the curse which the lady c a l l e d 
down upon him ("for I heard / and can f o r g e t not" 11. 433-4)_ 
he, u n l i k e the lady, cannot f o r g e t the sweet words which he 
t h i n k s she addressed t o him. The q u a l i f i c a t i o n " I thought / That 
thou wert" casts doubt on the very p o s s i b i l i t y of assessing the 
Maniac's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of events. The phrase conveys both the 
147 
Maniac's i n a b i l i t y t o recognize the lady a f t e r her unexpected 
change, and, p r e c i s e l y , h i s mistaking her f o r the person she may 
never have been. So much does the delayed p o s i t i o n of the pronoun 
'her' ( 1 . 406) suggest i n these l i n e s , where the Maniac appears 
t o have been overcome by h i s love, and, simultaneously, t o have 
overcome or consumed the lady, thereby l o s i n g her: 
I n t r u t h I loved even t o my overthrow 
Her 
(11. 405-6) 
Absolute Knowledge. 
The paradox of the Maniac's s i t u a t i o n l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t 
n e i t h e r the memory of h i s dream nor i t s d e n i a l as falsehood can 
take precedence one over the other. The breach t h a t a p parently 
i n i t i a t e d the Maniac's a l i e n a t i o n i s presented as waking up from 
a dream. As i n Alastor, the image of the dream does not a l l o w f o r 
any t r a n s i t i o n or any l i n k between sleep and waking, so t h a t the 
two c o n d i t i o n s cannot be contrasted w i t h each other. To t h i s 
e x tent, the Maniac's c l a i m t h a t he ever woke might even be p a r t 
of h i s d e l i r i u m . The passage from dream t o waking which cannot 
be witnessed i s , f o r the Maniac, not a passage: 
as one dreaming 
Of sweetest peace I woke, and found my s t a t e 
Such as i t i s . 
(11. 335-7) 
His i n a b i l i t y t o s i t u a t e himself w i t h i n h i s f i c t i o n corresponds 
t o a wish f o r absolute knowledge or absolute consciousness, t h a t 
i s , a l s o , a d e s i r e f o r l i f e w i t h o u t d i f f e r e n c e , and a wish t o 
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witness a passage as passage. This may be lik e n e d t o the demand 
which, from an a n x i e t y not t o impose a r a t i o n a l order upon 
i n s a n i t y , would be placed upon J u l i a n and Maddalo not t o reduce 
the Maniac's i r r e d u c i b l e d i f f e r e n c e , and not t o a s s i m i l a t e h i s 
uniqueness t o anything e l s e . The Maniac's p l i g h t i s not t h a t he 
sees e v e r y t h i n g only from h i s p o s i t i o n , but t h a t , p r e c i s e l y , he 
sees e v e r y t h i n g , l i k e the person who, because of h i s power t o 
perceive a t h i n g , takes i t as t r u t h . Awakening has l e f t the 
Maniac only w i t h the awareness of a d i s i l l u s i o n which, however, 
cannot a f f e c t h i s l o s t dream. The dream has not been r u i n e d by 
i t s d e n i a l , because dream and d e n i a l have nothing i n common. The 
Maniac's awakening from what can only r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y appear as 
falsehood, does not i n d i c a t e any possi b l e r e c t i f i c a t i o n or 
c o r r e c t i o n . The Maniac has himself changed and become 
unrecognizable. He has been d i v i d e d i n a way which does not a l l o w 
him t o put himself together again. There i s no way of t e l l i n g 
whether the deluded Maniac and the d i s i l l u s i o n e d Maniac are not 
the same. 
The Maniac i s subject t o r e p e t i t i o n w i t h o u t progression, because 
of the lack of und e r l y i n g c o n t i n u i t y which would a l l o w f o r 
progression. I n the Maniac's speech, no event or emotion has the 
time t o o f f e r a t r u e face. Every event i s i r r e t r i e v a b l e , and can 
only be repeated. The Maniac s u f f e r s as much from the m u t a b i l i t y 
of events, as from the evanescent s t r u c t u r e s w i t h i n t h i s 
m u t a b i l i t y , i . e . , from the arrangements which are not arranged 
despite t h e i r impermanence, but whose appearance i s an e f f e c t of 
t h e i r impermanence (11. 405-7, 11. 428-34). S u f f e r i n g from the 
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m u t a b i l i t y of impermanent b e l i e f s and emotions, he wishes t h a t 
there had been none: 
'That you had never seen me_never heard 
My voice, and more than a l l had ne'er endured 
The deep p o l l u t i o n of my loathed embrace 
That your eyes ne'er had l i e d love i n my face 
(11. 420-3) 
the a i r 
Closes upon my accents, as despair 
Upon my heart _ l e t death upon despair! 
(11. 508-10) 
His wish f o r a t o t a l d i s s o l u t i o n reproduces h i s wish f o r t o t a l 
v i s i b i l i t y and knowledge. He also experiences the f a c t t h a t 
d i s s o l u t i o n i s never complete, as he cannot even hold onto the 
n o t i o n of an i m p o s s i b i l i t y which could not be experienced. He 
already goes through a k i n d of death which does not b r i n g him t o 
hi s end: 
Even the i n s t i n c t i v e worm on which we t r e a d 
Turns, though i t wound not_ then w i t h p r o s t r a t e head 
Sinks i n the dust and w r i t h e s l i k e me _ and dies ? 
No: wears a l i v i n g death of agonies I 
As the slow shadows of the pointed grass 
Mark the e t e r n a l periods, h i s pangs pass 
Slow, ever-moving,_ making moments be 
As mine seem _ each an i m m o r t a l i t y 1 
(11. 412-1) 
'Month a f t e r month,' he c r i e d , 'to bear t h i s load 
And as a jade urged by the whip and goad 
To drag l i f e on, which l i k e a heavy chain 
Lengthens behind many a l i n k of pain ! 
(11. 300-3) 
I t i s i n t h i s sense t h a t h i s wish f o r absolute knowledge f o r c e s 
him t o be u n f a i t h f u l t o t h a t knowledge. Since the wish f o r 
absolute knowledge i s the wish f o r the t r u t h of h i s encounter 
w i t h "the lady", which would also be h i s t r u e t a l e p u t t i n g an end 
to a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and commentaries, i t i s c l e a r t h a t the 
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Maniac endures the fragmentary exigency whereby the very attempt 
t o give t h i s t a l e only exacerbates the distance from i t s g o a l . 
The Maniac inveighs against the f a c t of having been i r r e t r i e v a b l y 
a f f e c t e d (an event which, as w i l l be l a t e r examined, J u l i a n , f o r 
one, puts t o d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t ) as i f t h i s could be a complete 
event w i t h o u t f u r t h e r repercussion. 
I f the Maniac can be seen as e n t e r t a i n i n g both J u l i a n ' s and 
Maddalo's p o i n t s of view, t h a t i s t o say, f a i t h i n an i d e a l i s e d 
v i s i o n , and the persuasion t h a t i t i s bound t o be destroyed, t h i s 
i s because these are not merely thoughts f o r the Maniac, but 
d i f f e r e n t dimensions which do not communicate w i t h each ot h e r 
w i t h o u t s u b j e c t i n g the Maniac t o the whole range of t h e i r 
a l t e r a t i o n . Love and hate, or reproach and compassion are not 
merely i m p l i e d i n each other, but each emotion, and the name 
which i t bears, have never corresponded t o each other. Names or 
words, and whatever they might r e f e r t o , can be i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y 
blamed w i t h falsehood ( ' I f such can love, t o make t h a t love the 
f u e l / Of the mind's h e l l ; hate, scorn, remorse, despair', 11. 
440-1, ' I have not dwindled / Nor changed i n mind or body, or i n 
aught / But as love changes what i t l o v e t h not', 11. 469-71), 
j u s t as the Maniac and the lady, J u l i a n and Maddalo, s a n i t y and 
i n s a n i t y under the demand f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y 
exchange places w i t h o u t the r e s o l u t i o n t h a t i s expected from the 
process. Like J u l i a n and Maddalo i n t h e i r debate, l i k e any 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the Maniac wants a f i n a l word ('How v a i n / Are 
words! 1. 472-3), thereby encountering the u n j u s t i f i a b l e 
separation between name and t h i n g , the gap which, i n La Part du 
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feu, Blanchot describes as f o l l o w s : " t h i s absence which i s 
included i n every word and i s l i n k e d t o i t s power t o impart 
meaning, and t o draw the t h i n g away i n order t o s i g n i f y i t . " (19) 
The fragmentary exigency manifests i t s e l f i n t h a t there are as 
many stages and occasions t o s u f f e r as there are words t o 
describe them, i n an ever deepening, searching movement which 
expands the separation r e l a t i n g names and things (But t h a t I 
cannot bear more a l t e r e d faces / Than needs must be, more changed 
and c o l d embraces / More misery, disappointment, and m i s t r u s t / 
To own me f o r t h e i r f a t h e r , 11. 312-5). The Maniac's speech, i n 
which there i s always something else t o say, acts as the 
dispossession of the only t r u e speech, whereby i t i s revealed 
t h a t "when speaking, we defer from speaking." (20) The Maniac 
s u f f e r s from language being the lack of t h a t which i t speaks, and 
h i s speech i s then an instance of the imaginary language which 
Blanchot defines i n L'Espace litteraire: "everything i s speech, 
but... speech [being] nothing but the appearance of t h a t which 
has disappeared, i s imaginary, ceaseless, i n t e r m i n a b l e . " (21) 
Ambiguity. 
On the basis of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f e r e d i n t h i s a n a l y s i s , i t 
i s easier t o understand t h a t both J u l i a n and Maddalo see the 
Maniac's speech as evoking, and, at the same time, being s h o r t 
o f , poetry. J u l i a n sees a lack of mastery, of "measure" ( 1 . 542) 
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i n the Maniac's speech, whereas Maddalo locates the m o t i v a t i o n 
of the speech i n " s u f f e r i n g " : 
'Most wretched men 
Are cradled i n t o p o e t r y by wrong, 
They l e a r n i n s u f f e r i n g what they teach i n song.' 
(11. 544-6) 
Maddalo's comment sounds l i k e a c y n i c a l v e r s i o n of ' f u r o r 
poeticus', and appears t o be merely the opposite of a t r a d i t i o n a l 
conception of i n s p i r a t i o n as a s u p e r i o r power which operates 
through the s u b j e c t i v i t y of the i n s p i r e d poet. However, the 
Maniac i s n e i t h e r the medium of a superior power, nor the v i c t i m 
of h i s own f a i l u r e t o master expression, but he i s d e l i v e r i n g a 
kin d of language which, i n a world of m a n i f e s t a t i o n , can o n l y 
appear as f a i l u r e . The Maniac d e s t a b i l i z e s J u l i a n and Maddalo 
because, f a r from expressing a supposed u n i t y of emotion before 
the negative d i s s o c i a t i o n of r a t i o c i n a t i v e discourse, he r a t h e r 
represents the undermining of such u n i t y . This subversion i s an 
i n t e n s i f i e d v e r s i o n of the loss of being i n i t s p u r i t y and 
o r i g i n a l i t y , on which language, i n the separation between word 
and t h i n g , r e l i e s . 
As was suggested i n Chapter Two, Shelley's view of language i s 
marked by a lack of b i n a r y s t a b i l i t y i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
word and t h i n g , which i s the source of i t s c r e a t i v e , but a l s o of 
i t s i d e o l o g i c a l , power. This loss of being or " l i f e " l i e s a t the 
r o o t of Blanchot's d e s c r i p t i o n of two vesions of comprehension 
i n terms of death, r a t h e r than negation (22): "death i s sometimes 
t r u t h ' s e l a b o r a t i o n i n the world", "the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
comprehension", t h a t i s , the r u l e of J u l i a n and Maddalo's 
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r a t i o n a l order, and i t i s "sometimes the perpetuaty of t h a t which 
admits n e i t h e r beginning nor end", which i s the Maniac's p l i g h t . 
(23) Blanchot i n s i s t s on the te n s i o n between these two v e r s i o n s , 
a t e n s i o n which i s c e n t r a l t o h i s n o t i o n of the work of 
l i t e r a t u r e and t o h i s understanding of the way i n which the work 
i s made. To the extent t h a t the work must be made i n t o a d e f i n i t e 
artwork, i t t e s t i f i e s t o p o s s i b i l i t y and t o a c e r t a i n negative 
power, as i n the f i r s t sense of negation or death given above. 
But, t o the extent t h a t the work involves a shaping process which 
r u i n s the f i n a l i t y of d e f i n i t i o n , i t seems t o have already 
destroyed "the vast g e n e r a l i t y of being which n e c e s s a r i l y 
withdraws from a l l p a r t i c u l a r determination, but alone s u f f i c e s 
...[as t h e ] o b j e c t of poetry." (24) Neither v e r s i o n , i n 
Blanchot's n o t i o n of the work of l i t e r a t u r e , i s able t o cancel 
the other out. J u l i a n and Maddalo, on the one hand, and the 
Maniac, on the other hand, would then represent these two 
versions of the loss of l i f e i n t h e i r dissymmetry. However, the 
f a c t t h a t J u l i a n gives voice t o the Maniac, and allows h i s e r r i n g 
speech t o come i n t o the poem, leads t o an examination of the way 
i n which these two versions can communicate. 
Giving Voice t o the Maniac. 
The same c o n t r a d i c t o r y demands t o which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has been 
subjected, and which r e f l e c t the Maniac's concern t h a t language 
i s n e c e s s a r i l y the lack of t h a t which i t speaks, i n e v i t a b l y 
s t r e t c h the understanding of J u l i a n ' s response between the 
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notions of adequacy and b e t r a y a l . I t i s easy t o overlook the f a c t 
t h a t the Maniac's speech i s a speech only t o the extent t h a t 
J u l i a n r e p o r t s i t , and gives i t a voi c e . I n overhearing the 
Maniac, J u l i a n and Maddalo appear t o reproduce the dispossessing 
s t r u c t u r e which language represents towards ' l i f e w i t h o u t a 
d i f f e r e n c e ' . The two l i s t e n e r s appear t o " s t e a l " ( 1 . 297) h i s 
speech from the Maniac, as Tracy Ware's p o i n t about J u l i a n ' s 
n a r r a t i v e suggests: " I n purveying the Maniac's speech as p a r t of 
hi s own n a r r a t i v e , J u l i a n packages and s e l l s the reader something 
t h a t i s not r e a l l y h i s t o g i v e . " (25) Ware underlines the 
p o t e n t i a l d i s t o r t i o n which i t s r e c u p e r a t i o n i n t o a n a r r a t i v e may 
e f f e c t upon the Maniac's speech, which i s d e f i a n t o f any 
s t r u c t u r e of i n c l u s i o n or comprehension, t o the p o i n t of 
preventing any p o i n t of e n t r y i n t o i t . However, Ware's o b j e c t i o n 
does not f u l l y h old since, as already argued, the Maniac's speech 
does not represent a confession t o which he would own up. For the 
madman, language acts as the loss of any t r u t h which i t could 
convey. The Maniac's speech i s p r e c i s e l y n e i t h e r a p r o p e r t y nor 
an address. On the c o n t r a r y , Ware's remark a p t l y underlines the 
kind of m i s d i r e c t i o n which i s inherent i n the Maniac's speech. 
The Maniac's words can only be heard o b l i q u e l y . The powerless 
words of the Maniac cannot aim a t reaching anybody, and they t u r n 
t h e i r hearers i n t o a g h o s t l y audience. The a l t e r n a t i v e which Ware 
does not seem ready t o contemplate, i s t h a t the Maniac's speech 
must have become "J u l i a n " ' s p r e c i s e l y t o the extent t h a t he has 
become a persona whom the Maniac does not address. 
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The poem provides elements whereby i t can be understood t h a t the 
Maniac's speech has become J u l i a n ' s i n changing him t o the p o i n t 
t h a t he has been able t o r e p o r t i t , and, maybe, i n t h i s way, 
dispose of i t . The web of m i r r o r e f f e c t s w i t h i n which the 
characters are set u n w i t t i n g l y do not leave the characters 
unaffected, even as these same e f f e c t s u n d e r l i n e the l i m i t a t i o n 
and determination of t h e i r p o s i t i o n and t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n . The 
m i r r o r e f f e c t s i r o n i c a l l y r e l a t i n g the sane and the insane are 
also conducive t o a contamination between the two. The apparently 
innocuous s u p e r l a t i v e s i n J u l i a n ' s s l i g h t l y detached conclusion, 
" d r e a d f u l " , "unspeakable", "deadly" and "deeply" (11. 525-8) echo 
the Maniac's p a t h e t i c tones, and betray the "deep tenderness t h a t 
maniac wrought / W i t h i n [ h i m ] " (11. 566-7). This may be 
considered as the r e s u l t o f the f a c t t h a t , f o r example, w h i l e the 
persona of the Maniac casts an i r o n i c a l l i g h t on J u l i a n ' s 
enjoyment of " a l l waste," ( 1 . 14) J u l i a n cannot give h i s account 
without b r i n g i n g the Maniac's v e r s i o n of waste as dispossession 
and confinement i n t o p l a y . 
R e f e r r i n g t o the same passage ( l i n e s 14-17), Cronin notes t h a t , 
as J u l i a n "responds a c t i v e l y t o h i s surroundings and converts the 
most u n l i k e l y scenery i n t o a metaphor f o r h i s magnanimity" (a 
tendency towards self-aggrandizement which he shares w i t h the 
Maniac), the poem simultaneously foregrounds "a d i s p a r i t y between 
the landscape as i t i s and as i t i s perceived". (26) Cronin's 
p o i n t i s more r e l e v a n t t o t h i s argument i f i t i s agreed t h a t "the 
landscape as i t i s " can only appear by means of the d i s p a r i t y 
which J u l i a n ' s perception creates, and t h a t , t o t h i s e x t e n t , i t 
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i s not so much a p r e - e x i s t i n g norm, as attendant t o J u l i a n ' s 
e a r l i e r i d e a l i s m , i n d i c a t i n g the s l i g h t dissemblance inherent i n 
any per c e p t i o n . Consequently, while J u l i a n may not suspect the 
d i s p a r i t y or the meaning w i t h which the p a r a l l e l w i t h the Maniac 
endows h i s words, h i s c h a n g e a b i l i t y and h i s s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o 
such meaning are conveyed i n the poem i n the movement whereby he 
becomes p a r t of the unspoken, r e l a t i n g work o f the poem. I t may 
be suggested t h a t t h i s i s the g h o s t l y persona who harkens t o the 
Maniac. The " p o s i t i o n s " w i t h i n which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has s i t u a t e d 
J u l i a n and Maddalo, have also become the " m i n i s t e r s " of t h e i r 
change. 
More i m p o r t a n t l y , i f such i s the " J u l i a n " who harkens t o the 
Maniac, i t appears t h a t he i s the c r e a t i o n of the poem Julian and 
Maddalo, which includes the source of i t s t e l l i n g i n the Maniac's 
s o l i l o q u y . I t i s then p o s s i b l e t o see the r e s t of the poem as 
d i r e c t e d towards ensuring t h a t J u l i a n does impart the Maniac's 
s o l i l o q u y otherwise than as "unconnected exclamations," b ut, i n 
co n t r a s t , as a poem, since i t i s t h i s poem which gives existence 
t o the persona who harkened t o i t . I n t h i s case, Julian and 
Maddalo also contains one of the paradoxical c o n d i t i o n s under 
which, f o r Blanchot, the work of l i t e r a t u r e i s made, and which 
i s a d i r e c t consequence of the f a c t t h a t one cannot r a i s e oneself 
from the world t o a r t . On the c o n t r a r y , " [ T ] o say t h a t the poet 
only e x i s t s a f t e r the poem means t h a t he receives h i s " r e a l i t y " 
from the poem, but t h a t he does not dispose of t h i s r e a l i t y 
except i n order t o make the poem p o s s i b l e . " (27) I n l i s t e n i n g t o 
the Maniac J u l i a n l i s t e n s t o a poem which i s not y e t , (28) and 
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which may be considered as the i n s p i r a t i o n f o r J u l i a n ' s poem. I t 
remains to explore how, i n the remaining p a r t of the poem, J u l i a n 
makes the poem p o s s i b l e , and how t h i s i n v o l v e s r e c o n s i d e r i n g h i s 
t u r n i n g away from the Maniac, and h i s d e c i s i o n not to " r e c l a i m 
him from h i s dark e s t a t e . " (1. 574) 
The c o n s i d e r a t i o n of J u l i a n ' s response to the Maniac's speech 
must take i n t o account the e r a s u r e of d e f i n i t e i d e n t i t i e s which 
the l a t t e r c r e a t e s . J u s t as Maddalo was unable to p i n down the 
reason f o r the Maniac's c o n d i t i o n , the explanation f o r which 
cannot be found i n the s i l e n t temporal i n t e r v a l s which organize 
Maddalo's t a l e : 
"Alas, what drove him mad ?' ' I cannot say: 
A lady came with him from France, and when 
She l e f t him and returned, he wandered then 
About yon l o n e l y i s l e s of d e s e r t sand 
T i l l he grew w i l d 
(11. 245-9) 
s i m i l a r l y , J u l i a n ' s account of h i s ensuing a c t i o n s i s a non 
se q u i t u r , as i n d i c a t e d by the punctuation, p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
dashes: 
I n f r i e n d s h i p s I had been most fo r t u n a t e _ 
Yet never saw I one who I would c a l l 
More w i l l i n g l y my f r i e n d ; and t h i s was a l l 
Accomplished not; such dreams of b a s e l e s s good 
Oft come and go i n crowds or s o l i t u d e 
And leave no t r a c e _but what I now designed 
Made f o r long years impressions on my mind. 
The f o l l o w i n g morning, urged by my a f f a i r s , 
I l e f t b r i g h t Venice. 
(11. 575-83) 
The generous gesture which J u l i a n imagines and d i s c a r d s i s 
presented as an impersonal gesture. I t partakes of a crowd 
f e e l i n g which i s rem i n i s c e n t of the impersonal murmur, or 
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c e a s e l e s s speech, which i s peopled by the d i f f e r e n t u n i d e n t i f i e d 
personae d e l i n e a t e d by the Maniac's c o n t r a d i c t o r y emotions, the 
" s p i r i t ' s mate" (1. 337), the "mockery" (1. 385), or the " c h i l d " 
(1. 484). C h a n g e a b i l i t y i s a l s o manifest i n t h a t there i s no 
d e f i n i t e meaning which can be drawn from the i r o n i c a l m i r r o r 
e f f e c t s which the poem b u i l d s between J u l i a n and the Maniac. 
J u l i a n would l i k e h i s s o u l to be unenclosed, embracing e v e r y t h i n g 
w i t h i n h i s experience, (29) and the Maniac's speech does confirm 
J u l i a n ' s words t h a t "much may be endured/ Of what degrades and 
crushes us", 11. 182-3), but i t does so n e i t h e r i n the sense i n 
which J u l i a n meant them, nor i n the way i n which the Maniac's 
p l i g h t d e r i d e s them, but r a t h e r , i n the i n t e r p l a y of both. T h i s 
change a l s o a f f e c t s the use and s t a t u s of speech, as i n the 
example of the term " p r i d e " . Wasserman's g l o s s on J u l i a n ' s views 
i s as f o l l o w s : "only the impatience of p r i d e leads to the madness 
of expecting the unregenerated world to correspond immediately 
to the mind's i d e a l s . " (30) Pr i d e i s a term which has been used 
e a r l i e r by J u l i a n : 
We descanted, and I ( f o r ever s t i l l 
I s i t not wise to make the best of i l l ?) 
Argued a g a i n s t despondency, but p r i d e 
Made my companion take the darker s i d e . 
(11. 46-9) 
I t i s a l s o the reproach which the Maniac r e f u s e s , indignant a t 
the misapprehension of which he i s the v i c t i m , thereby 
i n a d v e r t e n t l y aggrandizing h i s uniqueness, and becoming the dupe 
of language: 
'You say t h a t I am proud _ t h a t when I speak 
My l i p i s t o r t u r e d with the wrongs which break 
The s p i r i t i t e x p r e s s e s . . . Never one 
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Humbled himself before, as I have done! 
(11. 408-11) 
I t may be as a r e s u l t of t h i s v a c i l l a t i o n t h a t the adequacy of 
the same word i s q u a l i f i e d i n the Pr e f a c e : " I say Maddalo i s 
proud, because I can f i n d no other word to express the 
concentered and impatient f e e l i n g s which consume him." (31) 
This c a s t s a shadow of a doubt upon the appropriateness of 
J u l i a n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of Maddalo, and p o s s i b l y foreshadows 
a l o s s of confidence i n the meaning of words on the p a r t of the 
author of the Pref a c e . Words are not given a f i n a l meaning but 
always expectant of the next t w i s t of meaning, as i l l u s t r a t e d by 
the use of the term " f r i e n d " , which a p p l i e s each time w i t h a 
d i f f e r e n t t i n g e to Maddalo (11. 20-1), J u l i a n (11. 191-3), "the 
lady" (11. 525-7), the Maniac ("Yet never saw one whom I would 
c a l l / More w i l l i n g l y my f r i e n d " , 11.576-7), and f i n a l l y to those 
to whom J u l i a n presumably r e t u r n s a f t e r l e a v i n g Venice ("But I 
had f r i e n d s i n London too" 1. 564). Rather than each occurrence 
c a s t i n g doubt on the appropriateness of the term, the term i s not 
e x c l u s i v e , and c a r r i e s the h i s t o r y of J u l i a n ' s v a r i o u s 
f r i e n d s h i p s . J u l i a n ' s n a r r a t i v e hangs i n the balance which words 
cr e a t e i n c a l l i n g f o r more words. I n t h i s case, can there be any 
question of b e t r a y a l , when the h i s t o r y i s not f i n i s h e d ? 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which see J u l i a n ' s f a i l u r e to " r e c l a i m [the 
Maniac] from h i s dark e s t a t e " (1. 574) as a b e t r a y a l do not take 
into account the f a c t t h a t J u l i a n a s s o c i a t e s t h i s "[dream] of 
ba s e l e s s good" p r e c i s e l y with the powerlessness which the Maniac 
has endured, and i s not a v a i l a b l e f o r a c t i o n . For example, K e l v i n 
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E v e r e s t has suggested t h a t , i n h i s f a i l u r e to " a r t i c u l a t e the 
Maniac i n h i m s e l f " , J u l i a n has betrayed the Maniac as w e l l as h i s 
i d e a s . (32) R e f e r r i n g to the t r a d i t i o n of the sermo p e d e s t r i s , 
(33) which S h e l l e y subverts to h i s own purpose i n t h i s poem, 
Cronin s t a t e s : " Whereas Pope and S w i f t can a s s e r t the heroism 
of the holding operation conducted by reason and by commonsense 
aga i n s t the inner f o r c e s which t h r e a t e n them, S h e l l e y r e p r e s e n t s 
any such defence as a weak-minded r e t r e a t from the c e n t r a l 
springs of the human p e r s o n a l i t y . " (34) On the contrary, J u l i a n ' s 
imagined p r o j e c t would be the epitome of the v a i n a s s i m i l a t i o n 
of the Maniac's ambiguity to a f i n a l meaning obtained by "study": 
But I imagined t h a t i f day by day 
I watched him, and but seldom went away, 
And s t u d i e d a l l the beatings of h i s heart 
With z e a l , as men study some stubborn a r t 
For t h e i r own good, and could by patience f i n d 
An entrance to the caverns of h i s mind, 
I might r e c l a i m him from h i s dark e s t a t e 
(11. 568-74) 
Not only would J u l i a n presume that the Maniac's worklessness can 
be turned i n t o the t r u e work of s a n i t y , but he would engage with 
a task which would i t s e l f be drawn i n t o the i n e r t i a which i t 
t r i e s to b r i n g to l i g h t ("day by day", "seldom went away", " a l l 
the beatings of h i s h e a r t " , "With z e a l . . . by p a t i e n c e " ) . The 
n a i v e t e of imagining t h a t t h i s could be "accomplished" (1. 578) 
i s the n a i v e t e of the b e l i e f that the Maniac's enigma could be 
penetrated from the world of l i g h t and s a n i t y . I t i s a l s o the 
n a i v e t e of these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which a s s i m i l a t e t h i s 
powerlessness i n t o the world of a c t i o n , and the b e l i e f t h a t the 
work can be made as i f i t were a p o s s i b i l i t y . T h i s b e l i e f 
partakes of the i l l u s i o n t h a t the t r u e work can take p l a c e 
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d i r e c t l y i n the world, which i s formulated as f o l l o w s by 
Blanchot: 
The need to w r i t e i s l i n k e d to the approach toward 
t h i s p o i n t a t which nothing can be done with words. 
Hence the i l l u s i o n t h a t i f one maintained contact with 
t h i s p o i n t even as one came back from i t to the world 
of p o s s i b i l i t y , "everything" could be done, 
"everything" could be s a i d . (35) 
In r e f r a i n i n g from r e c l a i m i n g the Maniac from h i s dark e s t a t e , 
J u l i a n may be s a i d to r e s i s t the absence of work which i s c a l l e d 
madness i n the world of a c t i o n . And y e t , i t i s s t i l l through h i s 
f a i t h f u l n e s s to the Maniac's powerlessness, i . e . , to worklessness 
as a mode of "accomplishment", t h a t , i n the same absence of t h i s 
gesture, J u l i a n o f f e r s powerless i n s p i r a t i o n a refuge or a 
r e s e r v e , where i t can continue to a c t outside m a n i f e s t a t i o n . To 
t h i s extent, J u l i a n ' s r e s e r v e would i l l u s t r a t e the B l a n c h o t i a n 
w r i t e r ' s i n e v i t a b l y ambiguous d e c i s i o n to s i l e n c e i n s p i r a t i o n , 
i n order to produce an i n e v i t a b l y ambiguous work: 
To w r i t e i s to make on e s e l f the echo of what cannot cease 
speaking _ and s i n c e i t cannot, i n order to become i t s echo 
I have, i n a way, to s i l e n c e i t . I b r i n g to t h i s i n c e s s a n t 
speech the d e c i s i v e n e s s , the a u t h o r i t y of my own s i l e n c e . 
I make perceptible, by my s i l e n t mediation, the 
u n i n t e r r u p t e d a f f i r m a t i o n , the g i a n t murmuring upon which 
language opens and thus becomes image, becomes imaginary, 
becomes a speaking depth, an i n d i s t i n c t p l e n i t u d e which i s 
empty. T h i s s i l e n c e has i t s source i n the effacement toward 
which the w r i t e r i s drawn. Or e l s e , i t i s the r e s o u r c e of 
h i s mastery. (36) 
In t h i s way, and a t the r i s k of appearing to betray the Maniac 
to the eyes of "the c o l d world," (1. 617) J u l i a n remains f a i t h f u l 
to the mode of being to which the Maniac's speech t e s t i f i e s , a 
worklessness which cannot come d i r e c t l y i n t o the world, but only 
through the poem. J u l i a n ' s poem i s s t i l l harkening to the Maniac, 
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and i t i l l u s t r a t e s Blanchot's statement that "the poet only 
speaks by l i s t e n i n g . " (37) 
The Maniac's speech t e s t i f i e s to h i s continuous involvement with 
the "lady" who, given t h a t she "came with him from France" (1. 
246) may be i d e n t i f i e d with the s p i r i t of r e v o l u t i o n . I n t h i s 
case, t h i s involvement manifests i t s e l f p r i m a r i l y as the 
expression of a want. The r e v o l u t i o n cannot be a p o c a l y p t i c a l l y 
accomplished, but p e r s i s t s as a want. S i m i l a r l y , the pure 
e x t e r i o r i t y of w r i t i n g , i e , i n s p i r a t i o n , cannot be w r i t t e n . (38) 
Works, and poems, would t e s t i f y to both these f e l t l a c k s . The 
kind of community w i t h i n which the Maniac i s audible to J u l i a n 
while not addressing him d i r e c t l y cannot take p l a c e otherwise 
than as the c r e a t i o n of, and i n , the poem. 
In t h i s connection, Simon C r i t c h l e y r e f e r s e x p l i c i t l y t o the 
temptation to a t t a c h a notion of accomplishment to the energy of 
w r i t i n g , which would mean seeing " w r i t i n g as the enabling of 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i o n , and r e v o l u t i o n as the transformation of the 
epoch of the Book i n t o the epoch of Writing". (39) As i s c l e a r 
enough, such a reading would be a complete misunderstanding of 
Blanchot's theory of the modern work of l i t e r a t u r e , as C r i t c h l e y 
u n d e r l i n e s : "Reading Blanchot a p o c a l y p t i c a l l y would r i s k p o s i t i n g 
the achieved r e v o l u t i o n as a Work, and con s t r u i n g post-
r e v o l u t i o n a r y forms of community i n terms of the very u n i t y and 
t o t a l i t y t h a t Blanchot's w r i t i n g seeks to undermine." (40) On the 
contrary, the "absence of work t h a t i s the other name f o r 
madness", i s , f o r Blanchot, the "pas encore" (not yet) which: 
does not r e f e r back to an i d e a l speech, [but] r a t h e r 
c o n s t i t u t e s , i n i t s non-presence, the very d e c i s i o n of 
speech, t h i s s t i l l to come t h a t a l l speech t h a t we 
hold to be present i s and t h a t i s a l l the more 
i n s i s t e n t f o r des i g n a t i n g and engaging with the 
future - (41) 
J u l i a n ' s d e c i s i o n to speak i n tu r n i n g away from h i s u n d i s c l o s e d 
community with the Maniac engages with the future by making the 
Maniac heard. Julian and Maddalo, considered as J u l i a n ' s work, 
a c t u a l l y "depends on the work's undergoing... the ordeal which 
always r u i n s the work i n advance and always r e s t o r e s i n i t the 
unending lack of work, the v a i n superabundance of i n e r t i a . " (42) 
The work, no more than i n e r t i a or worklessness, each being the 
i n t e r r u p t i o n of the other, provides no t r u t h to r e l y on. One of 
the most i r o n i c a l p o i n t s of the poem may be found i n the f a c t 
that "'The lady who had l e f t him, came again... but a f t e r a l l / 
She l e f t him', 1. 599, 11. 605-6). While her r e t u r n may be 
construed as having been induced by the Maniac's c a l l , and as 
turning h a l l u c i n a t i o n i n t o r e a l i t y , she remains true t o her 
changeable, i n t e r m i t t e n t nature, i n departing. 
* * * 
When the anonymous p u b l i c a t i o n of Julian and Maddalo i n The 
Examiner proved impossible, S h e l l e y suggested a separate volume, 
because S h e l l e y saw the poem as incompatible with Prometheus 
Unbound. (43) I n a l e t t e r dated 1820, S h e l l e y wrote: "The J u l i a n 
and Maddalo & the accompan[y]ing poems are a l l my saddest v e r s e s 
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raked up i n t o one heap. - I mean to mingle more smi l e s w i t h my 
t e a r s i n f u t u r e . " (44) I f , as Felman underlines i n her a n a l y s i s 
of Foucault's Histoire de la folie a 1 age classique, madness i s 
"a l y r i c a l explosion", t h a t i s to say, "the excess of i t s 
pathos,... p r e c i s e l y t h i s c a p a c i t y f o r s u f f e r i n g , " (45) then, i t 
i s p o s s i b l e to suggest that Julian and Maddalo c o n t a i n s the 
unworkable pathos of Prometheus Unbound's l y r i c a l drama. I n 
making Julian and Maddalo a poem which i s a work of madness, t h a t 
i s , a work of the absence of work, S h e l l e y a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
madness and the work are "word[s] p e r p e t u a l l y a t odds with 
[themselves]". (46) 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE TRIUMPH OF LIFE (1822) 
S h e l l e y ' s The Triumph of Life (1822) presents a view of the human 
multitude which does not seem to o f f e r the imagination the kind 
of e x p r e s s i o n of i t s forms which i s the s u b j e c t of A Defence of 
Poetry, w r i t t e n about a year e a r l i e r . I n A Defence of Poetry, 
S h e l l e y counters Thomas Love Peacock's d i s m i s s i v e view of the 
usef u l n e s s of poetry to the improvement of the world, by 
expounding the value of "the pl e a s u r e r e s u l t i n g from the manner 
i n which [poets] express the i n f l u e n c e of s o c i e t y and nature upon 
t h e i r own minds".(1) S h e l l e y bases h i s defence of poetry on the 
f a c t t h a t poetry c o n s i s t s of a v i s i o n of a s o c i e t y or community 
which i s not otherwise v i s i b l e to i t s e l f . The p l e a s u r e r e s u l t s 
from making i t v i s i b l e , independently of the content t h a t i s 
presented, and the beauty l i e s i n the shape given to that which 
i s otherwise s h a p e l e s s . To make t h i s v i s i o n v i s i b l e i s to mark 
"the before unapprehended r e l a t i o n s of t h i n g s , " (2) and to 
"create a f r e s h " a s s o c i a t i o n s the apprehension of which 
r e i t e r a t i o n and f a m i l i a r i t y muffle. 
I n A Defence of Poetry, f a m i l i a r i t y has a d i s o r g a n i s i n g and 
d i s t o r t i n g r o l e , compared to poetry which i s " a mirror which 
makes b e a u t i f u l t h a t which i s d i s t o r t e d " ( 3 ) . I t can be n o t i c e d 
from the outset t h a t S h e l l e y marks the transforming power of 
poetry by maintaining both the b e a u t i f u l and the d i s t o r t e d i n the 
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same sentence. I f the shaping e f f e c t of poetry i s to be v i s i b l e , 
the b e a u t i f u l cannot simply r e p l a c e the d i s t o r t e d , a t the r i s k 
of becoming, i n turn, e r a s e d by f a m i l i a r i t y . The shaping e f f e c t 
of poetry must a l s o make d i s t o r t i o n apparent, as a s i g n t h a t t h i s 
p o e t i c a l transformation of the d i s t o r t e d i n t o the b e a u t i f u l does 
not become a complete transformation. I n making d i s t o r t i o n 
apparent, poetry i s t h e r e f o r e as counterproductive as i t i s 
productive. I t i s both shaping and d i s t o r t i n g . One of the 
o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s a n a l y s i s of The Triumph of Life w i l l be to 
a s s e s s the e f f e c t s of poetry's counterproductive a s p e c t s , i n 
p a r t i c u l a r through the overwhelming theme of d i s t o r t i o n i n the 
poem. I t w i l l a l s o a s s e s s the extent to which the b e a u t i f u l 
c r e a t e d by poetry i n A Defence must be held, i n The Triumph of 
Life, as a d i s t o r t i o n symmetrical to th a t e f f e c t e d by 
f a m i l i a r i t y , thereby confirming S h e l l e y ' s argument i n the e a r l i e r 
essay, t h a t our human r e a l i t y i s p o e t i c a l . 
I n A Defence of Poetry, S h e l l e y has to i n v e r t the t r a d i t i o n a l 
motif of poets as expr e s s i n g the ' s p i r i t of the age' which a c t s 
as a p r e - e x i s t i n g m i l i e u to p o e t i c c r e a t i o n s , i n order to 
accommodate the notion t h a t these c r e a t i o n s , i n e f f e c t , make t h i s 
' s p i r i t ' apparent, and ar e not preceded by i t . I t i s p o s s i b l e to 
see The Triumph of Life as a response to the Defence's concern 
with the s p i r i t u a l mode of being which poetry brings about, and 
which i s , expectedly enough, not the mode of the f a c t u a l ( t o "the 
s t o r y of p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s " , Poetry adds "a thousand unapprehended 
combinations of thoughts"). (4) F a m i l i a r i t y ' s d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n i s 
only apparent through the d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n which poetry i t s e l f 
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e n a c t s . Poetry r e v e a l s more of the r e a l i t y t h a t i t i s wanting, 
a notion which i s turned i n t o a p o s i t i v e i n t e n t i n A Defence of 
Poetry ("Poetry enlarges the circumference of the imagination by 
r e p l e n i s h i n g i t with thoughts of ever new d e l i g h t , which have the 
power of a t t r a c t i n g and a s s i m i l a t i n g to t h e i r own nature a l l 
other thoughts, and which form new intervals and interstices 
whose void for ever craves fresh food") ( 5 ) . The Triumph of Life 
explores the m o d i f i c a t i o n which the d e s t a b i l i z i n g mode of being 
of poetry brings upon the l i f e t h a t was l i v e d u n w i t t i n g l y , and 
draws p e r i l o u s consequences from the imaginary power of poetry. 
(6) 
To the d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n of f a m i l i a r i t y ( " i f no new poets should 
a r i s e to c r e a t e a f r e s h the a s s o c i a t i o n s which have been 
disorganized") ( 7 ) , poetry, according to the Defence, s u b s t i t u t e s 
order whereby things appear as they never had before. S h e l l e y 
i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s i s not any order, but order i t s e l f , hence h i s 
adoption of the saying a t t r i b u t e d to Tasso t h a t "None deserves 
the name of Creator except God and the Poet," (8) and h i s c l a i m 
t h a t poets "are the i n s t i t u t o r s of laws" ( 9 ) . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t , 
before poetry, there i s nothing i d e n t i f i a b l e , nothing v i s i b l e . 
However, as suggested, The Triumph of Life explores the r e a l i t y 
which poetry bequeaths, when i t takes on a mode of being whose 
v i s i b i l i t y a r r e s t s a t t e n t i o n . 
While poetry appears to r e s t o r e t h i n g s to an i n t e g r i t y to which 
f a m i l i a r i t y d i d not l e t them c l a i m (the main t h e s i s of the 
Defence), t h i s r e s t o r e d plenitude cannot s e t t l e as a mode of 
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being. The power of poetry i s l i n k e d to i t s a v e r s i o n towards 
becoming r e i f i e d as a t h i n g . (10) I t i s with t h i s i n h e r e n t l y 
traumatic d i s r u p t i o n of shapeless nonexistence, the coming i n t o 
e x i s t e n c e and r e c o g n i t i o n of anything v i s i b l e i n the world both 
of o b j e c t s and i n t e l l e c t u a l i d e a s , which The Triumph of Life a l s o 
d e a l s . As w i l l be analysed, the poem o f f e r s a v e r s i o n of the 
r e c i p r o c a l d i s r u p t i o n and a s s a u l t which r e i t e r a t i o n , i n t e g r a t i o n 
and f a m i l i a r i t y on the one hand, and the breach of these under 
the form of d i s s e n t , on the other hand, bring upon each other. 
The s t r i k i n g aspect of The Triumph of Life i s t h a t the v i s i o n s 
of which both the n a r r a t o r and Rousseau are the r e c i p i e n t s , are 
the occ a s i o n s f o r t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e denunciations and ex p r e s s i o n 
of d i s s e n t . The kind of r e a l i t y which v i s i o n bequeaths i s 
e n t i r e l y dependent on the v i s i o n a r y mode of being which i s not 
meant to s e t t l e i n t o a f a m i l i a r r e a l i t y t h a t would bypass 
a t t e n t i o n . (11) V i s i o n i s the way i n which r e a l i t y appears 
o b j e c t i o n a b l e , i n a s i m i l a r way as i t oppresses the Maniac's 
obse s s i v e consciousness i n Julian and Maddalo. 
The Triumph of Life presents the reader with a v i s i o n of the 
n a r r a t o r ' s v i s i o n . (12) I t i s c l e a r t h a t the d i s t r e s s i n g e f f e c t 
of the l a t t e r upon the n a r r a t o r should not be confused w i t h the 
i n t e n t of S h e l l e y ' s The Triumph of Life. Although the poem 
obviously r e f e r s i t s reader to a t r a d i t i o n of a l l e g o r i c a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of l i f e , (13) the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the 
n a r r a t o r ' s v i s i o n as a " v i s i o n of l i f e " i s made p r i m a r i l y through 
the p r e - e x i s t i n g r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s t r a d i t i o n , as the n a r r a t o r 
himself never i d e n t i f i e s h i s v i s i o n i n such terms. The marked 
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presence of t h i s t r a d i t i o n , as a framework w i t h i n which to 
i d e n t i f y the s p e c t a c l e witnessed by the n a r r a t o r , does not, 
however, l e s s e n the d i s o r i e n t i n g e f f e c t of t h i s s p e c t a c l e . The 
n a r r a t o r may, t h e r e f o r e , be s a i d to be i n the p o s i t i o n of the 
witness to whom such shaping as poetry a f f o r d s and as i s passed 
on by t r a d i t i o n , according to A Defence of Poetry, ceases to a c t 
as a means of comprehension. His v i s i o n leaves the n a r r a t o r 
almost speechless (11. 177-9), and i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s v i s i o n , 
however incomprehensible i t was, could only be recounted because, 
i n the course of the n a r r a t i v e , the n a r r a t o r ' s v o i c e has evolved 
n e a r l y i n t o t h a t of the speaker, who brings the n a r r a t o r ' s and 
Rousseau's v o i c e s together. I n other words, The Triumph of Life 
presents the n a r r a t o r ' s v i s i o n as a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Even i f Rousseau's l a t e r testimony ("But a voice answered ... 
' L i f e ' " 1.180), which, a t the time the answer to the speaker's 
hardly u t t e r e d questions i s given, i s not even recognized as 
coming from "Rousseau" but from "an o l d root" (1.182), provides 
the name of " L i f e " , i t i s u n c l e a r to which element of the v i s i o n 
t h i s i s supposed to be the answer: whether i t i s the v i s i o n of 
the crowd, or of the c h a r i o t , a l s o c a l l e d c a r , which f o l l o w s the 
crowd, r e p l i c a t e s i t s movement and passes over them, whether i t 
i s to the anguish which t h i s d i s t r e s s i n g s i g h t provokes i n the 
n a r r a t o r , or whether i t i s the f a c t t h a t such a v i s i o n should 
have come to him a t a l l . The poem, t h e r e f o r e , c r e a t e s the sense 
t h a t the name of " L i f e " , and, p o s s i b l y , a l l the words of t h i s 
r e c o n s t r u c t e d v i s i o n , are powerless i n making the v i s i o n more 
acceptable. Rousseau's message i n The Triumph of Life does 
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"redeem[ing] from decay the v i s i t a t i o n s of the d i v i n i t y i n man", 
(14) but i t does so by g i v i n g decay a new l e a s e of l i f e . 
The Paradox of L i f e and Death. 
The n a r r a t o r ' s v i s i o n o f f e r s a r e v e r s e d p e r s p e c t i v e , whereby l i f e 
i s deathly, t h a t i s to say, a l r e a d y and i n e v i t a b l y spreading the 
signs of death. The human multitude seems to be reduced to the 
mere movement of going by. As i t s p r o c e s s i o n i s a n t i c i p a t e d by 
the demise and disappearance of i t s members, i t merely prolongs 
the process of disappearance as an experience to be l i v e d 
through. The members of the crowd are drawn i n t o the p a r a d o x i c a l 
death which Blanchot d e s c r i b e s as "the p e r p e t u i t y of that which 
admits n e i t h e r beginning nor end." (15) With t h i s p i c t u r e of 
l i f e conquered by, and p e r s i s t i n g w i t h i n , d e a t h l i n e s s , the poem 
c r e a t e s the nightmarish sense of what a death t h a t i s l i v e d 
through would be l i k e . L o g i c a l l y , l i f e i s c a l l e d the conqueror, 
r e v e a l i n g the same p a s s i v i t y as t h a t from which the Maniac 
s u f f e r s . Blanchot has encapsulated t h i s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n of l i f e 
and death as f o l l o w s i n The Writing of the Disaster: 
where power does not r e i g n - nor i n i t i a t i v e , nor the 
c u t t i n g edge of a d e c i s i o n - there, dying i s l i v i n g . 
There dying i s the p a s s i v i t y of l i f e - of l i f e escaped 
from i t s e l f and confounded with the d i s a s t e r of a time 
without present which we endure by w a i t i n g , by 
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awaiting a misfortune which i s not s t i l l to come, but 
which has always a l r e a d y come upon us and which cannot 
be present.(16) 
The members of the crowd are both not quite a l i v e (as i f they 
were y e t to be t r u l y born), and no longer a l i v e . The "Janus-
visaged Shadow" (1.94) may be connected to the paradox t h a t the 
l i f e which f o r c e s the members of the crowd to spend t h e i r 
l i f e t i m e i n the absence of the p o s s e s s i o n of l i f e , has conquered 
them. Conversely, t h i s a l s o a f f e c t s the notion of death, which 
ceases to be f i n a l . The members of the crowd p e r s i s t i n an 
intermediary c o n d i t i o n i n which, i n t h e i r s t r i v i n g , they merely 
postpone the fo r c e , whether t h i s i s viewed as l i f e or death, t h a t 
i s coming towards them. The multitude represents the extent to 
which l i f e must be suppressed i n the process of spending i t . 
The d i s r u p t i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n between l i f e and death i s 
accompanied by the i n a b i l i t y of the multitude to s i t u a t e i t s e l f 
i n r e l a t i o n to e i t h e r , and t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d by the f a c t t h a t the 
l i v i n g are included i n an i l l u s i o n of which they do not seem to 
be aware, as i s made c l e a r i n the d e p i c t i o n of the crowd's march 
towards i t s disappearance: 
And others as with steps towards the tomb 
Pored on the trodden worms t h a t crawled beneath, 
And others mournfully w i t h i n the gloom 
Of t h e i r own shadow walked, and c a l l e d i t death... 
And some f l e d from i t as i t were a ghost 
(11. 56-60) 
Whereas the f i r s t group seem only to mimic a progress towards the 
tomb, wh i l e apparently unaware of the i r o n i c a l aspect of t h a t 
which they "pored on", the second group mentioned appears t o 
mistake t h e i r shadow f o r death, thereby bringing the "gloom" i n 
which they mourn upon themselves. These two symmetrical c a s e s of 
i l l u s i o n , l a c k i n g a c r i t e r i o n to decide between them, are 
r e f l e c t e d i n the e l u s i v e and g h o s t l y r e a l i t y which the t h i r d 
group attempts to escape. The names "gloom", "death" and "ghost" 
w i l l be n e i t h e r confirmed nor disproved by the r e a l i t y which they 
s i g n i f y , as the l a t t e r does not p r e - e x i s t them. The i n a b i l i t y of 
names to be proved or disproved by the r e a l i t y to which they 
appear to r e f e r i n d i c a t e s that "our human r e a l i t y i s i n essence 
p o e t i c , t h a t t h i s r e a l i t y i s i t s e l f the d i s c o u r s e by which i t i s 
l a i d bare." (17) The c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the c h a r i o t and i t s 
Shape i n terms t h a t are s t r o n g l y suggestive of death (11. 89-92) 
may, then, a l s o be put i n t o question. The n a r r a t o r ' s v i s i o n c a s t s 
doubt over the terms i n which i t i s recounted, and the n a r r a t o r 
may appear as the v i c t i m of the same i n c l u s i v e i l l u s i o n as he can 
see the members of the crowd be. 
The moving crowd i s a s p e c t a c l e to r e c o i l from, because i t i s the 
image of the waste which remains hidden i n the task of l i v i n g . 
A f t e r a f a s h i o n which can be t r a c e d back to the d e s c r i p t i o n of 
a t t e n t i v e n e s s i n ' D i f f i c u l t y of Analyzing the Human Mind', to 
l i v e i s a process whose v i o l e n c e i s undergone, and i n which 
i n d i v i d u a l s are no more noteworthy than a t t e n t i o n c o n s i s t s i n a 
sequence of p a r t i c u l a r thoughts. The d e s c r i p t i o n of the multitude 
i s r e m i n i s c e n t of the mind t h a t i s r e f r a c t o r y to r e f l e c t i o n , and 
which, i n i t s r e c a l c i t r a n c e , repeats the v i o l e n c e which 
r e f l e c t i o n operates i n i t s containment of the mind's stream. The 
d i v i s i o n of the crowd i n t o i t s members ("Some... And o t h e r s . . . 
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But more" 11. 55- 63) merely spreads the confusion and the 
fragmentation. The multitude does not reach the s t a t u s of a 
whole. T h i s i s the s p e c t a c l e of the u n f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h i n f a m i l i a r 
l i f e . I f the passage of the crowd r e p r e s e n t s i t s l o s s of the 
"apprehension of l i f e " , as mentioned i n On Life, t h i s i s a l o s s 
which i s never d e f i n i t i v e l y experienced. 
Decay has become a strange way of p e r s i s t i n g . I t i s the 
replenishment of the l i f e which f a m i l i a r i t y i s so s u c c e s s f u l i n 
making f a m i l i a r and unremarkable. I n other words, the speaker 
s u f f e r s from being unable to overlook the waste i n human 
undertakings which should have remained hidden, the strangeness 
which f a m i l i a r i t y makes f a m i l i a r . The v i s i o n i s imposed upon the 
n a r r a t o r as something he would r a t h e r not see. The inadequacy of 
human understanding (1. 103) to the movement of the c h a r i o t , and 
the f a i l u r e to provide any kind of explanation i n terms of 
chronology (1. 104), however, do not prevent the c h a r i o t from 
pas s i n g . On the c o n t r a r y , the c h a r i o t r e p r e s e n t s t h i s movement 
which no a r t i c u l a t i o n can prevent or impede, j u s t as none can 
account f o r i t . Hence such an account as the n a r r a t o r ' s w i l l only 
r e f l e c t the powerlessness to account f o r i t . No matter how 
c r i t i c a l the speaker's account of the multitude may be, he i s 
unable to o f f e r a p e r s p e c t i v e which may a c t as a counterbalance 
or remedy to "the d e s o l a t i o n " (1. 160). 
In s e e i n g the torment which the multitude goes through, but, 
p o s s i b l y , not as i t i s experienced by the multitude, the n a r r a t o r 
may appear completely separate from the multitude. On the other 
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hand, the poem a l s o h i g h l i g h t s the n a r r a t o r ' s i n a b i l i t y t o be 
separate from the crowd i n any v e r i f i a b l e measure, s i n c e the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between h i s v i s i o n and the multitude's experience 
cannot be made. The n a r r a t o r may be c l o s e r to the crowd than he 
himself may even take a view of, as only the speaker's overview, 
which brings the n a r r a t o r and the crowd together, can allow such 
a view to be taken. The Triumph of Life draws the a l i e n a t i n g 
consequences of the " i d e a l mimicry" whereby, according to A 
Defence of Poetry, "the sentiments of the auditors must have been 
r e f i n e d and enlarged by a sympathy with such g r e a t and l o v e l y 
impersonations, u n t i l from admiring they i m i t a t e d , and from 
i m i t a t i o n they i d e n t i f i e d themselves with the o b j e c t of t h e i r 
admiration." (18) The p o s s i b i l i t y to admire, i m i t a t e and i d e n t i f y 
o n e s e l f i n the Defence, stems from the same o b l i v i o n or non-
presence to o n e s e l f which makes the members of the crowd 
m i r a c u l o u s l y l i v e on, i n the absence of the apprehension of l i f e . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t i n wishing t h a t decay be disposed of more 
s w i f t l y , and disappear from s i g h t , the poet-narrator p a r t i c i p a t e s 
i n the same impatience which makes the crowd overlook l i f e i n the 
movement of pursuing i t . The multitude would then make h i s own 
impatience v i s i b l e to the n a r r a t o r . 
B l i n d n e s s and I n s i g h t . 
1. Consciousness and r e t r o s p e c t i o n . 
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The Triumph of Life suggests t h a t t h e n a r r a t o r ' s i n s i g h t c a nnot 
be assessed a g a i n s t t h e b l i n d n e s s w h i c h i s denounced b o t h i n t h e 
m u l t i t u d e and t h e v a r i o u s h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s mentioned. A c c o r d i n g 
t o C r o n i n , i n r e j e c t i n g l i f e , and i n a l l y i n g h i m s e l f w i t h t h e 
s t a r s r a t h e r t h a n t h e sun, t h e v i s i o n a r y has doomed h i m s e l f t o 
see l i f e as a p o i n t l e s s p r o g r e s s r u l e d over by a b l i n d f o l d e d god. 
(19) One o f t h e p o i n t s o f t h e poem i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t l i f e may 
appear p o i n t l e s s i n t h i s way, w i t h o u t , c o n t r a r y t o C r o n i n ' s 
i m p l i c a t i o n , any a l t e r n a t i v e o r c h o i c e b e i n g a v a i l a b l e once t h e 
v i s i o n comes t o t h e speaker. T h i s i s borne o u t i n S h e l l e y ' s 
t r e a t m e n t o f t h e n a r r a t o r ' s v o i c e a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f the poem. 
Sunr i s e i s d e p i c t e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y , a t l e a s t i n appearance, o f a 
consciousness t o apprehend i t , s i n c e i t i s o n l y f o l l o w i n g "a 
s t r a n g e t r a n c e " t h a t t h e speaker i s a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e " t h e 
fr e s h n e s s o f t h a t dawn" as t h a t which has j u s t been d e s c r i b e d . 
I t t a k e s "a s t r a n g e t r a n c e " t o b r i n g t h e speaker back t o h i s 
s u r r o u n d i n g s (11.35-39). I t i s o n l y r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y t h a t t h e 
speaker i n t h e poem cannot be e n t i r e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 
d a y l i g h t d e s c r i p t i o n o f s u n r i s e , where t h e l i g h t which appears 
i s t a k e n as t h e o n l y l i g h t p r o v i d i n g " a l l t h i n g s " i n t h e i r 
appearance, and i n comparison w i t h which t h e absence o f 
appearance i s h e l d as a "mask." (1.3) I t i s a l s o o n l y 
r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y t h a t t h e opening d e s c r i p t i o n o f dawn i s r e v e a l e d 
as independent o f a s u b j e c t k n o w i n g l y p r e s e n t t o h i m s e l f . P r i o r 
t o t h i s , t h e two seemed n a t u r a l l y merged, and t h e n a r r a t o r ' s 
v o i c e was pre-comprehended w i t h i n t h e scene and u n q u e s t i o n e d , 
l i k e d a y l i g h t . His v o i c e c o u l d t h e n be t a k e n f o r t h e v o i c e o f 
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f a m i l i a r i t y which goes u n n o t i c e d . W i t h h i n d s i g h t , t h i s c r e a t e s 
t h e sense o f a scene t h a t i s seen w i t h o u t b e i n g l o o k e d a t , as 
w e l l as t h e sense o f a c o n t i n u o u s , dormant consciousness. The 
i n t e r v e n t i o n o f a speaker who has been b r o u g h t back t o h i s senses 
("But I . . . " 1. 21) s e p a r a t e s him f r o m a d e s c r i p t i o n t o which he 
cannot even be s a i d t o p a r t i c i p a t e s i n c e e i t h e r h i s presence o r 
h i s absence had been, u n t i l t h e n , u n n o t i c e d . The main p o i n t i s 
t h a t t h e dormant consciousness p r i o r t o t h i s awakening c o u l d n o t 
be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m awakened consciousness, and t h i s l a c k o f 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s n o t a m i s t a k e . Whereas t h e n a r r a t i v e sequence 
p r e s e n t s t h e n a r r a t o r ' s awakening as p o s t e r i o r t o t h e 
p r e s e n t a t i o n o f s u n r i s e , i t a l s o suggests t h a t dawn c o u l d be 
w i t n e s s e d i n t h e way i t has, thanks t o a k i n d o f w a k e f u l n e s s 
which p r e d a t e s t h e n a r r a t i v e (hence t h e use o f a n t e r i o r p a s t 
tense i n 1. 2 2 ) . The passage i s a p r e s e n t a t i o n o f consciousness 
t h a t i s never contemporary w i t h i t s e l f . The break o r awakening 
i s o n l y o b s e r v a b l e and re-marked t h r o u g h t h e change which i t has 
a l r e a d y o p e r a t e d . 
While r e t r o s p e c t i o n appears t o c a s t a shadow upon t h e un-
s e l f c o n s c i o u s f r e s h n e s s o f s u n r i s e , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e 
subsequent i d e n t i f i c a t i o n leaves t h e u n s e l f c o n s c i o u s and 
u n q u e s t i o n e d evidence o f dawn untouched, i f n o t r e i n f o r c e d , as 
a r e c o g n i s e d t o p o s , s i n c e t h e d e s c r i p t i o n f i t s t h e r e c o g n i t i o n , 
and pushes any e x p e r i e n c e o f p r i s t i n e , unknown dawn f u r t h e r away 
from i t s apprehension. Yet, S h e l l e y p o i n t s a t a paradox which 
cannot be r e s o l v e d , f o r , a l t h o u g h t h e f r e s h n e s s o f dawn seems t o 
have gone s t a l e i n becoming t h e o b j e c t o f r e c o g n i t i o n and 
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i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by t h e speaker ( a f t e r a l l , t h i s was a l r e a d y 
"dawn"), t h e u n q u e s t i o n e d i n i t i a l i m p r e s s i o n i s n o t d i s p r o v e d by 
t h e subsequent i d e n t i f i c a t i o n : dawn's f r e s h n e s s can be 
r e i t e r a t e d . I n t h i s way, S h e l l e y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e i s no 
o r i g i n a l event o r phenomenon which c o u l d make i t s name 
q u e s t i o n a b l e : t h e f r e s h n e s s o f dawn i s s e a l e d i n i t s name. The 
r e s u l t o f t h i s o p ening i s t o p r e s e n t t h e r e a d e r w i t h t h e sense 
of a b e g i n n i n g w h i c h has t o be r e v i s e d each t i m e , where n e i t h e r 
t h e s u n r i s e nor t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h e f e l t presence o f t h e 
speaker can be g i v e n p r i o r i t y i n t i m e o r i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n , hence 
the sense o f a consciousness t r y i n g t o reach t o t h e p o i n t p r i o r 
t o t h a t o f which i t i s c o n s c i o u s , and f i n d i n g i t s e l f a l r e a d y 
t h e r e . I t i s t h e r e f o r e t h e same t h i n g t o argue t h a t t h e r e i s an 
i n h e r e n t s l e e p i n e s s i n consciousness's w a k e f u l n e s s , and t h a t 
consciousness ever encounters a l l t h e n o v e l t y which i t f i n d s 
w i t h i n i t s e l f . 
T h i s u n - s e l f c o n s c i o u s d e s c r i p t i o n o f dawn seems t o be conveyed 
by t h e v o i c e o f u n d i s t u r b e d " r e v e r i e " , d e s c r i b e d i n 'On L i f e ' as 
th e s t a t e o f those who " f e e l as i f t h e i r n a t u r e was d i s s o l v e d 
i n t o t h e s u r r o u n d i n g u n i v e r s e , o r as i f t h e s u r r o u n d i n g u n i v e r s e 
were absorbed i n t o t h e i r b e i n g . They are conscious o f no 
d i s t i n c t i o n . " (20) I n t h i s passage, S h e l l e y n o t e s t h e s u b j e c t ' s 
d i f f i c u l t y t o be p r e s e n t and contemporary t o such a s t a t e : " t h e s e 
are s t a t e s which precede o r accompany o r f o l l o w an u n u s u a l l y 
i n t e n s e and v i v i d a p p r e h e n s i o n o f l i f e " . The "apprehension o f 
l i f e " i s as f l e e t i n g as t h a t w hich, i n a t t e n t i o n , passes 
a t t e n t i o n (see Chapter 3 ) . S h e l l e y suggests t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h 
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t h e v o i c e o f u n q u e s t i o n e d and communally agreed metaphors, such 
as a l l t h e a s pects w h i c h make dawn r e c o g n i z a b l e , resembles, and, 
p o s s i b l y , i n h a b i t s , r a t h e r t h a n i n h i b i t s , i n d i v i d u a l 
consciousness i n i t s most u n r e f l e x i v e s t a t e . The " l e g i s l a t u r e 
c r e a t e d by t h e g e n e r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p a s t f e e l i n g s o f 
mankind" (21) m i r r o r s consciousness's i n h e r e n t s l e e p , a p a s s i v i t y 
w hich B l a n c h o t d e t e c t s i n e c s t a t i c e x p e r i e n c e s , when: 
consciousness a l l o w s i t s e l f t o become f i l l e d w i t h an 
anonymous p l e n i t u d e . Thus t h e u n i v e r s a l u n i t y seems t o 
be r e c o n s t i t u t e d . Thus, b e h i n d t h i n g s , t h e s o u l o f 
each t h i n g obeys charms w h i c h t h e e c s t a t i c [man] 
h a v i n g abandoned h i m s e l f t o " t h e u n i v e r s e , " now 
c o n t r o l s . (22) 
I n t h i s way, S h e l l e y suggests t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e most 
spontaneous r e l a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d may be imbued w i t h c u l t u r a l 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . 
A l t h o u g h t h e n a r r a t o r has " k e p t . . . w a k e f u l " over t h e n i g h t , " t h e 
mask / Of d arkness" ( 1 1 . 3 - 4 ) , he does n o t b r i n g back any v i s i o n 
f rom t h i s o t h e r r e a l m i n t o t h e r e a l m o f d a y l i g h t . The n a r r a t o r ' s 
n i g h t l y w a k e f u l n e s s does n o t p r o v i d e any i n s i g h t w h i c h may be o f 
use i n t o t h e r e a l m o f d a y l i g h t , s i n c e , w i t h d a y l i g h t , h i s 
" t h o u g h t s ...must remain u n t o l d " , j u s t as h i s n i g h t l y e x p e r i e n c e 
appears t o be e n c l o s e d i n n o n - d i s c l o s u r e r a t h e r t h a n u n v e i l e d by 
t h e comparison o f i t w i t h " t h e s t a r s t h a t gem / The cone o f 
n i g h t " ( 1 1 . 2 2 - 3 ) , w i t h i t s s e p a r a t i o n between day and n i g h t , o f 
which n i g h t t i m e i s i g n o r a n t . The d e s i g n a t i o n o f n i g h t i s a l r e a d y 
t h e r e s u l t o f r e t r o s p e c t i o n , and o f an awakening which cannot be 
undone. I f awakening i s i r r e v e r s i b l e , t h e n , i t a l s o i n t e r r u p t s 
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any c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h a t from w h i c h i t i s t h e awakening, hence 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t o t a k e i t as t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f s l e e p . N i g h t l y 
w a kefulness i s i r r e t r i e v a b l e as i t i s s e a m l e s s l y t r a n s f o r m e d . The 
speaker's w a k e f u l e x p e r i e n c e , no more t h a n t h e l i g h t o f t h e 
s t a r s , can e n t e r t h e r e a l m o f broad d a y l i g h t , and d a y l i g h t 
e x p e r i e n c e cannot r e v e r t t o t h e n i g h t as something which w o u l d 
be a c c e s s i b l e t o i t i n t h e same terms. The s t a r s do n o t make t h e 
n i g h t more l i k e t h e day, on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e n i g h t i s deeper f o r 
t h e s t a r s . The u n r e l a t e d n e s s o f day and n i g h t reproduces t h e 
u n r e l a t e d n e s s o f t h e s t a t e s o f consciousness i n d a y l i g h t and a t 
n i g h t - t i m e . These a r e realms w h i c h appear t o be c l o s e d t o each 
o t h e r as t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y o f a f f i r m i n g t h a t one has been 
l e f t f o r t h e o t h e r . S i m i l a r l y , as n o t e d , t h e n a r r a t o r ' s v i s i o n 
o f t h e m u l t i t u d e c o n s t i t u t e s no i n s i g h t from o u t s i d e t h i s v i s i o n . 
Wakefulness cannot be opposed t o s l e e p , s i n c e t h e l a t t e r i s a l s o 
a k i n d o f w a k e f u l n e s s . There i s t h e r e f o r e a c o n t i n u i t y o f 
wa k e f u l n e s s , which s u n r i s e cannot w i t n e s s , b u t o f which i t may 
be a p a r t . (23) 
The r e s p e c t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f c i v i l i s e d n a t u r e and r e p u l s i v e 
human m u l t i t u d e may be t a k e n as e n c a p s u l a t i n g t h e t e n s i o n w i t h i n 
t h e argument around w h i c h Rousseau's r e f l e x i o n on s o c i e t y and t h e 
S t a t e i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y seen t o r e v o l v e . Rousseau's c i v i l i s e d 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f n a t u r e w h i c h s u s t a i n e d h i s d e n u n c i a t i o n o f 
c i v i l i s a t i o n as d e p r a v a t i o n , and h i s e f f o r t t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e a 
s o c i e t y whose c o n t r a c t u a l b a s i s would reproduce t h e model o f t h e 
n a t u r a l goodness o f man, so l o n g as i t i s embodied i n t h e General 
W i l l (24) may be t a k e n as t h e a t t e m p t s t o respond t o , and 
180 
harness, t h e u n f a m i l i a r f o r c e s w h i c h he uncovered i n h i s s e a r c h 
f o r an e l u s i v e a u t h e n t i c i t y , w h i c h i s n e c e s s a r i l y r e s i s t a n t t o 
a s s i m i l a t i o n and comprehension. (25) The n o t i o n t h a t t h e s e a r e 
s y m m e t r i c a l v i e w s , e c h o i n g each o t h e r and l e a v i n g no p o s s i b i l i t y 
of c h o i c e between them, i s conveyed by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e "scene" 
mentioned ( 1 . 31) may be u n d e r s t o o d as b o t h t h e dawn which has 
j u s t been d e s c r i b e d , and as t h e v i s i o n o f t h e m u l t i t u d e w h i c h i s 
about t o be d e s c r i b e d . T h i s i s a n o t h e r e f f e c t o f r e t r o s p e c t i o n , 
s i n c e , i n p u r s u i n g h i s r e t r o s p e c t i v e t a l e t o an a n t e r i o r 
e x p e r i e n c e (and I knew / That I had f e l t " 11. 3 3 - 4 ) , t h e speaker 
appears t o t e n d towards t h e p o i n t where he s t a r t e d . The e n s u i n g 
v i s i o n o f t h e m u l t i t u d e may t h e n be t a k e n f o r a n o t h e r v e r s i o n o f 
s u n r i s e . (26) The t r a n c e over t h e p o e t - n a r r a t o r ' s f a n c y l e a d s t o 
a m o d i f i e d v i s i o n o f "the scene", where l i g h t a c t s as a r e v e a l i n g 
v e i l . As w i l l be examined l a t e r on, t h i s bears consequences on 
the m o t i v a t i o n b e h i n d t h e c h o i c e o f Rousseau as f a t h e r f i g u r e o f 
the h i s t o r i c a l awakening c a l l e d t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t . 
As a consequence o f S h e l l e y ' s e x p l o r a t i o n o f t h e l a c k o f 
d i s t i n c t i o n between c o n t i n u i t y and d i s c o n t i n u i t y f r o m n i g h t t o 
day, o r between b l i n d n e s s and i n s i g h t i n The Triumph of Life, i t 
may be argued t h a t h i s l a s t poem draws t h e consequences f r o m t h e 
n o t i o n t h a t , as s t a t e d i n 'On L i f e , "we l i v e on, and i n l i v i n g 
we l o s e t h e apprehension o f l i f e . " (27) The sense o f such a l o s s 
as t h e m u l t i t u d e embodies may o n l y be t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e 
v e r y l i f e w h i c h has been l o s t . The Triumph of Life o f f e r s a 
p o r t r a i t o f l i f e as l i v e d i n t h e " v a l l e y o f p e r p e t u a l dream" ( 1 . 
397), b u t t h e sense o f d r e a m - l i k e e x p e r i e n c e does n o t l e a d t o a 
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higher awakening, any more than, i n Bowie's terms, the sense of 
what makes us aware of the work's inherent incompleteness can 
make i t complete. (28) 
The Waste of H i s t o r y . 
This s e c t i o n w i l l examine the conception of h i s t o r y f o l l o w i n g 
from l i v i n g as the l o s s of the apprehension of l i f e . I n the 
n a r r a t o r ' s denunciation of i m p e r i a l power and i t s pageant, power 
and s u b j e c t i o n m i r r o r each other. The mirror e f f e c t between "the 
m i l l i o n " and "those who upon the f r e e had bound a yoke" i s 
repeated by the r e v e r s a l i n f a t e a w a i t i n g the l a t t e r s i n c e they 
are bound to s u f f e r the s u b j e c t i o n which they i n f l i c t (1. 116). 
The h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s of power are s i n g l e d out i n such a way 
t h a t they seem to take advantage of the multitude, w h i l e 
simultaneously resembling i t i n the pageant of h i s t o r y . On the 
other hand, the crowd i r o n i c a l l y appears to c e l e b r a t e the 
movement which crushes i t , because t h i s movement may a l s o be h e l d 
as hastening the end of i t s torment. I t i s u n c l e a r whether the 
crowd follows (1.136) the c h a r i o t or leads (1.139) i t . H i s t o r i c a l 
f i g u r e s have to submit to the passage of h i s t o r y j u s t as the 
members of the crowd bear the movement of l i f e which they cannot 
encounter a l l a t once. The multitude which the f i g u r e s of power 
appear t o subjugate r e f l e c t s the submission of the l a t t e r to 
f o r c e s of want which t h e i r quest f o r power does not assuage. 
(29) On the other hand, the multitude's i n a b i l i t y to apprehend 
l i f e , and i t s ensuing s u b j e c t i o n , partake of a d e c i s i o n and a 
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p r o j e c t of mastery over l i f e which the h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s of 
power epitomize. I f the multitude r e p r e s e n t s the i n e r t i a 
d e f e a t i n g the m a s t e r f u l d e c i s i v e n e s s of the mighty, co n v e r s e l y , 
i t must be acknowledged t h a t the torment to which they are 
s u b j e c t e d r e s u l t s from a d e c i s i o n to r e p e l the approach of l i f e 
i n order to have the time to go through i t . They a l l p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n c a p t i v i t y , an assessment which, a t l e a s t i n i t s i r o n i c a l 
r e v e r s a l of masters i n t o s l a v e s , echoes Rousseau's statement t h a t 
"Man i s born f r e e [ y e t ] everywhere he i s c h a i n s . One t h i n k s 
himself the master of ot h e r s , and s t i l l remains a g r e a t e r s l a v e 
than they." (30) The movement of the multitude, i n i t s 
r e c a l c i t r a n t and d i s s e n t i n g s u b j e c t i o n to an unpalatable f a t e , 
would then r e f l e c t the same s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to "the s o u l ' s s e c r e t 
s p r i n g s " as i s e x h i b i t e d , i n an a m p l i f i e d manner, by "the mighty 
c a p t i v e s " . The multitude r e p r e s e n t s a movement which cannot be 
organized. 
The i r r e v e r s i b l e process of d e s t r u c t i o n , which seems a l l t h a t 
remains from the e x e r t i o n s of h i s t o r y , i s expressed i n Rousseau's 
judgment on the outcome of the Napoleonic episode: 
he sought to win 
"The world, and l o s t a l l i t d i d contain 
Of greatness, i n i t s hope destroyed; & more 
Of fame & peace than V i r t u e ' s s e l f can gain 
"Without the opportunity which bore 
Him on i t s eagle's p i n i o n to the peak 
(11. 217-22) 
Napoleon's f a l l i s not merely a case of downfall from the peak. 
In the f a i l e d attempt to win the world, Napoleon not only 
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destroyed a l l t h a t f o r which he attempted to win i t , but he l o s t 
more than would have been gained, had he not made h i s attempt, 
as the v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y f o r t h i s attempt r e f l e c t s on the base 
c o n d i t i o n i n t o which a world which could be the o b j e c t of i t was 
plunged. The passage designates the d i s a s t r o u s Napoleonic episode 
as the f a i l e d purge of the c o n d i t i o n s which had made i t p o s s i b l e 
i n the f i r s t p l a c e . Napoleon i s s i n g l e d out as the epitome of the 
f i g u r e wreaking d e s t r u c t i o n . Yet h i s f a i l u r e i s not so much the 
r e v e r s a l of the f a i l e d e n t e r p r i s e as i t i s i t s c o n t i n u a t i o n . I t s 
f a i l u r e does not put the record s t r a i g h t again: there can be no 
r e v e r s a l . The harm done cannot be compensated by the f a i l u r e of 
the attempt, as h i s t o r y goes on without the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t 
may be c o r r e c t e d . Napoleon and the other "anarchs" make the world 
old i n c o n t i n u i n g the mistakes which the course of h i s t o r y i s 
unable to mend. 
What the speaker and Rousseau appear to deprecate i n the f i g u r e s 
of h i s t o r y , i s not so much th a t t h e i r a c t i o n s are meant to harm, 
but t h a t , as they move the course of h i s t o r y along, they b r i n g 
about decay, which i s a l s o , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , what the speaker c a l l s 
for when he pleads "Let them pass" (1. 243), as though i n the 
hope of reaching the end of c o r r u p t i o n , and a new dawn. I n t h i s 
c a l l , the n a r r a t o r reproduces the multitude's n e g l e c t f u l 
impatience. There appears to be nothing to be r e t a i n e d i n h i s t o r y 
not so much i n s p i t e of, but because of i t s accumulating 
movement. The course of h i s t o r y i s a continuing d e v a s t a t i o n , and 
h i s t o r y provides more of the m a t e r i a l which i t d e v a s t a t e s . I f 
Napoleon i s seen as the v i c t i m of the same d e l u s i o n as the 
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m u l t i t u d e , t h e n , j u s t as t h e l a t t e r ' s e x e r t i o n i s merely a way 
of g i v i n g way t o l i f e s i n c e i t cannot e x p e r i e n c e i t a l l a t once, 
s i m i l a r l y , t h e d i c t a t o r ' s conquest may be seen as t h e mere 
o c c a s i o n f o r l e t t i n g such a t t e m p t s pass ( 1 . 2 2 5 ) . As i n t h e case 
o f i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n c e , t h e s t a t e m e n t from 'On L i f e ' t h a t " [ 0 ] u r 
whole l i f e i s t h u s an e d u c a t i o n o f e r r o r " (31) i s c o n f i r m e d . 
H i s t o r y b u s i e s i t s e l f i n t h e same way as t h e m u l t i t u d e goes about 
t h e t a s k o f l i v i n g . What i s t h u s condemned i s t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r 
l i f e and h i s t o r y t o u n f o l d as a process d i g r e s s i n g f r o m 
r e a l i z a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n l e a d i n g t o i t . The d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s o f t h e 
m i g h t y has n o t erased them f r o m t h e r e c o r d o f h i s t o r y , on t h e 
c o n t r a r y , t h e i r appearance makes h i s t o r y awry. They a r e 
u n f o r g o t t e n , j u s t as t h e m u l t i t u d e i s obscene. 
Rousseau's l a m e n t i n g account g i v e s more evidence o f h i s t o r y ' s 
i n a b i l i t y t o be p i n n e d down a c c o r d i n g t o a p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n 
towards e i t h e r improvement o r a g g r a v a t i o n . Napoleon's descent was 
th e c r o w n i n g achievement and t h e epitome o f h i s doomed 
e n t e r p r i s e . I n t h i s u n i n t e r r u p t e d c h a i n o f e v e n t s , i t may be 
p o s s i b l e t o c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e Napoleonic v e n t u r e and f a i l u r e , 
c o n t i n u e d t o h e a l i t s e l f , and, e q u a l l y , t h a t i t c o n t i n u e d t o make 
i t s h a r m f u l e f f e c t f e l t . I t becomes e q u i v a l e n t t o say t h a t 
Napoleon b r o u g h t d i s a s t e r upon h i m s e l f , and t h a t he was p o w e r l e s s 
i n r e p e l l i n g i t , j u s t as i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d e c i d e whether he 
t r i g g e r e d t h e f o r c e s necessary t o t o p p l e him, o r whether t h e s e 
s u c c e s s f u l l y w i t h s t o o d h i s a s s a u l t . Rousseau's account o f h i s t o r y 
leads t o a v i e w w h i c h loosens t h e l i m i t s o f h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s , 
b l u r s t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n , and c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n 
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c a u s a l t e r m s . As i t s course cannot be sundered, p r e s e n t t i m e s do 
n o t seem t o have even emerged f r o m t h e p a s t , as i s i m p l i e d by t h e 
n a r r a t o r : 
and f o r d e s p a i r 
I h a l f d i s d a i n e d mine eyes' d e s i r e t o f i l l 
W i t h t h e spent v i s i o n o f t h e t i m e s t h a t were 
And scarce have ceased t o be 
( 1 1 . 232-4) 
The p r e s e n t cannot a s c e r t a i n t h a t i t has p u t t h e p a s t b e h i n d , as 
t h e p a s t reaches t o t h e p r e s e n t . The i r r e p a r a b l e a s p e c t o f 
a c t i o n s i n h i s t o r y i s l i n k e d t o t h e i r l a c k o f a f i n a l meaning, 
and t o t h e c o n t i n u i n g i n f l u e n c e o f former t i m e s , as precedence 
does n o t produce t h e r e s u l t t h a t would e x p l a i n and t e r m i n a t e i t . 
Such i n f l u e n c e i s f o r m a l i s e d i n t h e poem i n Rousseau s p e a k i n g t o 
t h e n a r r a t o r over t h e y e a r s . But h i s t o r y does n o t p r o v i d e t h e 
terms by w h i c h i t c o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d . On t h e o t h e r hand, i t may 
be argued t h a t , b e h i n d t h e n a r r a t o r ' s and Rousseau's d e n u n c i a t i o n 
o f h i s t o r y as a d i s t o r t e d n a r r a t i v e , i s a w i s h f o r h i s t o r y t o be 
a t r u e n a r r a t i v e , i e , a t a l e whose r e l a t i n g would be immanent t o 
i t . 
I t has been a p p a r e n t i n t h i s a n a l y s i s , t h a t Rousseau cannot a v o i d 
a n x i e t i e s w h i c h a r e a t t e n d a n t t o h i s d e n u n c i a t i o n o f h i s t o r y . 
A l t h o u g h t h e m u l t i t u d e may be h e l d as t h e s t a g n a n t i n e r t i a w i t h 
which Rousseau i s i m p a t i e n t , because i t absorbs and dooms 
a t t e m p t s t o a r i s e f r o m d r e a m l i k e c o n t i n u i t y , i t i s a l s o t h e mere 
a g i t a t i o n w h i c h i s i m p e r v i o u s t o such f o r c e f u l d e c i s i v e n e s s as 
Napoleon t r i e d t o e x e r t . The movement o f t h e m u l t i t u d e r e p r e s e n t s 
t h e c o n t i n u i t y whereby such v e n t u r e s as Napoleon's come t o pass. 
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I n one a s p e c t , Rousseau's condemnation may appear even more 
t o t a l i t a r i a n t h a n t h e u s u r p e r s whom he condemns. Napoleon f e l l 
v i c t i m t o a c u r i o u s l a c k o f r e p r e s s i o n : 
"The Wise, 
"The g r e a t , t h e u n f o r g o t t e n : t h e y who wore 
M i t r e s and helms and crowns, o r wreathes o f l i g h t , 
Signs o f t h o u g h t ' s empire over t h o u g h t ; t h e i r l o r e 
"Taught them n o t t h i s _ t o know themselves; t h e i r m i g h t 
Could n o t r e p r e s s t h e m u t i n y w i t h i n , 
And f o r t h e morn o f t r u t h t h e y f e i g n e d , deep n i g h t 
"Caught them e r e e v e n i n g . " 
( 1 1 . 208-15) 
The m u t i n y i s t o be u n d e r s t o o d as t h i s f o r c e w r e a k i n g t h e 
d e s t r u c t i o n which, as d e s c r i b e d above, i s a l l t h e more d i s a s t r o u s 
as i t cannot even complete i t s d e s t r u c t i v e work b u t p e r s e v e r e s , 
and suspends t h e judgment o f h i s t o r y on t h e sense o f e v e n t s as 
e i t h e r improvement o r r e g r e s s i o n . The paradox i n Rousseau's 
condemnation l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s a l l t h e more d i f f i c u l t 
t o d i v e s t t h e m i g h t y o f t h e i r power as t h i s i s no t r u e power ( 1 1 . 
288-92). T h e i r s i s a power t h a t i s unable t o break t h e c i r c l e o f 
m u t i n y a g a i n s t , o r w i t h i n , m u t i n y (hence t h e m i r r o r e f f e c t 
between t h e m i g h t y and t h e m u l t i t u d e ) , and, i n t h i s d i s t o r t i n g 
p r e t e n c e , overshadows and o b s t r u c t s t h e emergence o f i n d i s p u t a b l e 
power. T h i s i s why, w h i l e Napoleon's d o m i n a t i o n i s h a r m f u l , i t 
i s even more so i n t h e measure w i t h i n which i t i s l a c k i n g ( 1 . 
213), i n s t e a d o f t h i s b e i n g i t s redeeming a s p e c t . 
As suggested, Rousseau's d e n u n c i a t i o n o f h i s t o r y i s u n d e r l a i d by 
a w i s h t h a t i t were t e r m i n a t e d , i n a f a r more r a d i c a l way t h a n 
t h e d e s t r u c t i o n which t h e f i g u r e s o f power c o u l d p e r p e t r a t e . I f 
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t h e Napoleonic v e n t u r e i s l i a b l e t o t h e d e p i c t i o n o f t h e f o l l y 
o f t h e b i d f o r power suggested i n B l a n c h o t ' s f o r m u l a : "he who 
masters d e a t h ( f i n i t e l i f e ) unleashes t h e i n f i n i t u d e o f d y i n g " 
32) t h e n , Rousseau's w i s h i s t o harness " d y i n g " so t h a t i t n e v e r 
reappears as t h e d i s s e n t a t t h e h e a r t o f l i f e which makes i t 
di s s e m b l e . Rousseau h i n t s a t a more sweeping mastery t h a n 
Napoleon was a b l e t o show. T h i s c l a i m t o mastery, however, i s 
a l s o t h e b i d whereby power c l a i m s t o be p o w e r f u l ("the morn o f 
t r u t h t h e y f e i g n e d " ) . The f i g u r e o f Rousseau f i t s p e r f e c t l y t h e 
l i n e s o f t e n s i o n w h i c h f o r m t h e b a s i s o f C l a r k ' s a n a l y s i s o f t h e 
c o n n e c t i o n between s e l f - i n t r o s p e c t i o n and r e v o l u t i o n a r y c r e a t i v e 
power i n S h e l l e y . (33) These can be l o c a t e d i n Rousseau's 
d e n u n c i a t i o n o f t h e d e p r a v a t i o n o f s o c i a l man and i l l e g i t i m a t e 
regimes, h i s a t t e n d a n t p r o j e c t t o remake t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f 
s o c i e t y w h i c h may be seen as a p a r a l l e l t o h i s p r o j e c t o f a 
c o m p l e t e l y s i n c e r e s e l f - d e l i n e a t i o n . 
Rousseau blames t h e h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s o f power f o r h a v i n g m e r e l y 
r e l i e d on t h e " [ s ] i g n s o f t h o u g h t ' s empire over t h o u g h t " , and f o r 
f a i l i n g t o f u l f i l l and embody t h e meaning o f the te r m "power" t o 
which t h e y c l a i m ( u n l e a s h i n g m u t i n y i n s t e a d ) , an i n s t a n c e o f 
f a t a l d i s s e m b l i n g w h i c h he f u r t h e r develops w i t h t h e examples o f 
P l a t o , S o c r a t e s , A r i s t o t l e and Ale x a n d e r ( 1 1 . 254-67). He a l s o 
blames t h e f i g u r e s o f power f o r n e g l e c t i n g a k i n d o f knowledge 
which i t was t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r u n d e r t a k i n g t o c l a i m t o have 
secured ( 1 . 2 1 4 ) . Simon Haines's comments u n r a v e l t h e movement 
t o w h i c h t h e f i g u r e s o f power f a l l v i c t i m : " L i f e i s 'the 
Conqueror', so th o s e who conquer most a r e th o s e most conquered... 
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The c a p t i v e s a r e those whom l i f e conquers by v i r t u e o f t h e i r own 
s t r e n g t h , o ver themselves and over t h e w o r l d . The s t r o n g e r t h e y 
a r e , t h e more c o m p l e t e l y t h e y a r e s u b j u g a t e d by means o f t h a t 
p a r t o f themselves t h e y have n o t overcome o r known." (34) The 
s t r i k i n g p o i n t here i s t h a t t h e method t o a v e r t s u b j u g a t i o n i s 
a l r e a d y p u t i n t h e terms which i m p l y i t : overcome and know. T h i s 
p o i n t s a t t h e ambivalence o f Rousseau's d e n u n c i a t i o n o f h i s t o r y 
which cannot h e l p r e s o r t i n g t o t h e terms i n which power i t s e l f 
c l a i m s t o be p o w e r f u l , and f i n d s t h e s e terms t o be w o r t h no more 
tha n t h e measure i n whic h t h e y h o l d good. 
On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e example o f Bacon succeeding and 
s u p e r s e d i n g A r i s t o t l e o f f e r s t h e a n t i t h e s i s t o t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f 
knowledge t h a t has been p e r m a n e n t l y secured. I n t h i s case, 
Rousseau p r a i s e s , r a t h e r t h a n d e p l o r e s , t h e s u c c e s s i o n : 
"The o t h e r l o n g o u t l i v e d b o t h woes and wars, 
Throned i n new t h o u g h t s o f men, and s t i l l had k e p t 
The j e a l o u s keys o f t r u t h ' s e t e r n a l doors 
" I f Bacon's s p i r i t [ ] had n o t l e a p t 
L i k e l i g h t n i n g o u t o f darkness; he compelled 
The P r o t e u s shape o f Nature's as i t s l e p t 
"To wake and t o unbar t h e caves t h a t h e l d 
The t r e a s u r e o f t h e s e c r e t s o f i t s r e i g n 
(11. 266-73) 
Rousseau d e s i g n a t e s t h e w o r l d v i e w t h a t has been superseded i n 
terms w h i c h echo h i s s c o r n f o r t h e u s u r p e r s o f power ("Throned", 
" j e a l o u s " , " t r e a s u r e " , " r e i g n " ) , t h e r e b y i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e 
w o r l d r u l e d by monarchy ("Throned") may become as o b s o l e t e as t h e 
w o r l d where t h i n g s which are y e t unknown, o r a r a d i c a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t w o r l d v i ew, i s unsuspected. Bacon's v i c t o r y p l u n g e d 
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A r i s t o t l e ' s world i n t o darkness, which i s markedly d i f f e r e n t from 
e n l i g h t e n i n g i t . L i k e l i g h t n i n g , Bacon brought i n the l i g h t 
whereby he could be v i s i b l e and evident. I n other words, the 
f i g u r e of Bacon, sudden and devoid of any predecessor as i t i s , 
r e l i e v e s Rousseau from the nightmare of h i s t o r y . That Rousseau 
sees Bacon i n t h i s l i g h t r e f l e c t s on the concern d e f i n i n g 
Rousseau's times with an awakening which could be s e l f -
c o n s c i o u s l y t r a n s p a r e n t . Contrary to the i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
Rousseau's a n t a g o n i s t i c s c e n a r i o , however, t h i s change of world 
leaves A r i s t o t l e and Bacon incommensurable. I n h i s d e p i c t i o n of 
Bacon's s u c c e s s , Rousseau cannot avoid l e a v i n g some h i n t a t the 
change to which the Baconian r e v o l u t i o n i s i t s e l f l i a b l e , f o r , 
i f the " t r e a s u r e " which i t d e l i v e r e d c o n s i s t s i n the " s e c r e t s " 
of Nature's r e i g n , then, the r e i g n comes to an end w i t h the 
r e v e l a t i o n of i t s s e c r e t s , but r e v e a l e d s e c r e t s are no longer 
t r e a s u r e d . With Bacon, the forerunner of B r i t i s h empiricism, and 
a f i g u r e whom enlightened Rousseau was bound to admire, t r e a s u r e s 
were no longer h e l d by nature. Bacon's emergence cou l d be 
a s s i m i l a t e d to a change i n perception, an aspect which S h e l l e y ' s 
a s s o c i a t i o n of Bacon with poets i n both A Philosophical View of 
Reform and A Defence of Poetry u n d e r l i n e s . (35) New ways of 
e n v i s i o n i n g the world are l i k e an e x t r a sense provided together 
with t h a t which i t makes p e r c e p t i b l e . I n b r i n g i n g about new 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s which turned the change which i t had e f f e c t e d i n t o 
an accepted world view, the Baconian r e v o l u t i o n became the 
d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n of the order i n which i t could be h e l d as 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y . Revolution d i s s o l v e s , and becomes i m p e r c e p t i b l e 
i n i t s very s u c c e s s . 
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The M u t a b i l i t y of D i s s e n t . 
T h i s changeableness i s a l s o p e r c e p t i b l e i n Rousseau's judgment 
on "the gre a t bards of o l d " (1. 274), whose legacy, conveyed by 
the verbs " q u e l l e d " and "tempers" may be understood as both 
a l l e v i a t i n g and i n t e n s i f y i n g "[T]he passions which they sung" 
and the "contagion" of " t h e i r l i v i n g melody": 
See the great bards of o l d who i n l y q u e l l e d 
"The p a s s i o n s which they sung, as by t h e i r s t r a i n 
May w e l l be known: t h e i r l i v i n g melody 
Tempers i t s own contagion to the v e i n 
"Of those who are i n f e c t e d with i t 
(11. 274-8) 
The ambivalence of these verbs r e f l e c t s the ambiguity p r e s e n t i n 
the understanding of the way i n which i n t e l l e c t u a l phenomena take 
on shape, and b r i n g about the c o n d i t i o n of t h e i r a c c e p t a b i l i t y 
to an audience or a community. While innovation may curb i t s e l f 
i n order to be accommodated, i t a l s o d e f i n e s the c o n s t r a i n t s with 
which i t has to contend. According to the double meaning of 
" q u e l l " (1. 274), the passions which are voiced and a l l e v i a t e d 
have been e x t i n g u i s h e d and crushed as d i s a b l i n g p a s s i o n s . The 
achievement of the poets of o l d c o n s i s t s i n strengthening t h e i r 
melody so t h a t i t may a l s o be a l l e v i a t i n g . For Rousseau, the 
passions of the poets of o l d were strong enough to be a l l a y e d , 
and to overcome the weakness which would make them unruly and 
withheld, t h a t i s , unsung. The achievement of the poets of o l d 
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i s to give passions the only form by which they can be known to 
e x i s t . 
The notion t h a t the triumphant world view i s i n f a c t a l s o the 
shape of which apparent opposition proved i t s e l f capable, j u s t 
as, while being a mistake, the Napoleonic venture was s t i l l 
s u c c e s s f u l i n arousing the f o r c e s t h a t toppled the t y r a n t , i s 
amenable to a notion of change and e v o l u t i o n as a c o n t i n u i t y 
whereby there i s no stopping what comes to be, s i n c e there i s no 
pre-determined plan nor f i n a l meaning to i t . "The great bards of 
ol d " embody the meeting between a s p i r i t and a world which d i d 
not p r e - e x i s t t h i s meeting. What comes i n t o shape means t h a t 
nothing can escape the shape of which i t i s capable. I t i s 
impossible to a t t r i b u t e the preceding poets a r o l e e i t h e r of 
moderation or i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n over a past which they have 
contributed to b u i l d . 
Rousseau's p o s i t i o n towards the e l d e r poets i s a case of modern 
contemplating c l a s s i c a l , and h i s a b i l i t y to contemplate t h i s 
i d e a l makes i t i r r e v o c a b l y i n a c c e s s i b l e to him. As a modern 
w r i t e r , Rousseau f e e l s t y p i c a l l y endowed with the knowledge of 
h i s decadence. Rousseau c o n t r a s t s h i s own p o s i t i o n with the l a c k 
of knowledge f o r which he blames the f i g u r e s of power, although 
he does so not i n terms of knowledge, but of " h i s h e a r t " : 
"For i n the b a t t l e L i f e and they d i d wage 
She remained conqueror - I was overcome 
By my own h e a r t alone, which n e i t h e r age 
"Nor t e a r s nor infamy nor now the tomb 
Could temper to i t s o b j e c t . " 
(11. 239-43) 
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This may imply that Rousseau cannot c l a i m to have ac q u i r e d the 
knowledge which the mighty c a p t i v e s d i d not, but to have s u f f e r e d 
from t h i s need f o r self-knowledge as an a d d i t i o n a l lack, which 
i s a l s o a t the root of h i s enduring d i s s e n t towards h i s t o r y and 
i t s f i g u r e s of power. Rousseau sees the multitude and the 
h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s of power a c t out, as i f n a i v e l y and u n - s e l f -
c o n s c i o u s l y , a lack of self-knowledge the awareness of which 
makes Rousseau p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t more a c u t e l y . (36) 
I n h i s judgment on the outcome of Napoleon as the epitome of the 
d i s a s t r o u s h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e of power, Rousseau suggests t h a t the 
deposal of Napoleon was as d i s a s t r o u s as the usurpation, and 
f a i l e d to r e v e r s e the course of the mutiny l e t loose i n t o the 
world. Napoleon's "mistake" was, then, to r e v e a l more of 
something as a mutiny, which d i d t r i g g e r the f o r c e s to quench i t , 
but made these f o r c e s themselves mutinous. Those who are i n the 
g r e a t e s t need of l i b e r a t i o n are a l s o l e a s t able to achieve i t . 
In t h i s r e s p e c t , The Triumph of Life echoes the l o g i c of 
S h e l l e y ' s view of the French Revolution i n the P r eface to The 
Revolt of Islam (1818): 
I f the Revolution had been i n every r e s p e c t 
prosperous, then misrule and s u p e r s t i t i o n would l o s e 
h a l f t h e i r claims to our abhorrence, as f e t t e r s which 
the c a p t i v e can unlock with the s l i g h t e s t motion of 
h i s f i n g e r s , and which do not eat with poisonous r u s t 
i n t o the s o u l . (37) 
T h i s i s the l o g i c whereby that which i s f e l t to be most wanting 
i s a l s o the l e a s t a t t a i n a b l e , as the want cannot b r i n g i t s own 
p r o v i s i o n . The dilemma i n the f i g u r e of Rousseau i s the c l o s e n e s s 
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to the d i s o r d e r to which h i s denunciation of i t brings him. 
Rousseau may be h e l d as having pointed out the la c k of the 
s u b j e c t ' s mastery over h i m s e l f , which men of a c t i o n and f i g u r e s 
of power l e t loose i n the world through apparently quenching i t . 
T h i s p a r a l l e l s Napoleon's mistake i n making mutiny apparent. I n 
p o i n t i n g out a t an unmanageable f o r c e w i t h i n the s u b j e c t , 
Rousseau was bound to be t a r g e t e d as a s e d i t i o u s s p i r i t . His 
denunciation of s u b j e c t i o n brought a h e a v i e r burden upon the man 
whom he saw i n need of emancipation, by simultaneously r e v e a l i n g 
the want of the means to achieve i t . Rousseau could then be seen 
as the epitome of the t r a n s m i t t e r of f o r c e s of want, (38) while 
f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t the forms of e x i s t e n c e which made these f o r c e s , 
of which he was the mouthpiece, more urgent to address. 
I n t h i s r e s p e c t , the poem b l u r s the d i s t i n c t i o n between Rousseau 
and the f i g u r e which he has come to represent. Accounts of 
Rousseau's legacy r a r e l y f a i l to b r i n g h i s p e r s o n a l i t y i n t o play, 
so t h a t he becomes a contentious f i g u r e who f u r n i s h e s the terms 
of the contention which he arouses. Rousseau's statement, " I / 
Have s u f f e r e d what I wrote" (1. 278-9), may be an a l l u s i o n to h i s 
au t o b i o g r a p h i c a l work The Confessions, which, as Blanchot's essay 
i n Le Livre a venir i n d i c a t e s , (39) may be held as the epitome 
of the dilemma a r i s i n g from modern l i t e r a r y p r a c t i c e . For 
Blanchot, the i n e v i t a b l e inadequacy of the responses to which 
Rousseau i s l i a b l e , l i e s i n the dilemma to which Rousseau exposed 
himself i n bidding f o r a kind of l i t e r a r y t r u t h to be taken on 
i t s own grounds, and i n the d i s c o v e r y t h a t l i t e r a t u r e was 
powerless i n s u b s t a n t i a t i n g t h i s t r u t h . 
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Rousseau i s always open to being misunderstood, given t h a t h i s 
work cannot be taken independently of a p r o j e c t which, i f i t 
could be r e a l i z e d , would preempt the work necessary to r e a l i z e 
i t . The t r e a c h e r y and delusion which Rousseau famously d e t e c t s 
everywhere a r e a l r e a d y the d e s p a i r to master the a g i t a t i o n 
derived from f a i l i n g to recognise genuineness. S h e l l e y uncovers 
the w i l l f o r t o t a l power i n Rousseau's myth of a u t o - a f f e c t i o n i n 
r e v e r i e . Rousseau's d i s t r u s t of w r i t i n g , as opposed to " s e l f -
a f f e c t i o n " and the immediacy of speech, may repeat the mastery 
of d i s r u p t i o n which the e s t a b l i s h e d order a l s o claims to s e c u r e . 
However, as suggested, Rousseau cannot help s c a t t e r i n g the f o r c e s 
f o r t o t a l power i n the gesture of gathering them. I n the 
multitude, Rousseau would face the d i s s o l u t i o n of d i s s e n t , and, 
p o s s i b l y , the d i s s o l u t i o n or d i s t o r t i o n to which d i s s e n t i s l ed 
once i t has "found [a] conductor," (40) and an image of the 
l e v e l l i n g i n t o which h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y d i s s e n t , i n i t s s u c c e s s 
(that i s , i n i t s f a i l u r e to gather i t s f o r c e s ) would be 
d i s t o r t e d . R e v e r i e muffles d i s s e n t , but i t i s a l s o the q u i e t n e s s 
of d i s s e n t . 
Rousseau's N a r r a t i v e . 
The n a r r a t i v e ' s tendency to unfold through a number of m i r r o r 
e f f e c t s which spin Rousseau's t a l e along, without r e a c h i n g a 
f i n a l s t a b i l i t y has been noted i n John A. Hodgson's a n a l y s i s of 
the s i n i s t e r e f f e c t of the Shape a l l l i g h t ' s potion upon Rousseau 
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as confirming p r e - e x i s t i n g a t t r i b u t e s i n the l a t t e r , and, more 
g e n e r a l l y , i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rousseau's t a l e as death's 
symbolic reenactment of l i f e . (41) A good example of t h i s i s 
Rousseau's supposed awakening. The u n c e r t a i n t y i n l o c a t i n g 
Rousseau's b i r t h or emergence i n t o consciousness (whether i n 1. 
311, or with " I arose" 1. 335, or with the mention of "A Shape 
a l l l i g h t " , 1. 351) r e s u l t s i n the sense t h a t t h i s i s an event 
which has e i t h e r been missed, because what i s de s c r i b e d appears 
to be the r e s u l t of i t , or expected i n a way the d e s c r i p t i o n does 
not supply, while g i v i n g a semblance of i t . As a r e s u l t , o b l i v i o n 
i s a s t a t e from which the n a r r a t o r of the t a l e i s never sure that 
he has emerged. T h i s i s symmetrical to the n a r r a t o r ' s e a r l i e r 
i n a b i l i t y to overtake and witness h i s coming into c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 
I t i s apparent t h a t Rousseau's n a r r a t i v e endows the events which 
i t r e l a t e s with an i n d e c i s i v e n e s s which the n a r r a t i v e produces 
i n the process of pinning i t down. T h i s follows from the f a c t 
that a n t e r i o r i t y i s a word t h a t can be used only a f t e r the event, 
and i s an e f f e c t of the imaginary r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the 
n a r r a t i v e . The n a r r a t i v e i s never at the point where i t purports 
to be, because i t has nothing by which to s i t u a t e i t s e l f : i t i s 
always "now" (1. 337), the passing mention of which g i v e s the 
n a r r a t i v e a semblance of c h r o n o l o g i c a l coherence, without an 
outside t i m e - s c a l e . While i t has been noted t h a t , i n Rousseau's 
t a l e , events occur unmotivated, (42) y e t , p r e c i s e l y through these 
mirror e f f e c t s , there i s no sense of t o t a l randomness, as the 
t a l e s p i n s i t s own pseudo- or quasi-order. 
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I f the sequence i n chronology and c a u s a l i t y i s d i s r u p t e d , i t 
becomes p o s s i b l e to suggest t h a t the disappearance of the Shape 
a l l l i g h t does not ensue from i t s d e t e r i o r a t i o n , which would be 
provoked by any mistake on the p a r t of Rousseau. (43) The 
a t t r i b u t i o n of agency, cause or e f f e c t i s made unc e r t a i n , i f i t 
i s agreed t h a t Rousseau's supposed i n a b i l i t y to s u s t a i n the 
v i s i o n i s t r a n s l a t e d by the f a c t t h a t i t i s , p r e c i s e l y , h i s 
gazing on the shape's dancing f e e t t h a t d i s i n t e g r a t e s the v i s i o n , 
or, a t l e a s t , enables him to witness i t s d i s i n t e g r a t i o n (11. 383-
5 ) . (44) The waning of the Shape corresponds to a v i o l e n c e which 
Rousseau's thoughts (1. 384), "mind" (1. 386), and " b r a i n " (1 
405) s u s t a i n and simultaneously w i t n e s s , however r a d i c a l the 
damage may be (1. 405). T h i s p a t t e r n echoes Rousseau's and the 
n a r r a t o r ' s s u f f e r i n g from t h e i r v i s i o n of the multitude. As i n 
the case of the Maniac i n Julian and Maddalo, t h i s i s s u f f e r i n g 
from the a b i l i t y to remain separate from s u f f e r i n g . Change such 
as the waning of the Shape a l l l i g h t a l r e a d y s i g n a l s the mind's 
change i n t o the a b i l i t y to witness i t . Change i s , then, every 
time a t r a n c e , or a lac k of d i s c o n t i n u i t y i n consciousness, such 
as the one the n a r r a t o r experiences a t the beginning of the poem. 
The same reasons which make the moment of change missed and 
overlooked a l s o make i t open-ended, so th a t Rousseau's v e r s i o n 
of events can be undone back to i t s beginning. What prevents the 
judgment on the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the Shape i s t h a t , according to 
Rousseau, i t s waning does not r e v i v e the thoughts i t had 
trampled, as a cou n t e r a c t i o n to t h e i r e x t i n c t i o n . As i n the case 
of h i s t o r y , change i s i r r e v e r s i b l e . The poem f o r e s t a l l s the 
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d e f i n i t i v e v e r s i o n of such d e t e r i o r a t i o n , s i n c e , i f Rousseau's 
response to the c h a l l e n g i n g appearance of the Shape i s imperfect, 
then h i s recounting of the event may i t s e l f be t a i n t e d , and a 
c o n t i n u a t i o n of h i s mistake. The main paradox i n Rousseau's 
n a r r a t i v e i s t h a t t h i s i s the recounting of an amnesiac episode, 
the recounting of which r e v i v e s i t s " v i s i t a t i o n , " (45) and 
r e i t e r a t e s i t s passage as one more opportunity to l e t i t go by. 
I f the Shape a l l l i g h t induces the f o r g e t f u l n e s s which f i n a l l y 
causes her disappearance, then, i t i s p o s s i b l e to t r a c e t h i s 
disappearing process back to the Shape's i n i t i a l appearance. The 
Shape's disappearance may not be deemed as a d e c l i n e from i t s 
a p p a r i t i o n , s i n c e her disappearance i n t o o b l i v i o n m i r r o r s her 
emergence i n some degree. The " c e a s e l e s s song" (1. 375) to which 
her f e e t move, and which appears to induce the d i s a s t r o u s 
trampling, r e c a l l s the e a r l i e r occurrence when 
a l l the p l a c e 
"Was f i l l e d with many sounds woven i n t o one 
O b l i v i o u s melody, confusing sense 
Amid the g l i d i n g waves and shadows dun; 
(11. 339-42) 
The scene has been a p t l y compared with a r c h e t y p a l Rousseauan 
scenes of a u t o - a f f e c t i o n from the Reveries, i n which the 
s u b j e c t ' s sense of s e l f - d i s t i n c t i o n merges with, and d i s s o l v e s 
i n t o o b j e c t s of perception. (46) The i n c r e a s i n g l y v i o l e n t 
trampling of thoughts by the Shape (11.382-8), however 
c o n t r a s t i n g with the hypnotic e f f e c t of flowing water i t may be, 
i s the r e t u r n to o b l i v i o n of thoughts which, i n t h e i r e a r l i e r 
n o n - d i s t i n c t i o n , made o b l i v i o n i m perceptible. As a r e s u l t , the 
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disappearance of the Shape means i t s continuing p e r s i s t e n c e f o r 
Rousseau (11. 424-5). The l a t e r transformation of the Shape 
makes i t s e a r l i e r appearance waver under the e f f e c t of a 
r e i t e r a t e d r e v i s i o n , so t h a t u l t e r i o r events are a l s o a w a i t i n g 
transformation. Blanchot has encapsulated the s h u t t l e movement 
between a n t e r i o r i t y and p o s t e r i o r i t y as fo l l o w s : "between being 
and not-being, something which never yet takes p l a c e happens 
nonetheless, as having long s i n c e a l r e a d y happened." 47). As w i l l 
be analysed, t h i s i s the backward progress of the waves to which 
thoughts, which make o b l i v i o n appear, are l i k e n e d l a t e r i n the 
poem (11. 406-10). 
According to de Man, i n the e a r l i e r scene, o b l i v i o n emanates from 
rhythm which a r t i c u l a t e s randomness. Yet, contra r y to de Man's 
suggestion, t h i s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a case of "the d i s t o r t i o n 
which allows one to make the random r e g u l a r by ' f o r g e t t i n g ' the 
d i f f e r e n c e s " . (48) I n t h i s episode, rhythm i s not p e r c e i v e d a t 
the expense of the d i f f e r e n c e s i n randomness, but, on the 
contrary, randomness generates i t s own rhythm by f i l l i n g up the 
i n t e r v a l between the p o t e n t i a l l y d i s r u p t i v e beats of r e g u l a r i t y . 
Randomness i s a rhythm of i t s own, which no longer awaits the 
second beat of r e g u l a r i t y . To t h i s extent, the absence of the 
l a t t e r , and the absence of termination, are e q u i v a l e n t t o the 
d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n of the Shape's dance, which may be seen as a 
r e t u r n to randomness which i s a rhythm or measure of i t s own, 
under the same s c a t t e r i n g and numbing e f f e c t . Rousseau's dilemma 
i s t h a t i n enjoying the naive o b l i t e r a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i o n i n 
r e v e r i e , he i s adequate to the same f l u c t u a t i o n with the s i g h t 
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of which the multitude presents him. The shape a l l l i g h t defuses 
the powers of the mind, and turns them i n t o a deeper r e s i l i e n c e , 
i n the same way as the r i v u l e t t u r n s a random rhythm i n t o a 
melody f o r those who hear without l i s t e n i n g (11.340-1). 
The Shape's task i s e r a s i n g to the extent t h a t i t reminds 
Rousseau t h a t he 'has' "thoughts" which are erased, these 
thoughts being mentioned only as they are s c a t t e r e d (11. 382-
390). The trampling of Rousseau's thoughts may not, then, be 
considered as a weakening of h i s mind i n the sense t h a t h i s mind 
was p r e v i o u s l y more potent. I t was only so potent as i t s 
s c a t t e r i n g i s able to r e v e a l . Thoughts make an e r a s i n g e f f e c t 
appear, an e f f e c t which determines the s u b j e c t ' s sense of s e l f , 
r a t h e r than the other way round, as the syntax i n d i c a t e s ("The 
thoughts of him", 1. 384, emphasis added). The Shape makes the 
events of the mind p e r c e p t i b l e i n t h e i r disappearance, and t h i s 
l o s s i s an a d d i t i o n , i n the same way as the multitude makes decay 
p e r s i s t . The Shape darkens thoughts so as to make them v i s i b l e 
l i k e s t a r s i n the n i g h t sky. 
Following the Shape's e r a s i n g e f f e c t , the next l i n e s may be 
considered as a t h i r d occurrence, or "wave", of o b l i v i o n , adding 
i t s e r a s u r e over the previous ones: 
And suddenly my b r a i n became as sand 
"Where the f i r s t wave had more than h a l f erased 
The t r a c k of deer on d e s e r t Labrador, 
W h i l s t the f i e r c e wolf from which they f l e d amazed 
"Leaves h i s stamp v i s i b l y upon the shore 
U n t i l the second b u r s t s 
(11. 405-11) 
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I n t h i s passage, S h e l l e y uses the f a m i l i a r motif of escape and 
p u r s u i t as a model f o r the workings of the mind. The metaphor of 
trampling and t r e a d i n g i s continued from the previous passage 
with the images of the t r a c k and the stamp. T h i s time, the 
e l u s i v e and u l t e r i o r nature of the mind i s conveyed through the 
f a c t t h a t the mind, symbolised by the p u r s u i t of deer by wolf, 
i s a l r e a d y engaged i n a t a s k t h a t could e l i m i n a t e a l l t r a c k i n 
a f a r more r a d i c a l way than the waves can, i f i t could be 
completed, i . e . , i f wolf could c a t c h up with deer. I n p a r t i a l l y 
e r a s i n g the deer's t r a c k , the waves reproduce t h i s process i n i t s 
incompletion and i t s perpetuation. The e r a s i n g process i s not, 
t h e r e f o r e , l i n k e d to an i n a b i l i t y to r e t a i n events on the mind's 
par t , but to the f a c t t h a t , by the time these are events f o r the 
mind, the mind has a l r e a d y missed i t s r e v e r i e - l i k e imperviousness 
to them. 
As suggested, the unwitnessed emergence of the mind's events may 
be considered as v i o l e n t as t h e i r e r a s u r e . De Man has compared 
t h i s v i o l e n c e to the combined v i o l e n c e whereby language both 
enforces i t s p o s i t i o n a l power and covers the f a c t t h a t i t cannot 
p o s i t meaning, (49) but presents i t s e l f as n a t u r a l l y given, hence 
i t s a r b i t r a r y and i n e x o r a b l e nature. (50) Language i n v o l v e s "the 
f o r g e t t i n g of the events t h i s language i n f a c t performed," j u s t 
as, i n order to maintain i t s e l f , thought "forgets what i t 
t h i n k s " , and must forget t h a t i t f o r g e t s i t , which i s , according 
to de Man, "the element i n thought t h a t destroys thought i n i t s 
attempt to forget i t s d u p l i c i t y " . (51) T h i s a p t l y d e s c r i b e s the 
extent to which, i n S h e l l e y ' s view, and as analysed i n Chapter 
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3, thought prevents i t s e l f from t h i n k i n g t o t a l l y , but remains 
d i s t i n c t , and withdrawn from what i t t h i n k s . S i m i l a r l y , the 
pretence whereby language appears n a t u r a l l y given d e r i v e s from 
the f a c t t h a t words cannot be mistaken f o r things (see Chapter 
2 ) . However, "what" thought t h i n k s i s i t s e l f a f u n c t i o n of 
thought, and i n c a l l i n g the a c t of thought v i o l e n t and the power 
of language s e n s e l e s s , de Man uses names which are a l r e a d y 
derived from the advent of language. The v i o l e n c e i s not i n i t i a l , 
(52) or, r a t h e r , what i s i n i t i a l i s not v i o l e n c e , which i s 
already the name t h a t language g i v e s i t . 
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CONCLUSION 
I t i s apparent from the f i n a l s e c t i o n s of Chapter F i v e t h a t 
Rousseau's n a r r a t i v e enacts the disturbance which Rousseau 
himself has made v i s i b l e . As suggested, t h i s i s a p a r a d o x i c a l 
n a r r a t i v e which i s never overtaken by the e r a s i n g process which 
i t recounts, so t h a t the n a r r a t i v e i t s e l f a c t s as erasu r e , even 
as i t r e t u r n s to the occurrence of e r a s u r e . I f , because of the 
i n c l u s i o n of the event t h a t can undermine i t , Rousseau's 
n a r r a t i v e can be h e l d as an e n t i r e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , then, even the 
erasure of h i s b r a i n i s p a r t of t h i s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and appears 
only as a f u n c t i o n of the n a r r a t i v e . I t i s p o s s i b l e to understand 
t h a t Rousseau i n The Triumph of Life becomes "Rousseau", the 
persona f o r whom the passage of the multitude, the 'Shape a l l 
l i g h t ' , and i t s e r a s u r e , are events w i t h i n the n a r r a t i v e ' s 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . (1) Rousseau has become the c r e a t u r e of the 
n a r r a t i v e of h i s l i f e . The "old root which grew /To str a n g e 
d i s t o r t i o n , " (11. 182-3) which a n t i c i p a t e s the n a r r a t o r ' s h a l f -
u t t e r e d questions, may then be the h i s t o r i c a l Rousseau, a 
h i s t o r i c a l l y t r a n s m i s s i b l e and mute o b j e c t , and, n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
the v e h i c l e f o r the persona who has taken on a n a r r a t i v e 
e x i s t e n c e , and i s able to bequeath "what [Rousseau] wrote" as a 
r e a l i t y to the n a r r a t o r . 
T h i s may be one way of understanding the f a c t t h a t Rousseau 
exposed himself to the f l u x (11. 460-8), i . e . , to the t a l e which 
the l i f e whose every moment i s i n s t a n t l y imaginary, becomes. 
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Conversely, when Rousseau j o i n s the multitude, he may be s a i d to 
merge with the world of h i s v i s i o n , t h a t i s , i n t o the depths from 
which he can speak again to the n a r r a t o r . That the n a r r a t o r has 
a v i s i o n which r e c a l l s Rousseau, means t h a t Rousseau may have 
never ceased speaking to the n a r r a t o r , included as he i s i n the 
v i s i o n which he made a v a i l a b l e to the n a r r a t o r . The i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of t h i s reach back to one of the main arguments of A Defence of 
Poetry. The n a r r a t o r ' s v i s i o n and h i s v i s i b l e world a r e the 
shapes of "that g r e a t poem, which a l l poets, l i k e the co-
operating thoughts of one great mind, have b u i l t up s i n c e the 
beginning of the world". (2) 
The Triumph of Life confirms S h e l l e y ' s main t h e s i s i n A Defence 
of Poetry t h a t "our human r e a l i t y i s p o e t i c a l , " (3) which may be 
considered as the most f o r c e f u l endorsement of poetry's 
accomplishment, s i n c e i t i s brought to the l e v e l of human r e a l i t y 
as a whole. But the poem a l s o confirms the aspect which, as 
Blanchot makes c l e a r , i s attendant to t h i s c e r t a i n t y , i . e . , t h a t , 
" i t i s the d i s c o u r s e by which i t i s l a i d bare." According t o t h i s 
p a r t of Blanchot's argument, the reasons which j u s t i f y the human 
e n t e r p r i s e , i n c l u d i n g i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n as a work of poetry, a l s o 
lay the l a t t e r open to the t h r e a t of a n n i h i l a t i o n , i n a movement 
which evokes a r e a l i t y which i s no longer humane. T h i s study has 
focused on the presence, i n three poems by S h e l l e y , of an 
awareness of t h i s p o e t i c a l movement, which i s sometimes a s o c i a t e d 
with the r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of the u n i t y from which man has been 
a l i e n a t e d , and sometimes with an i n e r t i a which i s p r i o r to the 
consciousness which can be taken of i t . T h i s t e n s i o n e n c a p s u l a t e s 
204 
the understanding of the work of l i t e r a t u r e as simultaneously 
making and unmaking i t s e l f , which i s c e n t r a l to Maurice 
Blanchot's notion of modern l i t e r a t u r e . 
The danger and the a t t r a c t i o n of t h i s p o e t i c a l movement have 
accounted f o r those i n s t a n c e s where, as i n Alastor, the poet i s , 
f o r S h e l l e y , a poet who has not spoken p o e t i c a l l y y e t , and where, 
by c o n t r a s t , as i n Julian and Maddalo, a p o e t i c a l work emerges 
from the speechlessness w i t h i n which i t i s confined. T h i s 
a b i l i t y , i n terms of Blanchot, of the p o e t i c a l work to put i t s e l f 
a t r i s k , and, simultaneously, to f i n d i t s s a l v a t i o n i n i t s near 
a n n i h i l a t i o n , sheds l i g h t on the extreme o s c i l l a t i o n s which 
c h a r a c t e r i z e S h e l l e y ' s works. The works which have been s e l e c t e d 
f o r t h i s study may be considered as the l e s s openly l y r i c a l i n 
the S h e l l e y a n corpus, as compared, for example, to Prometheus 
Unbound (1820). However, even The Triumph of Life t e s t i f i e s to 
the s t r e n g t h of S h e l l e y ' s engagement with the f u t u r e , even as he 
contemplates "the human r e a l i t y . " I n t h i s r e s p e c t , the l a c k of 
a f i n a l meaning, whereby any work of l i t e r a t u r e may be s a i d to 
be "merely a work," (4) i s a l s o the chance of h i s t o r y . 
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